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ABSTRACT 
Competing Populisms: Public Interest Litigation and Political Society in Post-Emergency India 
Anuj Bhuwania 
 
This dissertation studies the politics of ‘Public Interest Litigation’ (PIL) in contemporary India. 
PIL is a unique jurisdiction initiated by the Indian Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 
Emergency of 1975-1977. Why did the Court’s response to the crisis of the Emergency period 
have to take the form of PIL? I locate the history of PIL in India’s postcolonial predicament, 
arguing that a Constitutional framework that mandated a statist agenda of social transformation 
provided the conditions of possibility for PIL to emerge. The post-Emergency era was the 
heyday of a new form of everyday politics that Partha Chatterjee has called ‘political society’. I 
argue that PIL in its initial phase emerged as its judicial counterpart, and was even characterized 
as ‘judicial populism’. However, PIL in its 21st century avatar has emerged as a bulwark against 
the operations of political society, often used as a powerful weapon against the same subaltern 
classes whose interests were so loudly championed by the initial cases of PIL.  
In the last decade, for instance, PIL has enabled the Indian appellate courts to function as a slum 
demolition machine, and a most effective one at that – even more successful than the Emergency 
regime. A recurring sentiment in these recent PIL cases is a deep impatience with the populism 
that is believed to characterize political life in India, and with the illegalities fostered by it.  
However, I argue that the enormous powers of PIL stem from its own populist character, which 
allows the appellate courts great flexibility in being able to maneouvre themselves into positions 
  
of overweening authority. With little or no procedure to regulate it, it is increasingly difficult to 
locate PIL within the conventional rubric of adjudicatory practice. With radical departures from 
legal norms that further empower the Courts, I argue, PIL has emerged as the vanishing point of 
jurisprudence. As a weapon of civil society, PIL appears to be a mere legal tool and therefore a 
classic example of associational activity. But it is really a mirror image of the populist 
contemporary politics it assails, just without any of the protections that populist political 
mobilisation regularly requires in a liberal democracy like India. Just as the practices of illegality 
rampant among India’s white-collared denizens make its civil society uncontainable within any 
conventional notions of civic behaviour, its favourite weapon, PIL, too, has only a thin veneer of 
legality. The judicial populism of PIL allows for a radical instability that continually pushes the 
limits of what a court can do.  
This dissertation, after examining the why and the how of the rise of PIL, will focus on the most 
intensive laboratory of PIL in recent times – the city of Delhi. I foreground PIL’s role in the 
radical reconfiguration of the city in the 2000s, and go on to critique the limitations of the 
existing critical discourses on PIL: their obliviousness to its materiality and their insistence on 
purely ideological and consequentialist understanding of recent trends in PIL. Lastly, I address 
the conundrum of the enduring appeal of ‘debased informalism’ in contemporary India, 
particularly the self-conscious and opportunistic adoption and celebration of it by the most 
formal of judicial institutions. If the Weberian account of the emergence of modern law was 
anything to go by, legalism’s stock in India should have risen to its highest with the growth of 
capitalism in the post-liberalisation era. Instead ‘legalism’ has decisively acquired a negative 
connotation in India precisely in this same period. PIL is the most striking illustration of this 
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panels, particularly with Arun Thiruvengadam in Delhi, have contributed significantly to this 
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My parents, Om Prakash and Sumitra Bhuwania, even with their abiding faith in the power of 
education in a family milieu where very little of it existed, could never have anticipated that it 
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all. Finally, the real reason my academic interest in anthropology first got initiated was because 
of Trisha Gupta. She came to believe in this dissertation project even more than I did, in spite of 
being forced to live with it for so long. Her indefatigable support is really why this dissertation 
got written at all. Most tangibly it was her editing that untangled my knotty prose into some 
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shape, improving it considerably at ridiculously short notice. My gratitude to her is 
















In March 2013, even as I brought this dissertation to a close, two popular Hindi films were 
released in which ‘PIL’ made an appearance. In the somewhat ungrammatically titled Sahib, 
Biwi aur Gangster Returns, the mention of PIL comes when a state legislator – the eponymous 
‘Biwi’, whose official position has come to her by dint of being married to a small-time prince in 
the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh – decides to take some interest in what’s going on in her 
constituency. The first important piece of information her office assistant provides her with is 
that a PIL has been filed against land acquisition for a development project in her area. Her 
baffled response is, “Yeh PIL kya hota hai?” (“What is this PIL?”). She is clearly ill-informed. 
But that the film chooses to invoke PIL to show her complete political cluelessness, and that the 
astounding nature of this fact will be immediately apparent to the Hindi film watching audience, 
the lowest common denominator in India if ever there was one, gives us some clue perhaps to the 
omnipresence of PIL in contemporary Indian life. The second film, a satirical comedy called 
Jolly LLB, is much more directly concerned with the operation of the judiciary. It centres around 
a small-town lawyer who is trying to make it big in Delhi’s law courts and decides that filing a 
PIL might be the quickest way to get media attention. In a scene that made it into the film’s 
promotional trailer, a judge is shown angrily throwing away Jolly’s legal brief, saying, “What 
kind of PIL have you filed? You have spelt Prosecution as Prostitution, and appeal as apple!” 
Clearly, PIL is one kind of legal process everybody understands. As much as ‘appeal’ and 
‘prosecution’, it has entered the Indian demotic lexicon. 
So widespread is its reach that PIL has become a sort of metonym for the greatness of the Indian 





hagiographically) as PIL. There are more American law review articles on PIL than on any other 
area of Indian law. Indian judges routinely cite these approving articles to hail their own 
achievements. PIL has now successfully been transplanted to Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan as 
well1. PIL is celebrated by all and sundry as India’s unique contribution to contemporary 
jusriprudence. Lest it appear that I subscribe to this culturalist understanding linking PIL to its 
Indian-ness, I hope it will soon be apparent that my aim is precisely to question such a move. 
The remarkable thing, as we will see, is that such a self-consciously culturalist maneouvre was 
exactly what enabled and accompanied the rise of PIL. 
This dissertation will study the history and politics of Public Interest Litigation, or PIL as it is 
popularly known, a jurisdiction unique to the Indian higher judiciary that arose in the late 1970s 
in the aftermath of the political Emergency of 1975-77. It was hailed as the most dramatic 
democratizing move that the Indian judiciary had made in the post-independence period. 
According to legal scholar Usha Ramanathan, PIL led to an explosive “jurisprudence of 
constitutional relevance and the rejection of redundancy of peoples.”2 Ramanathan argues that it 
enabled the court to extend a unique invitation to journalists, activists, academics and anyone 
else who may be witness to constitutional neglect and lawlessness to participate in the judicial 
process. A PIL is pursued by filing a writ petition either in one of the various state High Courts 
or the Supreme Court. Its distinctive characteristics include: “a) liberalization of the rules of 
standing; b) procedural flexibility; c) a creative and activist interpretation of legal and 
fundamental rights; d) remedial flexibility and ongoing judicial participation and supervision.”3 
Legal scholar Lavanya Rajamani explains the effect of these changes: “The power of public 





proceedings. PILs in India have come to be characterised by a collaborative approach, procedural 
flexibility, judicially supervised interim orders and forward-looking relief. Judges in their activist 
avatar reach out to numerous parties and stake-holders, form fact-finding, monitoring or policy-
evolution committees, and arrive at constructive solutions to the problems flagged for their 
attention by public-spirited citizens. Judges have tremendous power, in particular in PILs, to 
design innovative solutions, direct policy changes, catalyse law-making, reprimand officials and 
enforce orders. And, they are not hesitant to exercise this power in what they perceive as the 
public interest. Where there is a perceived ‘vacuum in governance, the Court rushes to fill it’.”4 
 
It is important to keep in mind that this heroic persona of the Indian judiciary – made possible by 
PIL – is reserved only for the state High Courts and the Supreme Court. Indeed, thanks to PIL, 
the higher judiciary is often viewed as the panacea for the various endemic social and political 
problems that plague India. The lower judiciary, the system of civil and criminal courts at the 
district level, on the other hand, is perceived as purely pathological — inefficient, corrupt and 
overly embedded in the Indian social milieu. One of the remarkable ironies about studying 
India’s judiciary is the simultaneously-held diametrically opposite view of two wings of the 
same integrated system. This schizophrenia has been sustained for a long time and is only getting 
worse. One clue to the management of such an unsullied image by the higher judiciary, in the 
face of the impression of such extreme pathology below it, is the distancing tactic that the 
members of the higher judiciary have perfected: to intermittently express vivid despair at the 
condition of the lower courts. Legal sociologist Robert Moog quotes a Supreme Court judge 





criminal courts excel in slow motion.”5 The higher judiciary has successfully evaded any 
responsibility for the problems of the lower judiciary, although strictly speaking, they have direct 
vertical oversight over the latter.  
One effect of such despair is a constant “search for alternatives, which range from versions of the 
more traditional panchayats (village or caste), such state-run forums as lok adalats (people’s 
courts) or the widening array of tribunals…”6 Another result of this skewed judicial system is, as 
Moog demonstrates, “an increased flow of cases to High Courts and the Supreme Court in the 
form of appeals, revisions, reviews, or the use of the upper courts’ writ jurisdiction to avoid the 
district courts entirely.”7 Thanks particularly to the proliferation of writ petitions as convenient 
short cuts to the High Court, the judicial system has gradually become so top-heavy that by the 
early 1990s, Moog estimated that “the High Court has become the single most active trial court 
in the state of Kerala”. Article 226 of the Indian Constitution empowers the High Courts to issue 
writs for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights and for any other purpose, allowing its use 
against a breach of any legal right by the state. The Supreme Court has an analogous provision 
under Article 32 enabling writ petitions to be filed directly before it. Such relative ease of access 
to the higher judiciary, Moog has argued, has further undermined “the public’s perception of the 
quality of justice they receive from the subordinate courts. These very liberal appeals and writ 
policies encourage the impression that justice ultimately flows from the High Courts and/or the 
Supreme Court. They also feed the image that what the lower courts produce is a lower quality of 
justice, compounding the credibility problems these courts already have. These courts therefore 
become hurdles to get over, or avoid altogether (for example, through the writ jurisdiction), 





      *** 
Returning to live in Delhi in 2006 after nearly four years away, I found that PIL had become 
omnipresent in everyday discourses around the city. The urban fabric seemed torn asunder by 
PIL cases intervening in almost every part of the administration. The courts gave one the 
impression of governing the city through the instrument of PIL. Newspaper headlines routinely 
quoted statements by the Delhi High Court threatening to shut down the Municipal Corporation 
of Delhi (MCD): “Stop farmhouse weddings or we will shut MCD: HC”9 or “Catch monkeys or 
shut down, HC tells MCD”.10 Slums labeled “encroachments” were being demolished all over the 
city under court orders, the incidents reported with relish by new periodicals like Neighbourhood 
Flash and local sub-city supplements such as South Delhi Live that had begun to come bundled 
with major newspapers like the Hindustan Times. The city news became the site of both the 
demand and supply of the courts’ attention. Any political intervention against any of this – or 
even the intention of an intervention – would be declared ‘populist’. In those days, if one 
followed the city news at all, PIL was inescapable. The legal correspondent for a daily 
newspaper who reported from the Delhi High Court later described the period to me thus: “I 
would have seven bylines in the first six pages. The government used to function with contempt 
of court hanging over it.”11 
 
The city was being re-made through the means of PIL. Indeed Delhi had already transformed 
significantly because of PIL cases over the past decade, as we shall see in Chapter 2. Every 
aspect of Delhi’s transport, for example, had been re-configured because of PIL – autorickshaws, 





November 2006, I was witness to a well-connected lawyer specializing in heritage conservation 
cases threatening a local government official with the words “Main toh bas PIL thok doongi. (I 
will just slap a PIL [on you])”. Later, in December 2007, I heard an environmental scientist 
heading a new biodiversity park express the worry that the foreign species he had planted would 
be challenged by a PIL. (This actually did happen, a year later.)  
PIL procedure had enabled the Court to monitor and micro-manage every aspect of the city’s 
governance, making the whole city the direct object of its reformative attention. The all-
encompassing nature of the Court’s control over the city through PIL was slowly brought home 
to me as I begun to follow the leads thrown up by newspaper headlines. In 2006, for instance, I 
was struck by the headline “Supreme Court chides Delhi Govt. for Power Muddle”. The story 
turned out to involve a PIL about the lack of access to adequate electricity in the capital city that 
had been admitted in 1999 by the Supreme Court at the instance of a senior advocate. The case 
came to be legally titled ‘Power Crisis in National Capital Territory of Delhi vs Union of India.’ 
The senior advocate in question was made the amicus curiae, or friend of the court. The court 
went on to supervise the privatisation of electricity in Delhi from 1999 onwards. By 2003, when 
privatisation was complete, the PIL came to focus on transmission and distribution losses 
attributed to power theft. By 2006, this particular PIL’s remit had turned to inadequate power 
supply in Delhi, and the Court heard big power-generating companies talk of setting up 1000 
megawatt gas-based power plants. The Court’s ire in this case was particularly excited by power 
theft by ‘illegal’ settlements – unauthorised colonies, and especially slum clusters, better known 





whole, it was these communities that had emerged as the most visible symbols of illegality in its 
eyes. It was that conspicuousness that it wished to erase. 
      *** 
I will illustrate the qualitatively transformed nature of the relationship between the court and the 
city’s heterogenous publics in this period by discussing three revealing vignettes from three PIL 
proceedings I witnessed during my fieldwork. The first was in March 2007 during the hearing of 
a case in which a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court was supervising the formulation of the 
Municipal Corporation of Delhi’s draft scheme for grant of teh bazaari (vending rights) to street 
vendors in Delhi. The case was Sudhir Madan vs MCD. The MCD scheme had envisaged a 
process that would require first identifying sites in the city where hawking could be carried out, 
then inviting applications from interested eligible people and then granting such rights. During 
the day-long hearing, an alternative was suggested to the MCD scheme by one of the vendors’ 
organizations. They suggested instead that first a census be conducted of existing street vendors 
in the city and based on that ground level mapping, vending rights be formalised at the already 
existing sites. The judges were livid at such an idea. If such a suggestion was accepted, Justice 
BP Singh interjected, Delhi would have to be renamed “Hawker Nagar (lit. ‘hawker city’)”. 
There would soon be hawkers selling food in the Supreme Court building, he exclaimed.12  
The second vignette is from a hearing before a two-judge bench of the Delhi High Court in 2009, 
where a PIL against begging on the streets of Delhi was being heard. The presiding judge, Sanjay 
Kishan Kaul, was agitated about the proliferation of beggars in Delhi. He was particularly 
concerned that he had come across beggars even while being chauffeured around the India Gate 





day was not far when there would be beggars in the High Court building itself. The bench went 
on to introduce eighteen “zero tolerance zones” for beggars in Delhi, including all railway 
stations and bus terminals in the city. 
My final vignette is from a hearing in a PIL about traffic congestion in Delhi in 2006. As part of 
this PIL, the High Court had ordered the removal of a slum called Nangla Machi, inhabited by 
more than 3,000 families, that abutted an arterial road in Central Delhi and was allegedly causing 
traffic jams. When objections were raised by a lawyer for the slum-dwellers, Justice Vijender 
Jain pointed out that currently the slum concerned was less than two kilometers from the High 
Court. If action was not taken immediately, he said, the slum-dwellers would soon invade the 
court premises itself and squat there. 
A spectre was haunting the court. The spectre of the unruly masses of the city – street hawkers, 
beggars and slum dwellers – invading its pristine environs. These were precisely the unwashed 
masses that PIL had originally invited into the courtroom. But now PIL seemed to have adopted 
a path where it wanted to devour its own.  
Political commentators Nivedita Menon and Aditya Nigam called the fantasy of “Delhi-en-route-
to-Paris” being played out in the city around 2006 the result of a “judicial coup d'etat”: 
“propelled by a judiciary with no accountability and a media that is deeply implicated in this new 
game, there has emerged a technocratic elite which desires hypermodern cities cleansed of all the 
‘mess’ and ‘irrationality’ that comes with democracy and the people.”13 Clearly the higher 
judiciary with PIL as its principal weapon had taken over Delhi by 2006, effecting changes 





How did this jurisdiction of Public Interest Litigation, which arose with the Court speaking in the 
name of the people, become parasitical on the very same people? Delhi in the 2000s was going 
through dramatic transformations that seemed recognizably along the lines that neo-liberalism 
had effected in cities all over the world. What marks Delhi’s dislocations as distinct is their 
source and their basis — they are based not, as in the past, on administrative or municipal policy 
or executive directions, but on judicial directions in a series of PILs concerning the city. Delhi 
has emerged as the most relentless laboratory of the PIL jurisdiction. The question worth asking 
is how and why PIL emerged as the primary agent of neo-liberalism in Delhi. Or in other words, 
why did neoliberalism in Delhi take the PIL route? This is what I will explore in this dissertation.  
 
A clue to unravelling the new role played by the PIL Court can be found in the other 
commonalities shared by all three of the cases mentioned above. These were all PILs which dealt 
squarely with three major problems that Delhi was perceived as having an excess of – street 
vending, begging and traffic congestion. In each case, the city as a whole was the site for reform. 
Perhaps even more crucially, in all of these PILs, the petitioner was either irrelevant, had been 
excised, or had never even existed. All three were PIL cases owned and led by the court itself. A 
different form of adjudication – if one can call such PILs adjudication at all – was at work in all 
three of them.  
I will briefly examine each of these three cases to highlight the strange new powers with which 
PIL had empowered the Court. The street vendors’ case, Sudhir Madan vs MCD14, had been 





petitioner had been made irrelevant and an array of parties concerned with street vending 
involved. The begging case was slightly different. Court on Its Own Motion vs In Re Begging in 
Public did not have a petitioner in the first place. The Court initiated it as a suo motu case and 
appointed an amicus curiae to assist it. The third case, Hemraj vs Commissioner of Police, began 
with a plea to curtail goods traffic in a specific locality of Delhi called Chhattarpur. But after this 
specific issue had been resolved, Hemraj’s remit was expanded to deal with the problem of 
traffic congestion in the entire city. The petitioner was made redundant and an ‘amicus curiae 
committee’ appointed.  
A new kind of judicial process had emerged, entirely court-led and managed, sometimes even 
initiated and implemented by its own machinery. The Court appointed its own lawyers and 
instrumentalities. Such radical departures from basic norms of adjudication could be honed to 
perfection in PIL cases, as they were never envisaged to have any procedural limitations in the 
first place. There was almost no institutional control of these cases at all, except such self- 
control that the court wished to exercise.  
A new kind of PIL had emerged — what I call an ‘Omnibus PIL’. A PIL that had originally been 
filed to address a specific problem in a specific part of the city could now be turned into a matter 
that dealt with that particular problem all over the city. In such an Omnibus PIL, the petitioner 
with his specific concerns about a particular place would be removed, and an amicus appointed 






Through this new manoeuvre, PIL became a means to target those populations living on the 
margins of legality, who had hitherto been protected by their elected representatives. These 
illegalized citizens were ordinarily not even made parties to these omnibus PIL proceedings. 
These conspicuously illegal communities of the urban poor were seen as obstructing the neat 
solutions to the problems of the city. They would have to go as collateral damage. That they 
were there in the first place was because of the everyday political networks that Partha Chatterjee 
has called ‘political society’. These were the networks most drastically unraveled by this new 
kind of PIL.  
The Omnibus PIL-led judicial interventions in almost every area of urban governance were 
cumulative and interlinked, and are perhaps better understood as an aggregation rather than as 
isolated instances. The multiplicity of Court-appointed bodies, the lack of clarity about their 
terms of reference and procedures, the extent of their investigative or executive powers and the 
non-availability of their records or minutes together made the entire adjudicatory process of PIL 
impenetrable and almost impossible to challenge. I came across an example of such opacity on a 
blazing hot morning in May 2007 when I received a frantic call from a friend in Nizamuddin 
Basti, informing me about shops being demolished near the famous Sufi shrine of Hazrat 
Nizamuddin Aulia. On reaching there, I came across a municipal ‘demolition squad’ going about 
their ‘job’ with large hammers and pickaxes. (The lanes in this area are far too narrow for 
bulldozers.)  
My persistent questions to the Assistant Engineer in charge of this demolition, about the orders 
under which it was being carried out, fetched only a vague response from him about it being a 





“MC Mehta” cases pending in the Supreme Court, so this wasn’t particularly useful. I made at 
least twenty phone calls on my mobile phone, standing there next to the demolition squad, just 
calling all the phone numbers of the various Court-appointed Committees I knew of, to try and 
figure out which of them had ordered this particular action. But to no avail. After further 
requests, the best the leader of the demolition squad would do was to give me the phone number 
of the Deputy Commissioner of that particular municipal zone, for further following up. I 
mention this instance as an illustration of the incredible legal illegibility that characterizes the 
materiality of PIL procedure. At that point of time, there were so many PIL cases pending under 
which both the Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court were ordering demolitions that it was 
virtually impossible to keep track of them, and people living and working in the fringes of 
legality had come to expect the worst.  
The orders in these cases were often specific directions, which were unreported and difficult to 
access, as they were given in a bewildering array of interim applications in open-ended Omnibus 
PILs. Indeed, PIL cases did not often end up in any ‘judgments’ at all but in an endless spiral of 
‘orders,’ which are not reported in law journals. However, much of the scholarship on PIL has 
continued to concentrate on the completed judicial process, i.e. judgments and other reported 
decisions of the courts, and the discursive charge they have. Yet because of the way in which the 
PIL jurisdiction has developed, most of its concrete actions are based on interim orders. These 
are in the nature of what legal scholar Upendra Baxi has called “creeping jurisdiction”, where the 
court regularly hears reports about the status of compliance with its orders, and gives further 





required me to focus attention on such minutae rather than rely solely on judgments, as 
traditional legal scholarship tends to do. 
This dissertation tries to engage in a method that Kim Lane Scheppele has described as 
‘constitutional ethnography,’ defined as “the study of the central legal elements of polities using 
methods that are capable of recovering the lived detail of the politico-legal landscape.”16 The 
focus throughout is on “a set of repertoires that can be found in real cases and that provide 
insight into how constitutional regimes operate.”17 PIL emerges as a robust instance of 
Constitutionalism, seen “as a set of practices in which the transnational ambitions of legal 
globalization flow over and modify the lived experience of specific local sites, and as a set of 
practices in which local sites inescapably alter what can be seen as general meanings.”18 The 
higher judiciary has hardly ever been the locus of anthropological study, and this dissertation 
hopes to address this lack. While legal academia in India is obsessed exclusively with the higher 
judiciary, legal anthropology has solely focused on trial courts and panchayats. This perhaps is 
related to the fetishisation of the unmediated face-to-face interaction with the litigants in a 
dispute or trial that the ethnographer can represent, and a discomfort with the heavily mediated 
drama of an appellate court – where the litigant is marginal or even absent and the lawyers 
represent their cases through heavily textualised presentations. Of course, part of the reason PIL 
is anthropologically interesting is because it is very deliberately presented as providing 
substantive, popular justice, unmediated by legalese and with an emphasis on questions of fact 
rather than law (even if it is actually ill-equipped to adjudicate on disputed questions of fact, as 





To adapt David Scott’s memorable turn of phrase in Conscripts of Modernity19 to my purposes: 
PIL has been talked of as a romance – if anything, as a romance gone wrong. In this dissertation 





The Supreme Court and its public: the curious case of the disappearing public interest 
petitioner 
 
“It is by no means merely a matter of misguided theory that the French concept of le peuple has 
carried, from its beginning, the connotation of a multiheaded monster, a mass that moves as one 
body and acts as though possessed by one will; and if this notion has spread to the four corners 
of the earth, it is not because of any influence of abstract ideas but because of its obvious 
plausibility under conditions of abject poverty.” 
–Hannah Arendt20 
 
The Indian Supreme Court is widely considered the most powerful judicial institution in the 
world21. In the last 35 years it has acquired a central role in Indian public discourse.– This rise 
follows the reconfiguration of Indian political life in the aftermath of the Emergency of 1975-77. 
The principal means by which the Court has acquired its new importance is the phenomenon of 
‘Public Interest Litigation’ or more commonly ‘PIL’ – a term that is too easily translated into its 
American (and hence ‘global’) counterpart, but in fact has little in common with it.22 PIL is a 
unique feature of the Indian appellate judiciary. It is not simply pro bono lawyering, something 
that good lawyers do, like in the US. In India, PIL is a jurisdiction – that is, what some judges are 
empowered to do in a specific capacity provided or interpreted in the law. As a Canadian scholar 
wrote in 1989, “Unlike the case of public interest litigation in Canada or the United States, the 







The Indian form of PIL jurisdiction was born in the immediate aftermath of the Emergency, 
through the ingenuity of a Supreme Court commonly seen as trying to undo the legacy of its 
capitulation to the political rulers of that period. PIL, right from the start, was marked by a key 
rhetorical mode increasingly deployed by judges: arguments made in the name of ‘the people’ 
and an impatience with ‘technical formalities’. In other words, the Court redefined itself as the 
fount of substantive justice: portraying itself as the “last resort for the oppressed and 
bewildered”.24  
 
In this chapter, I will map the discursive context that PIL responded to and reconfigured with 
enormous popular appeal – particularly its roots in the political language of the India of the 
1970s. In fact, the emergence of PIL was famously hailed in the early-1980s by the leading 
Indian legal scholar Upendra Baxi as indicating that the court had “at long last” become the 
“Supreme Court for Indians”. I will explore here this ‘people’s court’25 aspect of the Indian 
Supreme Court. My effort, in particular, is to understand why  the Court needed to position itself 
as speaking for the public – and how it managed to do so. In Section I, I will deal with the ‘why’ 
and in Section II with the ‘how’ of the journey that the Supreme Court of India made in its post-
Emergency avatar to be able to ventriloquise ‘the people’. 
 
Section I 
The first question here is perhaps this: why did the Supreme Court emerge so powerfully in the 





remained largely unchanged since the Constitution first came into force in 1950. The answer to 
that conundrum lies partly in the text of the Constitution and partly in the specific political 
conjuncture of 1970s India. Sudipta Kaviraj26 has argued that “the political history of 
independent India can be divided into two distinct historical periods to date.” The first lasted till 
the late 1960s, and its political life could be “fit unproblematically into the liberal-individualist 
format of constitutional arrangements”. By the late 1970s, Kaviraj argues, there emerges a new 
“vernacular” to Indian politics, based on the languages of caste, region and religion27. A similar 
periodisation, I argue, can be made for the Indian Supreme Court. 
 
The Indian Constitution, in the words of its most famous scholar Granville Austin, is a seamless 
web of three mutually dependent and inextricably intertwined strands – first, a federal 
governance structure that has its roots to the colonial-era Act of 1935; second, principles of 
democracy and universal adult suffrage providing popular sovereignty and drawing from the 
Congress party and the freedom movement it led, and finally and most crucially for our 
purposes, ideas of social revolution which stemmed from the Objectives Resolution adopted 
during the December 1946 Assembly session28. The most radical departures signifying a move 
towards a postcolonial Constututional framework  were incorporated in part III and part IV of the 
Constitution, both parts being products of elaborate comparative constitutional scholarship by the 
framers. Part III lists ‘Fundamental Rights’: it is the standard list of negative rights borrowed 
from Euro-American history, with some interesting departures facilitating state intervention to 
ensure socio-religious equality.But part IV is what makes the Indian Constitution a teleological 





widespread poverty. Its key provisions prescribe the direction to which the state must aspire. The 
idea of having ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’, as these provisions are called, was 
borrowed from the Irish Constitution. The incorporation of such constitutionally prescribed 
futures implied that “the nation was now conceived as a project”, as Uday Singh Mehta has 
written. Unlike the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution was not primarily a 
procedural document, as American Constitutional scholar John Hart Ely has argued, but a 
substantive one. 29 Or, to place it in a comparative frame made famous by Hannah Arendt and 
applied to India by Mehta, the Indian Constitutional revolution follows the French example and 
not the American one. It sets out to deal with ‘the social question’, i.e. with the question of how 
issues of material destitution and inequality might be addressed. As Mehta writes, “for Arendt, 
the American Constitution served as an ideal in which political power was limited, public 
freedom secured, and national unity anchored in the structures of political institutions – and all 
this was possible only because social questions were kept at bay.”30 But it is not the American 
model that the Indian and most other post-colonial constitutions adopt. American 
constitutionalism “stemmed from a deep distrust of power… The first impulse of this 
constitutionalism was thus to limit political power, to be suspicious of it, and to constrain its 
reach.” Indian constitutionalism, on the other hand, constitutes power and “celebrates its ambit”. 
Channelling Arendt’s famous warning that “every attempt to solve the social question by 
political means leads to terror”31, Mehta suggests that in India too, with such a vision, “freedom 






The socially revolutionary agenda of the Indian Constitution, as already mentioned, is 
incorporated in the ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’. These principles, though non-
justiciable according to the Constitution, unlike the ‘Fundamental Rights’, were declared to be 
“fundamental in the governance of the country”.  As Austin summarized it, the Directive 
Principles contain “a mixture of social revolutionary – including classically socialist – and Hindu 
and Gandhian provisions.” Mehta explains Part IV’s teleological nature thus: “This 
constitutionally enshrined vision of the future is what has often been seen as implying an activist 
and capacious state, responsible for the eradication of poverty, undoing the stigmas of casteism, 
improving public health and education, building large industry, facilitating communication, 
fostering national unity, and, most broadly, creating conditions for the exercising of freedom.”33 
But this freedom itself needed to be postponed and seen “as a future prospect” that would come 
about as a result of the project of social revolution. The Indian Constitution would make the 
assertion of freedom conditional on achievements which could at best only be prospective. As 
Mehta argues, “the successful culmination to free oneself from imperial subjection led almost 
immediately to freedom itself becoming a subsidiary concern; that is, subsidiary to national 
unity, social uplift, and a concern with recognition.”34 
 
The tension between this implicit ideological devaluation of freedom, which had been enshrined 
in the Fundamental Rights chapter and thereby made justiciable, with the project of the new 
state, as incorporated in the Directive Principles, would soon become the principal juristic 
battleground of the post-independence period. The political discourse that emerged around it saw 





the Directive Principles. In particular, for our purposes, this conflict framed the fraught 
relationship between the judiciary and the Congress regimes in the immediate aftermath of the 
adoption of the Constitution, which would culminate in the Emergency of 1975. The most 
obvious reason for the conflict was that the Supreme Court had specifically been made the 
custodian of Fundamental Rights by the Constitution, while the Directive Principles were after 
all, legally speaking, merely the aims of the state without any force of law.  
 
The powers of the Supreme Court under the new Constitution are important to note here.  The 
Indian Supreme Court is not a constitutional court alone. It is a successor not only of the Federal 
Court set up under the 1935 late colonial constitutional statute, but also of the Privy Council 
located in London, which had, throughout the colonial period, the discretion to entertain and 
decide all Indian cases as the final court of appeal. Most importantly, the Supreme Court brought 
into being by the Indian Constutution in 1950 acquired a new original jurisdiction – to hear writ 
petitions to enforce fundamental rights against the state. Insofar as it decides disputes between 
the central government and the states and between states, it also functions as a federal court. And 
in so far as it has the power to grant “special leave to appeal” under Article 136, it can hear any 
appeal from any court in India.  
 
The granting of this last power led to an interesting debate in the Constitutent Assembly.35 One 
of the members of the assembly, Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava discussed the Court’s powers with 





Bhargava’s remarks on Article 136, which was then numbered 112, and Article 142, then 
numbered 118. 
“Sir, in regard to article 112, I want to make one or two observations. This article 112 is 
exceptionally wide. The words are “in any cause or matter” and I understand this is a departure 
from the established law of the land also… our Supreme Court shall be fully omnipotent as far as 
a human court could be and it shall have all kinds of cases… My humble submission is that 
article 112 is the remnant of the most accursed political right of the divine right of kings. At the 
same time the jurisdiction of the article is almost divine in its nature, because I understand that 
this Supreme Court will be able to deliver any judgment which does complete justice between 
States and between the persons before it. If you refer to article 118, you will find that it says ‘The 
Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is 
necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree 
passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as 
may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament.’36 So far so good: but my humble 
submission is that the Privy Council also, which as a matter of fact belonged to Great Britain and 
which was a sign of our judicial domination by the British, even that had very wide powers and 
proceeded to dispense justice according to the principles of natural justice. What is this natural 
justice? This natural justice in the words of the Privy Council is above law, and I should like to 
think that our Supreme Court, will also be above law, and I should like to think that our Supreme 
Court will also be above law in this matter, in this sense that it shall have full right to pass any 
order which it considers just; and in this light. I beg to submit before the House that this is a very 





have judicial swaraj certainly… Thus the Supreme Court will be in this sense above law. I want 
that this jurisdiction which has been enjoyed by the Privy Council may be enjoyed and enlarged 
by our Court and not restricted by any canon or any provision of law.”37 (Emphases mine) 
Another prominent Constituent Assembly member even called the Court a potential 
‘Frankenstein monster’.38 Its interesting to note here, in light of the future growth of PIL as a 
form of accessing the Supreme Court, that another member of the Assembly had suggested that 
“those citizens who are so poor as not to be able to move the Supreme Court, should be enabled 
under proper safeguards, of course at the cost of the State, to move the Supreme Court in regard 
to the exercise of any of these fundamental rights.”39 
 
The ‘divine’ powers of the Supreme Court would be dormant for the first three decades of its 
existence, but would emerge as key to its new political role in post-Emergency India. Before we 
move on to this political history, a brief introduction to the structure of the Indian judicial system 
is necessary. Robert Moog, an eminent sociologist of Indian law, provides this useful summary: 
“India’s judiciary is a three-tiered, integrated system. The Supreme Court which sits in New 
Delhi, is the only all-India forum… High Courts stand at the head of the judiciary in each state… 
These are the intermediate appellate courts in the system, but they also have writ jurisdiction… 
The third tier is the district-level courts…Despite India’s federal system of government, the court 
system is integrated in the sense that there is no bifurcation between state and federal judiciaries. 






I have provided a brief background to the constitutional provisions that underlie the powers of 
the higher Indian judiciary. These would come into play immediately after the Constitution came 
into force on 26th January 1950, with the legal battles on land reform -- the signature post-
independence program to bring about the social revolution. The first move came on 5th June 
1950, when the Bihar High court struck down as unconstitutional --as violative of the right to 
property -- a law taking over zamindars’ estates without payment of compensation. Nehru’s 
response to the judges’ refusal to buy his version of the Constitution was immediate and extreme. 
The first Constitutional amendment was pushed through Parliament that would, among other 
things, declare land reform statutes beyond the scope of judicial review41. The mood of the 
moment can be gauged from Nehru’s famous comment in Parliament while debating this 
Amendment: “Somehow we have found that this magnificent constitution that we have framed 
was later kidnapped and purloined by the Lawyers.”42 The First Amendment implied, in an 
apocryphal statement by a later Chief Justice, that the Indian Constitution became the only one 
that contained a provision providing for protection against itself.”43 The more the Supreme Court 
fought for a higher market value compensation for the landlords, the stronger Nehru’s response 
was: he kept amending the Constitution to reverse court decisions.44According to the eminent 
legal scholar Rajeev Dhavan, by the mid-1950s the Courts had “backed off – but gracefully, 
without wholly surrendering their power of judicial review.”45 What emerged from the episode 
was a détente with the Court and an embrace of what Dhavan calls “Nehru’s Planning 
Commission model of law and social change.”46 This was very much of a piece with the then-
dominant modernization theory and its approach of ‘law and development’ that privileged the 





vivendi47, the first of many, was Justice Gajendragadkar. Dhavan describes his approach as being 
“to assure the government that judges would strive for social justice by playing a supportive role 
in empowering the government to achieve its goals.”48 The court, in this period, repeatedly 
upheld the Parliament’s absolute right to amend the Constitution. 
 
This new compact suffered a spectacular implosion in 1967, when the Supreme Court gave a 
decision in IC Golaknath vs.State of Punjab that would bar any amendment of the Fundamental 
Rights chapter of the Constitution. The rationale for this decision had been explained by Justice 
Hidayatullah in an earlier minority decision from the Gajendragadkar era where he wrote: “The 
constitution gives so many assurances in part III [Fundamental Rights Chapter] that it would be 
difficult to think that they were the plaything of a special majority. To hold that would mean 
prima facie that the most solemn part of our constitution stands on the same footing as any other 
part.”49  This time round, in 1967,the Court was taking on an apparently much weaker Congress 
party, with Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister. But this was a miscalculation of Himalayan 
proportions. Mrs. Gandhi’s response was not just a surfeit of constitutional amendments to 
reverse the recent dictum of Golak Nath that had made fundamental rights unamendable, she also 
launched a ferocious political attack on the court itself.  
 
Thus began what Granville Austin would call “the great war, as distinct from earlier skirmishes, 
over parliamentary versus judicial supremacy.”50 For the next six years, there would be many 
moves and counter-moves by the two sides. The court would declare unconstitutional some of 





privy purses and indirect control of private newspapers. Her response was to launch a massive 
political campaign against the Supreme Court, casting it as anti-socialist and pro-property. She 
was re-elected with a huge majority in 1971, with enough political capital to radically amend the 
constitution, pack the court and declare the need for “a committed judiciary.” A series of 
amendments – 24th, 25th and 26th -- followed. The first undid Golak Nath and restored 
Parliament’s absolute power to amend the Constitution. The second replaced the term 
‘compensation’ in the Right to Property with ‘amount’, thus restricting the possibility of  judicial 
review of land reform. The third amendment was truly radical. It inserted a new article (31C) that 
placed beyond the scope of judicial review all laws claiming to implement two key classically 
socialist Directive Principles: 39(b) and 39(c), both relating to the distribution and concentration 
of wealth on the ground of violation of fundamental rights of equality, freedom and property. 
The architect of Mrs Gandhi’s strategy was an ex-Communist lawyer called Mohan 
Kumaramangalam. The Court’s defence of private property was attacked as elitist and instead the 
demand for a ‘committed judiciary’ was made. While debating Article 31C in Parliament, he 
attacked Supreme Court judges as coming from “the class of men of money and property… that 
undemocratic collection of very respectable gentlemen.”51 Mrs Gandhi was at the height of her 
political powers, and it would require something special from the Supreme Court to take her on. 
 
The culmination of the war was the final battle, the case of His Holiness Swami Kesavananda 
Bharati vs State of Kerala. This was to become the most influential Constitutional case in Indian 
history. The legal challenge was to the constitutionality of the far-reaching post-1971 





Constitution, or could it be subject to judicial review. This was the “inner conflict of 
constitutionalism”52-- political theatre at the highest level. It was heard by a bench of 13 judges, 
the largest in the history of the Indian Supreme Court, over seventy working days for four and a 
half hours daily between October 1972 and March 197353. The judgment that emerged on 24th 
April, 1973 was a puzzle, with eleven opinions running over more than 600 pages. A special 
statement was made by nine of the judges clarifying the view of the majority, with its famous 
dictum that Parliament could not alter the ‘basic structure’ or framework of the Constitution. 
And while Parliament could henceforth amend any part of the Constitution, the judiciary could 
declare the amendment unconstitutional if it violated the ‘basic structure’. This was the enduring 
modus vivendi achieved by the court: conceding a lot, but retaining its final say. It stands as 
binding precedent to this day, with the prospect of it being reviewed receding every year. 
 
To return to 1973: Mrs Gandhi’s response to the Kesavananda judgement was swift and 
devastating. The next day, when the new Chief Justice was to be appointed, she chose to violate, 
for the first time in India, the principle of seniority conventionally followed in the appointment to 
this constitutional office, superseding three of the senior-most judges who had been part of the 
majority in Kesavananda, and thus compelling all three to resign immediately. This was a frontal 
attack on the Supreme Court as an institution. The lowest point in executive-judicial relations in 
post-independence Indian history had been reached. What is important to note here is the defense 
that her then chief ideologue Kumaramangalam gave for this decision. He told the parliament 






By June 1975, when Emergency was declared, the negative political discourse about the court as 
a legal impediment to socialism was only strengthened further. The Emergency regime 
constituted a committee to review the Constitution, resulting in the 42nd Amendment. With 59 
different  clauses, this was to be the most thoroughgoing and radical Constitutional Amendment 
in Indian history. Its official aim, according to the ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons,’ was “to 
spell out expressly the high ideals of socialism, secularism and integrity of the nation…and 
give…[the Directive Principles] precedence over those Fundamental Rights that had frustrated 
the Principles’ implementation.”55  It declared India a ‘socialist’ and ‘secular’ Republic. Not only 
was Article 31C (that had been struck down by Kesavananda) re-introduced, but it was expanded 
to say that all laws declared to implement Directive Principles would be exempt from judicial 
review. The opposing voices included HM Seervai, who had only recently been the Central 
government’s lead counsel in Kesavananda. He wrote that “it was an unfounded assumption, 
based on the battles over the right to property, that the Directive Principles were to secure social 
justice and the Fundamental Rights were ‘mere selfish individual rights.’56 
 
Directive Principles had by now explicitly come to be deployed not as general constitutional 
goals but purely as a resource to empower the legislature and immunize it from judicial review.57 
This approach put the judges under pressure. As Dhavan puts it, “the 1971-76 
empowerment/immunisation” approach to Directive Principles placed the judges in an 
uncomfortable bind. Confronted by an appeal to lofty ideals, they found themselves “carried 
away to concede absolute powers to the government in the name of socialism and to abnegate 





masters, but the ground for this battle had been laid by the apotheosis of the Directive Principles. 
As Dhavan argues, the post-Emergency Supreme Court ended up doing this by declaring that the 
Constitution did not just have a basic structure, “but a distinct socioeconomic goal of 
ameliorating poverty and achieving an egalitarian distributive justice.”59 The Court declared its 
constitutional duty to fulfill the Directive Principles. 
 
Such was the context in which PIL was born. With the birth of PIL, says Dhavan, the court 
claimed a partnership with government. “It seemed to be arguing that these duties could not be 
deferred or left to the legislature. ..[The Directive Principles] had to be dealt with immediately. 
Of course, they had to be grounded in some guaranteed constitutional or statutory right. But an 
underlying sense of purpose was derived not from these entitlements, but from the goals of the 
Constitution.” Its important to note here that even the new rights discourse of the Supreme Court 
in the post-emergency period was more embedded and interested in Directive Principles than 
Fundamental Rights. Dhavan continues, “[The judges] declared a strong constitutional 
commitment to what they claim to be the primary purpose of the Constitution, enlarged the role 
of activist citizens, and became the mediator of both the values and processes by which this 
purpose can be achieved.” An analogy can be drawn here from Sudipta Kaviraj’s work on Mrs 
Gandhi’s politics, where he argues that even the fierce opposition to Mrs Gandhi, the response of 
Jai Prakash Narayan and the ‘Sampoorna Kranti’60 movement, was actually carried out in the 
language of populism adopted Mrs Gandhi. The Supreme Court, too, in search of a new 
legitimacy, responded by mimicking Mrs Gandhi’s populism. The battle henceforth was between 





Court eventually did become a ‘committed judiciary’ by the trajectory it adopted in the early 
1980s. There was however one vital difference from this early 1970s ideal— the Court itself 
became the self-proclaimed vanguard of the social revolution.  
 
One of the axiomatic statements about the rise of PIL in India has long been that it was an 
attempt by the post-Emergency Supreme Court to restore its image in the public eye after the 
crisis of legitimacy created by its ignominious role during the Emergency. While this statement 
has become a truism, the question remains: why and how did the Court have to respond to that 
crisis of legitimacy in the form of PIL? To understand why this might not be so obvious, let us 
first rehearse the Court’s infamous Emergency performance. The most widely known instance of 
its capitulation during this period was in the Habeas Corpus case61, where the Court upheld the 
validity of the draconian Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA). A five-judge bench of 
the Court decided by a 4:1 majority that habeas corpus rights had been entirely suspended by the 
Emergency and that even a mala fide detention order could not be challenged before the courts62. 
In the hall of infamy of Indian Supreme Court, these observations by Justice Beg in this case will 
always hold pride of place: “the care and concern… bestowed upon the welfare of detenues who 
are well housed, well-fed and well-treated is almost maternal.” The good judge even felt obliged 
to defend the internal Emergency, holding that it was justified “not only by the rapid 
improvements” in the seriously dislocated national economy and discipline, but also because 
“the grave dangers of tomorrow, apparent to those who have the eyes to see them, have been thus 





superseding Justice Khanna, the only judge with the courage of conviction to give a minority 
decision in this case. 
 
The Habeas Corpus case is generally considered the lowest point in the history of the Indian 
Supreme Court, and it is the damage done to its reputation by it that the post-Emergency court is 
often said to be trying to undo through PIL. But the question remains, why did the Court respond 
through PIL? There were other means available. Soon after Mrs Gandhi was re-elected in 1980, 
she re-introduced a preventive detention statute called National Security Act (NSA), to take the 
place of the now-repealed MISA. It was challenged before the Supreme Court immediately. 
Some of the judges who were part of the majority in the Habeas Corpus case (Justices Bhagwati 
and Chandrachud) also heard this case64, giving them a neat opportunity to exorcise the demons 
of the Emergency and depart from their judicial imprimatur on the clampdown on personal 
liberty. The Supreme Court did no such thing. It upheld NSA unanimously. The path not taken 
here is as interesting as the path taken -- that of PIL. Even where the Court did take on Mrs 
Gandhi, like in the Minerva Mills decision where it struck down Article 31C, the language of the 
Court -- Justice Bhagwati’s judgment -- mirrors Mrs Gandhi’s language in astonishing fashion: 
declaring Directive Principles as part of the “basic structure” of the Constitution65. One of the 
interesting corollaries is that, as Pratap Bhanu Mehta argues, “all the Supreme Court’s celebrated 
‘activist’ decisions… stemmed from a concern for equality rather than civil liberties. Indeed, 
civil liberties concerns have been palpably weak in Indian courts.”66 The concern has rarely been 






Dhavan, writing in 1987, called the emergent PIL turn optimistic in the face of a widespread 
state of lawlessness.67. But in a sense, the legal constituencies for PIL and for “state lawlessness” 
largely diverged. The latter was the concern of civil liberties lawyers who typically worked in 
lower courts, dealing with trial litigation in criminal cases, as opposed to the high-profile 
Supreme Court and High Court lawyers who wanted to influence policy at the highest level 
through PIL. It is quite rare that these two sub-species of lawyers overlap, and the divergence has 
only increased over the years. Very rarely will one find a civil liberties lawyer filing a PIL. And 
even if it happens, the homilies delivered in such a PIL hardly ever travels to the criminal justice 
system. In fact, in the sociology of Indian legal profession there is a clear distinction between 
trial lawyers and appellate lawyers. Trial lawyers do, of course, get involved in appeals in the 
higher courts, but they are rarely optimistic enough to engage in policy-making through 
litigation. PIL lawyers like to define themselves as such. And this trend of PIL is very much part 
of the story of law as panacea that emerged in the early 1980s, with the growing trend of social 
reform through law reform that has been so critically reflected on in the recent times68. 
 
It is useful here to return to Dhavan’s account of the rise of PIL. “[A] new public interest or 
social action law movement has developed,” he writes, “led, essentially, by middle class judges, 
academics, newspapermen and social activists who feel that law can be “turned around” to 
provide solutions for the poor.”69 Notice here the talk is of a solution to the problems of the poor, 
not of taking law off their backs so it gives them less trouble. This is what makes it ‘optimistic’, 
and part of the law reform trend of the post-Emergency period. This new optimism is also 





“rule of law” is “an unqualified good” in 18th century England. Here law is not a problem that 
has to be struggled with; it is a possible solution. The romance of the state as being able to 
reform the unruly social gets strengthened through PIL. Here the state is not the oppressor but 
the source of revolution. Shyam Divan argues that “until the 1970s, the role of the court was 
largely ‘negative’ -- to confine governmental action within constitutional bounds”.70 With PIL, 
as Dhavan says, the concern becomes distributive justice. “It [the Court] can no longer fall back 
on a conservative concern for protecting life, liberty, property and religious freedom. Rather, it 
needs to think about those social welfare, social justice and civil  and political rights which might 
give its vast millions a real chance both to withstand the pressures of India's unruly acquisitive 
capitalism and to fight for their individual and collective entitlements as full citizens and not just 




“If in the seventies lawyers and justices achieved a proper conception of judicial power as 
people’s power, in the eighties the SAL72 movement innovated a more direct, unmediated form 
of people-judiciary partnership.” 
–Upendra Baxi73 
 
In 1979, when PIL, as we know it now, had barely been born, legal scholar Upendra Baxi 
reflected on the Indian Supreme Court’s new language in a lecture. He said, “[T]here are more 





Elections [of 1977] than ever before in the Court’s history” .74 He is here referring to the period 
between 1977 and 1979 -- already “the people” appear more often in the Court’s language in 
these two years than they have in its prior 27 years of existence. The post-Emergency court, Baxi 
observed, was “seeking legitimacy from the people”, and “in that sense (loosely) there are 
elements of populism in what it is doing.”75  
 
Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, writing in 1981, discussed the 1970s battle of ‘Judicial Review 
versus Parliamentary Sovereignty’ as revolving around the question, “who spoke for the 
people?”: “Judges of state high courts and of the Supreme Court claimed to speak from the 
authority of the written constitution, which expressed the people’s will as well as the 
fundamental law of the land. Ruling Congress governments claimed to speak with the authority 
of constitutional majorities in parliament, based on electoral mandates that expressed the 
people’s will.” 76 
 
The ground for this transition to a “people’s court” was prepared in 1973, in the landmark 
Kesavananda judgment itself. Justices Hegde and Grover, speaking for the majority of the 
Supreme Court bench in this case, questioned the assumption that the Parliament speaks for the 
people as a whole, but they still did not claim any access to the people. The two judges said: 
“When a power to amend is given to the people its contents can be construed to be larger than 
when that power is given to a body constituted under that constitution. Two-thirds of the 
members of the two Houses of parliament need not represent even the majority of the people in 





thirds of the members of either House of Parliament... Therefore the contention on behalf of the 
Union and the States that two-thirds of members in the two Houses of Parliament are always 
authorized to speak on behalf of the entire people of this country is unacceptable.”77 
 
A spoke had been put in the wheel of parliamentary legitimacy and in particular, its monopoly on 
speaking for the “people.” Soon after the Emergency, this issue re-emerged in State of Rajasthan 
vs. Union of India. In 1977, the newly elected Janata Party government at the Centre dissolved 
all the Congress ruled states’ assemblies, invoking Emergency powers under Article 356. Called 
upon to decide on the constitutionality of such a dissolution, the Supreme Court enthusiastically 
supported it and interestingly based its decision on the sentiments of the people -- as expressed in 
the recent Parliamentary election results of 1977. J. Bhagwati was the most eloquent. Interpreting 
the electoral mandate, he surmised: “there is a wall of estrangement which divides the 
Government from the people and there is resentment and antipathy in the hearts of the people 
against the Government.” He argued that the consent of the people was the basis of democracy 
and “when that is withdrawn so entirely and unequivocally as to leave no room for doubt about 
the intensity of public feeling against the ruling party…” and “on account of total and massive 
defeat of the ruling party in the Lok Sabha elections, the Legislative Assembly of the State has 
ceased to reflect the will of the people and there is complete alienation between the Legislative 
Assembly and the people.” While the court had begun to claim rhetorical access to the people, it 
was still a claim mediated by its interpretation of the election results. And a pattern had been set, 
a decision disastrous for the institutional viability of Indian federalism was legitimized by the 






Soon after this we see the birth of Public Interest Litigation (PIL). The Supreme Court’s first 
programmatic statement  about this new phenomenon came in 1981. In the Judges’ Transfer case 
that year, the rule of locus standi (‘standing’ is the American legal term) was relaxed, opening up 
the doors of the Supreme Court to ‘public-spirited citizens’—both those wishing to espouse the 
cause of the poor and oppressed (who were referred to as having ‘representative standing’)78  and 
those wishing to enforce performance of public duties (who were said to have ‘citizen standing’). 
‘Representative standing’ in Indian PIL was characterized by an American legal scholar Clark 
Cunningham as similar to class actions except with a non-class member representing the class.79 
A petitioner under citizen standing on the other hand sues not as a representative of others but in 
his own right – as a member of the citizenry at large to whom a public duty is owed. 
 
 J. Bhagwati’s judgment in the Judges’ Transfer case was a kind of manifesto for PIL. Bhagwati 
took this opportunity to reflect on the question of ‘standing’ as  
“of immense importance in a country like India where access to justice being 
restricted by social and economic constraints, it is necessary to democratize judicial 
remedies, remove technical barriers against easy accessibility to Justice and promote 
public interest litigation so that the large masses of people belonging to the deprived 
and exploited sections of humanity may be able to realise and enjoy the socio-
economic rights granted to them and these rights may become meaningful for them 






J. Bhagwati makes a statement here that would be repeated ad nauseam in later years, “But it 
must not be forgotten that procedure is but a handmaiden of justice and the cause of justice can 
never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities…The Court would therefore 
unhesitatingly and without the slightest qualms of conscience cast aside the technical rules of 
procedure in the exercise of its dispensing power and treat the letter of the public minded 
individual as a writ petition and act upon it. Today a vast revolution is taking place in the judicial 
process; the theatre of the law is fast changing and the problems of the poor are coming to the 
forefront. The Court has to innovate new methods and devise new strategies for the purpose of 
providing access to justice to large masses of people who are denied their basic human rights and 
to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning.” 80 (all emphases mine) We see here a tirade 
against technicalities and a plea for adapting the inherited British legal system to ‘Indian 
realities’. The rhetoric of indigenisation is mobilised to make a case for legal informalism in the 
form of PIL. 
 
Sudipta Kaviraj has argued that “the evasion of institutional controls” during Mrs Gandhi’s rule 
was “accompanied by a rhetoric of radicalism – a particularly dangerous combination of a 
bourgeois leader invoking socialist principles to evade encumbrances of bourgeois 
constitutionalism.”81 J. Bhagwati would adapt Mrs Gandhi’s strategy to the judiciary – here was 
a judge invoking ‘the poor’ to evade constitutionalism, the judge himself facilitating a discourse 
by which legality was constructed as the enemy of justice. Kaviraj has talked about analogous 
dilemmas more generally, “The politics of community assertion in India has created a potential 





representing large communities with a strong sense of grievance have often regarded procedures 
of liberal government as unjustified obstacles in their pursuit of justice. Procedures are 
sometimes threatened by the politics of intense participation.”82 While the nationalist movement 
initially spoke in the participatory language, the first two decades of post-independence politics 
saw a clear attempt to suppress it and adopt the procedural path. 83 We can see strong parallels to 
this trajectory in the judiciary. The Court had made a clear choice with PIL – choosing 
participation over procedure. And the language it used to make that choice was that of 
indigenization.  
  
Later writers on PIL have emphasized this discourse of indigeniety and decolonization,  to 
establish PIL’s status as a “distinctly Indian” 84 legal phenomenon, arguing for instance that PIL 
“has cut the umbilical cord between the Indian legal system and its mentor systems in the ‘white’ 
common law world”85 and that it “entails reconceptualization of the role of judicial process in at 
least the Third World societies.”86 This culturalist manouvre to justify the need for PIL as a 
peculiarly Indian achievement would be part of its enduring appeal. 
 
 The need for a truly ‘Indian’ jurisprudence achieved through a gesture as grand as PIL had not 
always been felt. In 1968, the most well-known American commentator on Indian law, Marc 
Galanter, was struck by the fact that for Indian legal professionals, modern Indian law is 
“notwithstanding its foreign roots and origin… unmistakably Indian in its outlook and 
operation.”87 Mrs Gandhi’s assault on the Indian judiciary in the early 1970s tried to undo such a 





institutions, to delegitimize the higher judiciary. Soon after the Emergency was declared, Mrs 
Gandhi derided the Indian legal system saying, “we have adopted the Anglo-Saxon juridical 
system, which often equates liberty with property [inadequately providing] for the needs of the 
poor and the weak.”88   
 
In 1973 the Expert Committee on Legal Aid, chaired by the ex-Communist recent appointee to 
the Supreme Court, Justice Krishna Iyer, submitted a report commissioned by the Government 
that “viewed itself as a radical critique of Indian legal arrangements” and spoke glowingly of 
nyaya panchayats89 as part of a larger scheme of legal aid and access to the courts90. The follow-
up Emergency-era “Report on National Juridicare: Equal Justice - Social Justice” was headed by 
Justice PN Bhagwati. This report argued that “panchayats would remove many of the defects of 
the British system of administration of justice, since they would be manned by people with 
knowledge of local customs and habits…”91 Galanter would later reflect on how these visions of 
paternalistic indigenous justice, published during the 1975-1977 Emergency, provided the basis 
for future developments like PIL. As he recounted in a co-written 2004 essay, “in the Krishna 
Iyer and Bhagwati reports, the imagery of indigenous justice was combined with celebration of 
conciliation and local responsiveness under the leadership of an educated outsider.”92 
 
In an essay written a few years after the Emergency, Upendra Baxi described the role these two 
judges, later the chief architects of PIL, had played as “legitimators of the [Emergency] regime”: 
“During the 1975-76 emergency, legal aid to the people was one of the key points of the 





Bhagwati, themselves deeply committed to the spread of the legal aid movement, readily 
responded. They led a nationwide movement for the promotion of legal services. They 
organized legal aid camps in distant villages; they mobilized many a High Court justice 
to do padayatras (long marches) through villages to solve people's grievances. They, 
through “camps” and lokadalats (people's courts), sought to provide deprofessionalized 
justice. They also in their extracurial utterances, called for a total restructuring of the 
legal system, and in particular of the administration of justice. In a sense, their movement 
constituted a juridical counterpart of the 1971 Garibi Hatao (eliminate poverty) 
campaign, as well as of the Twenty-Point Programme.”93  
 
The 42nd Amendment to the Constitution introduced during the Emergency contained a new 
Directive Principle titled “equal justice and free legal aid”. It read: 
“The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal 
opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or 
in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by 
reason of economic or other disabilities.”  
 
Legal aid was to be the means by which the expense and the general lack of access to courts was 
to be mitigated – by making legal aid itself into a directive principle. While legal aid ordinarily 
ought to have provided access to legal services in courts at a cost borne by the state, what instead 
happened was that the institution itself was changed, and the legal process transformed, 





arena as replacements to regular courts. While legal aid was meant to make access to lawyers 
less expensive or free, the courts decided that instead they would change themselves and make 
themselves accessible, so people could directly come to them. Dhavan saw in this trend a desire 
“to design alternative structures, processes and normative understanding… to show a far greater 
proximity to notions of law and justice in civil society”. The principal way in which this was 
sought to be done was through institutional changes: at the lowest level, by creating ‘lok adalats’ 
or ‘people’s courts’; at the intermediate level, by creating tribunals with non-lawyers at the helm, 
and at the highest level, PIL. Legal technicality, the colonial nature of the Indian legal system 
and the complicatedness of procedure itself came to be seen as the principal problem. Law itself, 
or rather legal procedure – especially the standard adversarial nature of legal proceedings – was 
perceived as the enemy of access to justice. Thus, as Galanter and Krishnan have shown, the 
phenomenon of “debased informalism” began in law94. While legal aid itself was neglected and 
poorly funded, these other institutional innovations had a field day. It was not as if informal non-
state institutions were given power. What happened instead was that state institutions themselves 
were transformed and made to behave according to some inchoate ideas of what informal 
‘traditional’ institutions were like. The state’s legal institutions were now set to mimic their 
fantasy of what they imagined an informal institution would look like. It was as part of this move 
towards informalism in the 1970s and 80s that the Supreme Court started speaking in the name 
of the people.  
 
Anticipating and leading this trend, during the Emergency, both Justices Krishna Iyer and 





adjudication, including the system of stare decisis95.They advocated a return to swadeshi96 
jurisprudence including justice by popular tribunals.”97 Bhagwati spoke of the Indian judicial 
system as being ill-suited to “a country where the majority lived in villages and was ignorant of 
its legal right.”98 Here we see another symptom of what Kaviraj has diagnosed as the crisis of 
institutions in India during that period:  
 
“Legitimacy of institutional power was increasingly giving place to a legitimacy of 
individuals; and perhaps still more significant, the new rhetoric of socialism, 
indiscriminately used by nearly all political forces, signified something often fatally 
misunderstood. Socialist rhetoric often gave a respectable cover for the re-emergence of 
an essentially pre-capitalist alphabet of social action. It looked upon impersonal rules and 
application of rationalistic norms with derision, as forms of ‘bourgeois’ fastidiousness.”99 
 
Justice Bhagwati summed up his PIL agenda in clear populist terms in the Judges’ Transfer case: 
“It is necessary for every Judge to remember constantly and continually that our 
Constitution is not a non-aligned national charter. It is a document of social revolution 
which casts an obligation on every instrumentality including the judiciary, which is a 
separate but equal branch of the State, to transform the status quo ante into a new human 
order in which justice, social, economic and political will inform all institutions of 
national life and there will be equality of status and opportunity for all. The judiciary has 
therefore a socio-economic destination and a creative function. It has, to use the words of 





active role calculated to bring social justice within the reach of the common man. It 
cannot remain content to act merely as an umpire but it must be functionally involved in 
the goal of socio-economic justice.” 
He followed it up with a dig at “the British concept of justicing, which to quote Justice Krishna 
Iyer (Mainstream, November 22, 1980), is still hugged by the heirs of our colonial legal culture 
and shared by many on the Bench” and which believes that “the business of a Judge is to hold his 
tongue until the last possible moment and to try to be as wise as he is paid to look.”100 To undo 
such anachronisms, the Committee on Implementation of Legal Aid Schemes (CILAS) was 
established in 1980 by Indira Gandhi, just back in power, with Justice Bhagwati as Chair to 
effectuate his earlier Emergency-era report. On 8th and 9th May, 1981, a seminar was organized 
by CILAS under his leadership, with most of India’s legally active social groups participating. 
From the Bench and otherwise, the PIL court under Justice Bhagwati extended to journalists, 
activists, academics and anyone else who may have been witness to constitutional neglect and 
lawlessness an invitation to participate in this new kind of judicial process. Right from these 
early years, therefore, these occupational groups emerge as PIL’s principal constituency. The fact 
that the birth of PIL in this post-Emergency period coincided with the rise of  ‘new social 
movements’ and ‘investigative journalism’ in India is not coincidental. And PIL was identified so 
closely with Justice Bhagwati that most of the early PILs in 1980-82 arose out of letters written 
by individuals to him in his twin capacities as a judge of the Supreme Court and the Chairperson 






In this early phase of PIL, a controversy broke over Justice Bhagwati actively soliciting petitions, 
a fact which drew attention to the judge-led character of PIL. Arun Shourie, then editor of the 
Indian Express, gave an interview in 1983 where he observed, “A judge of the Supreme Court 
asked a lawyer to ask me to ask the reporter to go to these areas, get affidavits from some of the 
victims who are still alive and some of them who were dead, from their families. The affidavits 
were got compiled, sent and he entertained a writ. Eight months later someone came to me 
saying that the same judge had sent him… to ask me to ask the respondent to file such and such 
information in a letter through so and so… A third time a civil rights activist asked that the same 
thing be done. He said the judge had asked him… The point that the opponents of the case were 
making was that the litigants were choosing a judge. As it turns out, some judges were choosing 
their litigants.”102 From the beginning, the PIL petitioner was a crutch that judges could rely on 
to further their own agenda, but as we shall see, even this crutch soon became unnecessary. 
 
PIL was primarily a revolution in procedure, and its innovative features that emerged in its early 
years, as analysed by legal scholars, were as follows: 
a. The rules of locus standi have been relaxed. 
b. The formal requirements regarding the lodging of a petition have been simplified 
c. Evidence can be gathered by a commission appointed by the court.  
d. The procedure is claimed not to be of an adversarial nature.  
e. The court can order far-reaching remedial measures.  
f. The execution of the remedial orders is supervised and followed up.  





concern the start of the procedure, the next two have to do with its course, and the last two with 
its outcome.”103 
 
A famous PIL that showcased many of these innovations was the 1984 case of Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha v Union of India, filed by an organization dedicated to the ending of ‘bonded labour’. As 
analysed in a much cited article on PIL from the late 1980s, “When the petition was first 
received the Court appointed two lawyers to visit the quarries where the bonded labourers were 
said to be held. This was followed by a ‘socio-legal’ investigation of the area undertaken by an 
academic, funded principally by the State government in whose area the offending quarry was 
sited. The defendants objected to the admission of this evidence, arguing that it was based only 
on ex parte statements which had not been tested by cross-examination, nor were any such 
investigations within any of the relevant Supreme Court Rules.”104 Justice Bhagwati addressed 
this objection by first reverting to his standard trope of Indian difference. He argued that insisting 
on a rigid legal procedure “in a country like India beset by problems of ‘poverty, illiteracy, 
deprivation and exploitation’ would be to place fundamental rights beyond the reach of the 
common man”. In a far-reaching precedent, he declared that in such PILs “it was not necessary 
to be bound by the normal conception of an adversarial trial in which each party produced 
witnesses who were then cross-examined by the other side… The introduction of such evidence 
could not… be resisted by assertions that it was of no evidentiary value since it could not be 
subjected to direct cross-examination. To accept such a conclusion would be to introduce the 






Justice Bhagwati’s usual flourish can be usefully contrasted with another concurring judgment in 
the same case, which clarified that any such procedural flexibility would be limited by any 
contrary statutory provision as well as by ‘principles of natural justice’. But it was Justice 
Bhagwati’s judgment that carried the day, with massive implications, which we will witness in 
their full splendour in the next two chapters. One could here either be charitable and recall the 
old adage “hard cases make bad law”, or bemoan the path not taken, courtesy Kaviraj: 
“Constitutionalism, as a version of precommitment, is… related to an ability not to take courses 
of action which might offer immediate relief but are fraught with dangers of long-term 
calamity.”106 
 
In 1979, Upendra Baxi was the first to use the framework of ‘judicial populism’ to explain the 
then imminent rise of PIL, deploying Edward Shils’ definition: “populism proclaims that the will 
of the people as such is supreme over every standard, over the standards of traditional 
institutions, over the autonomy of institutions and over the will of other strata. Populism 
identifies the will of the people with justice and morality.” Interestingly, clear-eyed as Baxi was, 
he did not view this new trend as a problem, but saw it instead as strategically opportune. He 
wrote in the same book, “the politics of the Court represents the best hope for the millions of 
Indians for a new constitutional dawn.”107 He even went so far as to argue that “[t]he interests of 
the people require the Court to lead and the legislature to follow”108, citing as explanation “the 
nagging political realities of India”. 109 Many years later, in 1993, Baxi would write about PIL as 
the court’s response to the executive’s demand for a ‘committed judiciary’: “Throughout the 





the Constitution and the promise of progress and justice within it. Now, led by the Supreme 
Court of India, judges and courts have shown their “commitment”; the executive did not have 
this kind of “commitment” in view at the same time, it cannot repudiate it publicly.” 110 
 
In a recent interview in 2011,111 Justice Bhagwati proudly discusses his sole authorship of PIL 
and the circumstances that led him to invent it. He talks of visiting the poor states of Bihar, 
Orissa and UP as a judge, of seeing the stark naked poverty there and of being moved because 
his justice had not been reaching them. It was this realisation that made him create PIL. In what 
is still the most widely-cited article on PIL, written soon after its birth, Upendra Baxi famously 
celebrated PIL by arguing that it took “suffering seriously,” as a result of which “the Court is 
being identified by justices as well as people as the ‘last resort for the oppressed and the 
bewildered.’” This mobilization of suffering by the Supreme Court through PIL is evocative of 
what Hannah Arendt called, in the context of revolutionary France, ‘eloquent pity’, as 
counterposed to ‘mute compassion’.112 While the latter “has no notion of the general and no 
capacity for generalization,” the former ends up depersonalizing the sufferers, lumping them 
together into an aggregate… the suffering masses, et cetera.” Talking of Robespierre, Arendt 
says even if he “had been motivated by the passion of compassion, his compassion would have 
become pity when he brought it out into the open where he could no longer direct it towards 
specific suffering and focus it on particular persons. What had perhaps been genuine passions 
turned into the boundlessness of an emotion that seemed to respond only too well to the 
boundless suffering of the multitude in their sheer overwhelming numbers... Measured against 





law, the application of the same rules to those who sleep in palaces and those who sleep under 
the bridges of Paris, was like a mockery.”113 
 
In Uday Mehta’s gloss on the uses of such pity in Indian constitutionalism, following Arendt, he 
argues: 
“Since pity maintains a distance from its object, it can conceive of the object as 
embodying an abstraction, or representing a type, such as the poverty-stricken or the 
disadvantaged castes or the people of India. And because it is not limited by the 
injunction to share in the plight of those it perceives, it can imagine a redress to their 
condition that corresponds to the generality of its perspective.”114 
The Indian Supreme Court soon put the political legitimacy it had accumulated through PIL to 
dramatic use. After the gas leak disaster in Bhopal in 1984, a complex litigation ensued. By 
1987, while the civil suit was still extant in a district court in Bhopal, an appeal was pending in 
the Indian Supreme Court to decide whether the interim compensation of 2.5 billion rupees was 
legally appropriate. This interim relief was meant to address the urgent needs of the victims 
before the final compensation amount could be decided by the district court. But instead of 
adjudicating this limited issue, the Indian Supreme Court in January 1988 presided over a 
secretly-achieved final settlement between the Indian government, as the sole representative of 
all the gas victims, and the defendant multinational company Union Carbide, allowing the 
company to get away with the relatively minuscule amount of 470 million dollars.115 Castigated 
widely for this apparently unethical act, the Court went on to give a series of post-facto 





how the Supreme Court would persistently mobilize ‘suffering’ to perform an ‘ornamental 
function’116 and justify itself. Thanks to years of PIL, the Court was very much at home in the 
language of ‘suffering’ and could deploy it masterfully – if cynically. The court legally justified 
the expropriation of the grievance of the victims – declaring them ‘judicially incompetent’– by 
the government which had emerged as the ‘surrogate victim’117 The mobilisation of “‘suffering’ 
and ‘agony’” of the victims “allowed the judiciary to create a verbal discourse which legitimized 
the position of the government as guardian of the people and the judiciary as protector of the rule 
of law.”118 Das lays out the justifications given by the Court for its strangely hasty settlement: 
“The first imperative to arrive at the meagre settlement was the ‘suffering’ of the victims. The 
second imperative to do this with complete secrecy, and to present the victims with a fait 
accompli, was the irresponsibility and inability of the victims to understand the issues that 
affected their lives.”119 Das concludes, “In the judicial discourse, …every reference to victims 
and their suffering only served to reify ‘suffering’ while dissolving the real victims in order that 
they could be reconstituted into nothing more than verbal objects.”120 In classic post-PIL 
language, the Court went on to justify itself, “Legal and procedural technicalities should yield to 
the paramount considerations of justice and humanity.”121 
 
After having been around for more than a decade, the nature of PIL had apparently begun to 
change. Clark D. Cunningham, one of the earliest American commentators on PIL, noted this 
change in 2003. In early PIL cases, “in each case, behind the public spirited petitioner the court 
could see the faces of particular people in urgent need of justice. However, in more recent years 





policy in which the petitioner stands for the entire citizenry of India rather than individual 
victims of injustice.”122 The fortunes of the public spirited petitioner, too, started to change. The 
first sign of things to come was in 1988.  Sheela Barse, a journalist, had filed a case regarding the 
rights of children in prison. Later, Barse wanted to withdraw the PIL, saying that the court had 
become ‘dysfunctional’ and that she was frustrated with the slow progress of the case due to 
repeated adjournments.  
 
J. Venkatachaliah called this withdrawal application “a walk-out of the court.”  He dismissed her 
application for withdrawal after dwelling on her arguments at length: “(Her) ground is that the 
proceedings are brought as a “voluntary action” and that applicant is entitled to sustain her right 
to be the “petitioner-in-person” in a public interest litigation and that the proceedings cannot be 
proceeded with after de-linking her from the proceedings. This again proceeds on certain 
fallacies as to the rights of a person who brings a public interest litigation. Any reconnection of 
any such vested right in the persons who initiate such proceedings is to introduce a new and 
potentially harmful element in the judicial administration of this form of public law remedy. That 
apart, what is implicit in the assertion of the applicant is the appropriation to herself of the right 
and wisdom to determine the course the proceedings are to or should take and its pattern. This 
cannot be recognised... The petition cannot be permitted to be abandoned at this stage. Only a 
private litigant can abandon his claims.” The Court removed her as petitioner and appointed the 
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee as petitioner. The Sheela Barse case marked the beginning 
of the process that has since become a characteristic feature of PIL: the Court claiming 






From the mid-1990s, this process went one step further. The Court now began to wilfully 
displace the petitioner and appoint a senior advocate as amicus curiae to assist it. This happened 
most famously in the Vineet Narain case (relating to political corruption as indicated in the Jain 
Hawala Diaries). As Chief Justice Verma observed in this case: 
 
“Even though the matter was brought to the court by certain individuals claiming to represent 
public interest, yet as the case progressed, in keeping with the requirement of public interest, the 
procedure devised was to appoint the petitioners’ counsel as the amicus curiae and to make such 
orders from time to time as were consistent with public interest. Intervention in the proceedings 
by everyone else was shut out but permission was granted to all, who so desired, to render such 
assistance as they could, and to provide the relevant material available with them to the amicus 
curiae for being placed before the court for its consideration.” 
 
The appointment of the Amicus Curiae is recorded in one of the interim orders passed in this 
case: 
“Anil Diwan has been requested by us to appear as Amicus Curiae in this matter... It is open to 
anyone who so desires, to assist Shri Anil Diwan and to make available to him whatever material 
he chooses to rely on in public interest to enable Shri Diwan to effectively and properly 
discharge functions as Amicus Curiae. Except for this mode of assistance to the learned Amicus 
Curiae, we do not permit any person either to be impleaded as party or to appear as an 





the focus on the crux of the matter getting diffused in the present case by the appearance of many 
persons acting independently in the garb of public interest.” 
 
This dispensation of the petitioner in the PIL cases has become routine since then. Public spirited 
petitioners now often appear as an impediment to justice rather than its allies. The court appears 
to manage just fine without them. A leading commentator on PIL, S.Muralidhar, (now a judge of 
the Delhi High Court), is one of the few voices critical of this trend. He argues that it defeats the 
very purpose of the PIL jurisdiction and renders petitioners redundant as mere informants. He 
writes, “The petitioners are then entirely at the mercy of the amicus curiae who as the delegatee 
of the court’s screening power can decide who can or cannot petition the court and what can and 
cannot be said by them.” 123 In effect, these public-spirited petitioners are deprived of their right 
to espouse the public cause because of this procedural innovation. The PIL petitioner, who might 
often have greater knowledge and understanding of the issue than the amicus curiae, is thus 
silenced without even taking his or her consent.  
 
Once petitioners were made dispensable, the remit of PILs could be enlarged and extended in 
unanticipated directions according to the whims of the Court. At the time of the birth of PIL, the 
Court had needed a public spirited petitioner to stand in for the public. But over a period of time, 
even this became unnecessary, and the Court could fold ‘the public’ into itself. This was the 
reductio ad absurdum of legal procedure, presaged by Justice Hidayatullah in 1984 when he 
predicted that PIL would result in the “annihilation of all procedure”.124 Whether this new post-





procedural norms to control it, and even the minimal crutch of a petitioner now deemed 
unnecessary, what was unveiled was a new beast, of a kind perhaps unknown in modern legal 
history. The PIL judges could now give free rein to their ideological predilections; their 
awesome power had no limits except their own sense of judgment. 
 
While the new form of PIL had been made possible by Vineet Narain, its full implications took 
some time to manifest themselves. I will dwell on the evolving power of the Court in this new 
kind of PIL in the next two chapters. But let me provide here three revealing examples of the 
unique problems that this kind of PIL would give rise to.  
 
The first of these is the so-called Forest case125, one of the most influential and egregious 
instances of this new kind of PIL, in which forest governance for all of India has been taken over 
by the Supreme Court126 and the Amicus Curiae Harish Salve has been requested by the court to 
screen all applications for intervention. It has further been directed that only he and the counsel 
for the central and state governments would be heard in the matter. Any person with any 
grievance has to first approach the Amicus Curiae and the special body appointed by the Court 
called the Central Empowered Committee (CEC), which can then place it before the Court, at its 
discretion. The far-reaching effects of such a judicial policy can be gauged from a controversy 
that arose in 2009. This was regarding the non-recusal of Justice Kapadia in the case before the 
Forest Bench relating to permission given to Vedanta Alumina Ltd to mine bauxite in the 
Niyamgiri Hills of Odisha, the traditional home of the Dongria Kondh tribe. Justice Kapadia 





1999 Resolution passed in the Chief Justices Conference, which required that if a judge holds 
shares in a company involved in litigation before him, he should disclose it. But if no objections 
were raised by the lawyers for either party, it would be presumed that the parties have no 
problem.  
 
But in this new kind of PIL, as we know, the only parties which are heard are the state and the 
amicus curiae. So, as advocate Prashant Bhushan explains, “the only lawyers represented in the 
case were those of Vedanta Alumina Ltd (the project proponent), Odisha Mining Corporation 
(the mining lease holder), the Odisha government (the promoter of the project), the Centre’s 
Environment Ministry (which granted the approval to the refinery), and the junior Amicus 
Curiae, Uday Lalit (since the senior amicus, Mr Harish Salve, had a retainership from Vedanta). 
The only lawyer who could have objected to Justice Kapadia’s hearing the matter was Sanjay 
Parikh who was representing the tribals in a connected writ petition. He was, however, prevented 
from speaking by Justice Pasayat on the bench, on three occasions when he tried to get up to 
speak. He was told in no uncertain terms that the amicus could take care of the interests of the 
tribals and that he would not be separately heard.”127 Thus we see the removal of afflicted voices 
from PIL proceedings. The assumption was these voices could be subsumed and represented by 
the Court and the state, thanks to this new kind of PIL.128 
 
Another example of the difficulties that arise because of this trend of the Supreme Court 
appointing an Amicus Curiae and making the petitioner irrelevant, is provided by the case 





during the Gujarat pogrom of 2002. The statutory National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) 
and the Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) led by Teesta Setalvad are the petitioners in this 
case. In this case, too, the court has chosen to appoint Harish Salve as amicus curiae, and has 
paid little attention since to the petitioners. In the court hearings of this case that I attended, the 
bench would only hear the amicus and the Counsel for the Gujarat Government. To provide a 
sense of the power that the amicus had vis-à-vis the petitioner, let me quote Setalvad’s statement 
to the newsmagazine Tehelka in 2011, “Nearly six years after our criminal writ petition praying 
for the transfer of investigation in nine major riot cases to the CBI was filed, that on 26 March 
2008 that the Supreme Court appointed a SIT. Though it was headed by a retired CBI director, it 
comprised of Gujarat police officials. When the matter of who would constitute the team came 
up, the CJP on behalf of the victim survivors pleaded that only those officers from Gujarat who 
enjoyed reputations of neutrality and impeccable integrity should be included. But to our shock 
the amicus accepted the names of officers given by the state of Gujarat without even consulting 
us. We placed our objections to this unfair procedure and suggested alternate names but nothing 
happened.”129  
 
The petitioners were keen that an independent investigation be conducted by the Central Bureau 
of Investigation (CBI) but Salve did not think it would be a good idea and managed to scuttle it. 
The Court finally appointed a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to independently conduct the 
investigation in the five heinous cases of riot violence. However when the SIT’s report was given 
to the Court, it chose to keep it confidential and give copies to the amicus and Gujarat 





submitted in the Supreme Court, The Times of India reported that “the SIT led by the former CBI 
Director R. K. Raghavan told the Supreme Court that the celebrated rights activist cooked up 
macabre tales of wanton killings.” It was later revealed that the Times of India article was based 
on its interpretation of the SIT Report, which the Gujarat government had selectively leaked to 
the Times of India correspondent, while the actual petitioners in the case were not privy to the 
information. The resultant widespread media reportage made it appear as if the report had 
indicted these NGOs rather than the Gujarat government. But because of the systemically 
skewed nature of this PIL case, where the amicus and the state were the only parties that the 
court shared documents with, this highly mischievous misinformation campaign of the Gujarat 
government could not be adequately contested. Eminent columnist and political scientist Pratap 
Bhanu Mehta wrote a widely circulated blog post based on the Times group’s newspaper 
coverage concluding that: “the SIT’s findings against Teesta Setalvad are a salutary reminder, 
that the rule of law and the cause of truth should not be allowed to be subordinated to any 
ideology: communal or secular.”130 He later disavowed this opinion piece, but considerable 
damage had already been done.131 
 
The final logical culmination of this new kind of PIL is that the Court entirely does away with 
the requirement of a petition with the widespread use of suo moto powers, or as it is called in 
India, ‘Court on its own motion.’ Thus a 1994 newspaper article called ‘And Quiet Flows the 
Maily Yamuna’ on the polluted nature of Yamuna in the Hindustan Times newspaper led the 
court to convert it, on its own motion, into a writ petition to clean up the river Yamuna. The case 





particular case is still pending after 19 years, and the court is currently supervising a 30 billion 
rupee project involving the institution of “Interceptor Drain sewers” with the assistance of the 
amicus curiae Ranjit Kumar.  
 
But even more amazing things have happened in this case. While this writ petition was pending, 
the amicus curiae filed I.A. No. 27132 in 2002, referring to the national address of Dr. APJ Abdul 
Kalam, then President of India, on the eve of Independence Day. This related to creating a 
network between various rivers in the country, with a view to dealing with the paradoxical 
situation of floods in one part of the country and droughts in other parts. In other words, it related 
to the inter-linking of rivers and taking of other water management measures. On 16th 
September, 2002, the Court, while considering the said I.A., directed that the application be 
treated as an independent writ petition and issued notice to the various state governments as well 
as the Attorney General for India and passed the following order: “Based on the speech of the 
President on the Independence Day Eve relating to the need of networking of the rivers because 
of the paradoxical phenomenon of flood in one part of the country while some other parts face 
drought at the same time, the present application is filed. It will be more appropriate to treat to 
treat it as independent Public Interest Litigation with the cause title "IN Re: Networking of 
Rivers-- v.---" . Amended cause title be filed within a week.” Thus, I.A. No. 27 in AQFMY 
[Writ Petition (Civil) No. 725 of 1994] was converted into In Re: Networking of Rivers [Writ 
Petition (Civil) No. 512 of 2002]. In the course of one suo moto case, the court had taken up 
another. The first involved the cleaning up of one of India’s bigger rivers; the second, 






All these three instances illustrate the dangers inherent in PIL’s dangerous departures from the 
basic norms of adjudication. The next chapter will examine the experimental interventions made 






The rise of the environmental PIL: the Supreme Court and the ‘cleaning up’ of Delhi 
 
“The new role of the Supreme Court is that of a policymaker, lawmaker, public educator and 
super administrator all rolled in one. In the US, they have the Congress, the Federal Environment 
Protection Agency and bags of money to protect the natural environment. Here, we have our 
Supreme Court.”  
–Shyam Divan133  
 
“In Delhi, in 2000, so much of the government’s activity in so many matters boiled down to 
securing compliance of court orders in PIL that one might have been excused for thinking of it as 
the court’s bailiff.” 
–Gita  Dewan Verma134 
 
In 1985 a spate of ‘environmental’ PILs were filed by a lawyer named MC Mehta in the 
Supreme Court of India. These PILs were fated to collectively change the trajectory of  public 
interest litigation in India and they signalled a new era of PIL, shifting the focus away from its 
till then dominant concerns of poverty and judicial reform to the subject of environment. Three 
of these environmental cases are still going on after 28 years and have played a massive role in 
blazing the trail for the boundless potentialities of PIL in India, particularly in Delhi. These cases 





particularly fertile as case studies for the history of PIL. While they were first admitted by 
Justice Bhagwati in 1985, these cases scaled new heights in the early 1990s with Justice Kuldip 
Singh at the helm and his growing reputation as a ‘green judge’. One of these MC Mehta cases 
was about pollution in the river Ganga, India’s most important river. The court closed down 
hundreds of tanneries in the industrial city of Kanpur. The three populous riparian states of West 
Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh were all given regular orders to take steps regarding pollution in 
the Ganga. The style of functioning of the Court at this time can be discerned from the following 
description provided in 1995 by Shyam Divan, then a young environmental lawyer: “A public 
interest litigation to clean up the Ganga has caught the judge’s fancy. Each Friday a huge shoal 
of advocates, administrators, company executives, and public officials attentively follow the 
court proceedings as a range of snappy judicial directions are issued… The Ganga court 
functions a bit like a village panchayat dispensing justice in the shade of a banyan tree. The 
rigour of formal court procedures and statutory requirements are diluted in favour of a summary, 
result-oriented process.”135  
The two other big environmental cases filed by MC Mehta that continue till today have reshaped 
Delhi in the name of environment. One of them is about vehicular pollution and the other about 
industrial pollution. The vehicular pollution case, which started with a series of orders in the 
mid-1990s, led to a complete overhaul of public and private transport in the city. Its initial orders 
included the phasing out of leaded gasoline, the introduction of pre-mixed fuels for two-stroke 
engine vehicles and the removal of 15-year-old commercial vehicles. But soon to come in this 
case was the most famous of its decisions— to order all commercial public transport vehicles to 





fuel. The decisions were actually taken at the behest of a fact-finding body called the 
Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority, abbreviated as EPCA and commonly 
referred to as the Bhure Lal Committee after its chairman, who was then a member of the Central 
Vigilance Commission. The EPCA was appointed as a statutory body on January 28, 1998 under 
the orders of the Court. This five-member committee also originally composed of a 
representative from the Central Pollution Control Board, the Automobile Manufacturers 
Association of India, the Centre for Science and Environment (an environmental NGO) and the 
Transport Department of Delhi.136  Because the committee was designed to express the interests 
and expertise of the major affected parties, the Supreme Court has since 1998 consistently 
looked to the committee as its fact-finding commission and has relied almost exclusively on its 
findings when making its decisions in the Delhi Pollution Case.137 Of course the court did not 
always follow EPCA recommendations- the most prominent example of such an instance being 
the fate of diesel-fueled private vehicles. As a 2004 article on this case notes, “The Environment 
Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority (EPCA) recommended that private diesel cars 
should not be registered and that the Supreme Court should freeze sales of diesel cars. Lawyers 
for the automobile industry strenuously opposed this. Instead of following the EPCA 
recommendation, the Court ordered only that all private cars must conform to engine standards 
by new, tighter deadlines.”138 Another glaring instance of the court’s skewed sense of priorities 
in this case was when it did follow EPCA recommendations and made a direction (on the same 
day as the CNG order) to augment the number of public transport buses in Delhi to 10,000 by 1st 





its other orders were causing havoc) and even twelve years later, Delhi has less than 10,000 
public buses in its fleet. 
The petitioner MC Mehta was active in the Delhi vehicular pollution case till 1995. Thereafter 
the court relied on Harish Salve, a senior lawyer who was appointed as the amicus curiae—
literally ‘friend of the court’, a court-designated position that provides legal representation in 
Supreme Court cases to individuals and groups who do not otherwise have counsel. “In this case, 
the amicus curiae was a combination of special master and advisor to the justices.”140 He 
collected and sorted out factual material and distilled from the numerous affidavits and other 
representations submitted to the Court a précis of their perspectives. At several critical junctures, 
Salve did factual research to debunk what he described as “extravagant claims” and otherwise 
played a central role in moving the case forward.141 For a case of city-wide scope, a relatively 
small number of stakeholders actually played much of a role in the deliberations.  
On 28th July, 1998, the Supreme Court issued its famous order that all public transport in Delhi 
would be converted to run on CNG by 1st April, 2001142. The CNG order included buses, taxis 
and auto-rickshaws, some 100,000 vehicles in all.143 This was immensely controversial because 
the science behind it was severely contested, with two committees giving diametrically opposite 
reports regarding the advisability of adopting diesel or CNG144. Even if the problem of pollution 
in Delhi was widely acknowledged to be severe, many alternative solutions to this dismal 
situation had been suggested. Another controversial aspect of the court’s solution was that 
private vehicles were relatively unaffected, while public transport was made to bear the brunt – 
directly affecting the livelihoods of people employed in public transport. The effect of this forced 





number of public buses available. The drivers of autorickshaws (officially known as TSRs: 
‘Three-wheeled scooter rickshaws) were particularly badly hit. The change-over from petrol to 
CNG engines required a relatively large monetary investment which most autorickshaw drivers 
were not in position to make, and bank loans were hardly available to them. They ended up 
taking usurious loans from private financiers. Besides, CNG was not actually available in 
sufficient quantity for many years, even after it had been imposed as the only fuel for 
autorickshaws. This led to extreme hardship, as  autorickshaw drivers would normally have to 
queue for 3-4 hours to refuel their vehicles, which affected their workdays very adversely. 
Serpentine queues of dozens of autorickshaws outside gas stations were a normal sight in Delhi 
between 2000 and 2003.  
The autorickshaw drivers’ situation was exacerbated by an earlier order of the Supreme Court in 
the same case in 1997, which stated that: 
“It would be in the interest of the environment, to freeze the number of TSRs for the present at 
the level at which they are actually in use in the city. We, therefore, direct that there would be no 
grant of fresh permits in respect of the TSR, save and except by way of replacement of an 
existing working TSR with a new one.”145  
The result of this court-ordered permit freeze was catastrophic for auto-rickshaw drivers. In 
2010, the EPCA found that, according to the Transport Department of the Government of Delhi, 
the number of registered three-wheelers in the city was 55,236, while 72,429 of them had existed 
in 1997.146 There was thus a substantial decline in absolute numbers of autorickshaws in Delhi 





over 1,000 new private vehicles every day. In the period from 1997 to 2011, while private 
vehicles increased manifold, the Supreme Court’s freeze on TSRs resulted in an artificial scarcity 
of permits.  
The decline in the number of  auto-rickshaws in Delhi’s streets  was due to the combined effect 
of the Supreme Court’s TSR freeze order of 1997 and its enforcement of CNG conversion soon 
after. In 2002, the Court did allow a minuscule 5,000 new permits to be issued, but otherwise the 
number of TSRs remained stagnant till 2011, when the court finally allowed 45,000 new permits 
after the TSR unions approached it in August 2009 and prayed for relief from the freeze “in view 
of the increase in population and increase in the number of vehicles during the past several 
years.” The court asked the EPCA to examine the matter afresh and requested it “to give a report 
as regards the needfulness for fresh permissions for three wheelers.”147  
As was argued in a 2010 report on auto-rickshaws in Delhi: 
“The permit cap created a gap between the supply of autos and the growing demand 
from Delhi's increasing population. A black market for auto-permits soon emerged 
and the price of an auto-permit rose dramatically. Just a year later owner-drivers 
were ordered to replace their autos or convert them to CNG by fitting expensive 
conversion kits. Unable to afford the Rs. 25-30,000 CNG kits, thousands of owner 
drivers had no option but to sell their autos and permits to financiers at bargain 
prices, further focusing power in the hands of the consolidating finance “mafia”.”148 
The black market price of an autorickshaw with licence increased to 6.5 lakh rupees by 2011, 





lakhs.149 In November 2011 when the Supreme Court finally allowed 45,000 new autorickshaw 
licences to be granted,  the market price went down to as low as 2.5 lakh rupees150. The creation 
of this black market in TSRs was purely a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, as can be 
gauged from the results of revoking it. Already, the order about change in fuel had made many 
autorickshaw owners take loans from private financiers, and when they were unable to pay these 
back, they had to transfer their permits to these financiers. Studies have shown that before the 
Supreme Court’s double whammy, most autorickshaws were owned by drivers themselves, while 
the effect of the fuel change and the permit freeze was that almost the entire fleet of 
autorickshaws came under the control of financiers, and drivers were converted into wage 
labour.151 Even the EPCA recognized in 2010 that “the bulk of the vehicles on road are owned by 
a limited number of people who rent these to drivers on a charge of around Rs 250-300 for an 8-
hour shift.” By the time the EPCA recommended the removal of the cap on auto-rickshaws, 
recognizing their importance as public transport and finally understanding the impact of the 
court-ordered freeze, great harm had been done to all concerned. As its 2010 report noted: 
“EPCA has noted that the current crisis of pollution in the city and its adjoining areas 
is largely because of the exponential growth of private vehicles. The only option for 
the city in the future is to provide a viable and reliable public transport system, which 
will restrain the use of private vehicles on the roads. The three-wheeler plays an 
important role in providing an intermediate public transport facility. It remains 
cheaper to operate as compared to any four-wheeled vehicle and removal of the cap 
and the high transaction costs associated with it will bring down the cost of capital 





cap will also help in eliminating the dominating hold of “financier’s mafia” who are 
exploiting not only the drivers but also general public by pushing up artificially the 
capital cost of 3-wheelers and hence the operational cost.” 
 
Both these decisions— the permit freeze and the CNG changeover— in the Delhi Pollution case 
were taken without even giving the city’s autorickshaw drivers and their representatives a chance 
to argue their side of the story. I was witness in August 2009 to the proceedings of this case. An 
application had been filed in the Supreme Court for its permission to increase the number of 
permits for auto-rickshaws that had been fixed in 2002. The lawyer for the autorickshaw union 
had just begun his oral submission pleading for notice to be issued in this case because seven 
years had passed since the freeze, and the rationale for the original order of 1997— that auto-
rickshaws were polluting vehicles— was now irrelevant since the CNG fuel now used was eco-
friendly. If notice had been issued, the application would in any case have been examined by 
EPCA, and based on their recommendation, the Court would have considered granting 
permission. But the amicus curiae Harish Salve weighed in, opposing the application itself. His 
contention was that the presence of autorickshaws on Delhi roads led to traffic congestion, 
because of which motor vehicles generally had to spend more time in stationary mode with 
engines on, leading to further pollution, therefore even CNG-fuelled autorickshaws would cause 
pollution. Presumably, in Salve’s reasoning the introduction of thousands of motor vehicles  in 
the city on a daily basis would cause no such problem. No authorities were cited by Salve and 





In this case which transformed Delhi’s roads, the Supreme Court displayed a stark preference for 
imposing disproportionate environmental costs on public transport while allowing private 
transport to thrive, even though the latter was the cause of most of the vehicular pollution in 
Delhi. The case induced a marked increase in private transport, which expanded so exponentially 
since the Court’s actions of the late 1990s that the reduction in carbon emissions of public 
transport vehicle was over a period more than compensated for by the rise of private vehicles, 
particularly diesel vehicles.  
An ideological interpretation of this case can therefore rightly be made, as it significantly 
worsened the livelihood of thousands of poor informal sector transport workers in the name of 
environmental problems and the need for clean fuel, while stimulating the demand and supply of 
private automobiles, just when this sector was opening up in a post-liberalisation Indian 
economy. While such an interpretation would not be incorrect, I would instead ask a different 
question: why was the court the instrument of such a major policy change? And how was this 
forced transition carried out? 
The Supreme Court acted supposedly on purely environmental grounds, marshalling the spectre 
of vehicular pollution without adequately considering the impact it would have on vulnerable 
sections of the population who live a hand-to-mouth existence, and without making any effort to 
cushion them from the harsh economic effects of such a transition. There was a callousness at 
work in which a blinkered and absolutist idea of environmentalism — Amita Baviskar called it 
‘bourgeois environmentalism’— was imposed, where the poor are bizarrely and conveniently 





ecologically benign system. But here it was not just an ideological lens, this effect was actually 
enacted at the behest of the Supreme Court in public interest.  
Indeed, soon after this forced change of fuel, there was an appreciable drop in vehicular pollution 
in Delhi. The effects seemed to last for about a decade, after which the problem resurfaced, as 
the number of private vehicles had increased so much in the meantime that their combined 
emissions neutralized the reduced pollution caused by public transport. But the interesting thing 
about this is not the ideological aspect as much as the ability of the Supreme Court to ride 
roughshod over the interests of tens of thousands of people employed in ‘non-corporate 
capital’152, with the unspoken assumption that they could be made redundant or ignored. This 
kind of blinkered obliviousness is simply not conceivable by any democratic regime in India. 
The only time the Indian state could carry out such a draconian measure was perhaps during the 
Emergency regime. And therein you have the unique power of the Court, which as many critics 
have argued153, does a very careful negotiation when it comes to high politics, but as we have 
seen here, can take an intransigent stand when it comes to vulnerable groups. It is not irrelevant 
that many of these decisions were made during the period of 1998-2004, when Jagmohan, the 
principal architect of the Emergency cleaning up of Delhi as the then Vice-Chairman of the 
Delhi Development Authority, held office in the NDA government at the Centre. He was first 
Minister of Urban Development between 1999-2001 and then, shunted out of that ministry 
because of his absolute refusal to countenance the powers of what Partha Chatterjee has called 
‘political society.’154  He then became Union Minister for Tourism, where he still managed to 
exert enough power, in complicity with the courts, to make hundreds of thousands of people 






The other PIL [Writ Petition (Civil) Number 4677] filed by MC Mehta in 1985 that changed the 
face of Delhi was the case regarding industrial pollution in Delhi, which led to the relocation of 
industries from the city, based on city-zoning laws. The Master Plan of Delhi got so much 
attention as a result of this case that it became a paperback bestseller by the mid-2000s. The case 
started with a plea against stone-crushing units, alleged to be causing dust pollution in the city. 
300 such units were closed down under court orders in 1992.155 But as we will find, a PIL case 
does not come to a close with the achievement of the objective with which it was first filed. The 
closure of the stone crushing units was almost an unmarked blip in the juggernaut that this case 
became. With Justice Kuldip Singh at the helm in the 1990s, this PIL case almost single-
handedly led to the deindustrialization of Delhi (before Justice YK Sabharwal led it in a slightly 
different tangent from 2005, as we will see below). 
The first major blow came on 8th July 1996, when the Court ordered the relocation of 168 large 
industries from Delhi within five months. The court reasoned:  
“Delhi is recording heavy population growth since 1951. As the city grows, its 
problems of land, housing, transportation and management of essential 
infrastructure like water supply and sewage have become more acute. Delhi is one 
of the most polluted cities in the world. The quality of ambient air is so hazardous 
that lung and respiratory diseases are on the increase. The city has become a vast 
and unmanageable conglomeration of commercial, industrial, unauthorised 





spaces and green areas. Once beautiful city, Delhi now presents a chaotic picture. 
The only way to relieve the capital city from the huge additional burden and 
pressures, is to deconcentrate the population, industries and economic activities in 
the city and relocate the same in various priority towns in the NCR.” 
 
The court’s order was as per the ‘Second Master Plan for Delhi – Perspective 2001’ 
(henceforth, the Master Plan) notified in 1990 which specifically provided that the 
hazardous/ noxious/ heavy/ large industries were not permitted to operate in the city of 
Delhi and the existing industrial units falling in these categories were to be shifted/ 
relocated outside city limits. These industries were either characterized in the Delhi 
Master Plan’s Annexure III as ‘H(a) category’ meaning ‘Hazardous and noxious 
industries’ or ‘H(b) category’ meaning ‘heavy and large industries.’  
 
The court ordered that if the factory owners chose to relocate to a neighbouring district, 
they would have to pay each worker monthly wages during the period of the move, as 
well as one year’s salary as a resettlement bonus. If owners opted to close their factories, 
workers would be entitled to six years’ wages as a retrenchment allowance. Two years 
later, it was found that only one out of the 168 industries had paid any compensation to 
the workers.156 In any case, the liability of the factory management was limited to the 
narrowest possible definition of “workmen,” those who were on the rolls as permanent 
employees.157 An estimated 35,000-50,000 workers were rendered jobless because of this 





factories.158. A new federation of trade unions and other human rights organizations  was 
formed in December 1996 as a response to the Supreme Court’s orders, called Delhi 
Janwadi Adhikar Manch (DJAM—Delhi Socialist Rights Forum)159. The Manch tried to 
intervene in Court, as Amita Baviskar records, “Three trade unions affiliated with the 
Manch approached the bench separately through their lawyers, asking to be heard in the 
air pollution case. The judges brushed them aside, merely remarking that the court would 
protect workers' interests and did not need the intercession of the unions. This verbal 
assurance was not recorded as a part of court proceedings.”160 Later again, “when the 
Manch approached the Supreme Court and pointed out that the judges’ orders were being 
violated, the court suggested that they take their complaints to the labor commissioner, an 
official whose previous inaction had already demonstrated his total lack of interest in 
protecting workers’ rights.”161 Meanwhile, the closure suited many of the industries. The 
bigger ones were anyway keen to shut down or relocate, but Indian labour laws made 
closure of an industrial establishment almost impossible, so the Court gave them a timely 
opportunity. Not only that, this order provided them a real bonanza as they were free to 
dispose at least 32 percent of the industrial land as commercial real estate, land that had 
been earlier given to them by the government at severely subsidised rates. The Court was 
not unaware of this as it noted, “In view of the huge increase of prices of land in Delhi 
the reuse of the vacant land is bound to bring a lot of money which can meet the cost of 
relocation.” Baviskar estimated that the total number directly affected by loss of 






Within three months of the July 1996 order, the Court also ordered in the same case the 
relocation or closure of another 513 nonconforming factories, 46 hot mix plants, 21 arc/induction 
furnaces and 243 brick kilns, all of which were to be closed down or moved by 1997. This spate 
of 1996-97 orders was only the first of many major developments in this case that completely re-
ordered the city. Already, even at that early stage, it was perceived as signalling a new trend. As 
Baviskar noted, “The partnership of environmentalists M.C. Mehta and Kuldip Singh, advocate 
and judge, which resulted in directives that affected the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of 
thousands of workers and their families, people who had no representation in court, exemplifies 
the new efficient dispensation of justice in the “public interest” that middle-class people 
acclaim.” The case continued though the dramatis personae changed. By the late 1990s, like in 
the vehicular pollution case, an amicus curiae, Ranjit Kumar, had been appointed, and the public 
interest petitioner MC Mehta no longer actively participated. 
In 2000 came the next major development in the deindustrialising trajectory of this case. This 
time, the scale was much bigger as the order was to close/relocate all ‘non-conforming’ 
industrial units, ie units located in areas designated as ‘residential’ in the Delhi Master Plan, the 
attempt being to strictly enforce Delhi’s zoning laws.163 The stage was set in 1996 itself when the 
court asked Delhi Pollution Control Authority (DPCC) for information on the number of 
polluting and non-polluting units running in non-conforming areas. The resulting survey put the 
figure of industries in Delhi at 126,218 units, with 97,411 of them being non-conforming.164 It 
was decided that only ‘household industries’- those that did not pollute, employed fewer than 
five workers, used no more than one kilowatt of power, and occupied an area smaller than 30 





the 51,000 units that applied for these licences could meet these stringent criteria.165 On 1st April, 
1996 the court ordered the rest to be relocated by 1st January, 1997. But there was a fundamental 
problem. There was nowhere to relocate them, as there were not enough industrial plots as 
envisaged in the Master Plan. Only after the order was passed in 1996, a government developer 
called Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation (DSIDC) began to acquire land in 
Bawana, on the Northern outskirts of the city, where small factories from residential areas could 
relocate. The Court meanwhile allowed those factory owners who had applied to the DSIDC for 
alternate plots temporary licenses to continue operating in their old locations. The Court asked 
the government to submit quarterly reports about the progress in complying with the court's 
orders. In September 1999, the court heard the case again and fixed the deadline for relocation 
for 31st December, 1999. Eventually by July 2000, 52,000 of these had applied for alternate plot 
allotments, but not a single factory had been relocated. Because it had still not finished 
developing the industrial land, DSIDC in 2000 asked the Supreme Court for an extension until 
March 2004 to develop the Bawana industrial properties.166  
The Court at this point lost all patience with the relocation process and on September 12, 2000, it 
ordered that “all polluting industries of whatever category operating in residential areas must be 
asked to shut down.” This judicial exasperation with the mendacity and inefficiency of the 
government would lead to massive devastation in the lives of Delhi’s labouring class. As factory 
owners later complained, “they were bearing the brunt of the punishment that ought to have been 
meted out to the state for its inaction.”167  
It was as if the court had no duty to take care of workers’ interests in this massive relocation 





1999 deadline lapsed and the process was nowhere near complete, the Supreme Court issued 
notice in November 2000 to the government representatives that they would be hauled up for 
contempt for not implementing the Court’s orders, the government panicked and “ordered the 
immediate closure of all nonconforming industrial units (and not just the polluting ones).”168 
Almost a hundred thousand factories were thus closed down within a week. Government 
officials, escorted by heavily armed policemen, went around sealing factory premises, locking 
their doors, disconnecting electricity and water supply. Riots ensued, with a general strike on  
November 20, 2000. The accompanying violence led to three workers being shot dead by the 
police and hundreds injured. I remember being forced to walk to my then workplace, a distance 
of more than ten kilometers, and witnessing the scenes of complete breakdown typical of a 
general strike in a big city in India. The court, soon after these incidents, scolded the government 
for closing not just polluting, but also non-polluting units. However, its new deadline for closing 
all polluting units now was not much later, fixed for 7th January, 2001, which was eventually 
extended till 31st December, 2002.169 In the intervening chaos of the 2000-2003 period, 
thousands of factories closed down, though the Delhi government tried and eventually succeeded 
in liberalising the Master Plan norms for factories. The definition of ‘household’ factories was 
liberalised as well as 24 areas with about 20000 factories and a land use concentration of 70%+ 
industrial usage redesignated as ‘industrial’ and thus regularised. This issue led to a major 
political battle between the central and the state governments, as Delhi’s land use planning is in 
the hands of the central government. 
Kaveri Gill has analysed the impact of this Supreme Court action on a specific ‘polluting and 





otherwise be seen as environment-friendly. This community of workers, belonging to a dalit 
caste called ‘Khatik’ and working in the plastic scrap trade, had prior to this been quite 
successful in exercising their political voice around a caste identity. But the interventions of the 
PIL court in this case negated their ability to mobilize politically. The usual democratic channels 
were bypassed by the Supreme Court. “The elected representatives of the people, in this case 
Outer Delhi MLAs and others, such as former and present chief ministers from both political 
parties, were given no avenue to contest the order and influence the course of policy on the basis 
of larger trade-offs with poverty and livelihoods in their constituencies.”170 The court was thus 
able to ride roughshod over the negotiations of political society and able to impose its vision of 
the city via its apotheosis of zoning laws as mentioned in the Master Plan.  
In September 2000 the Court had taken the implementation of the order out of the hands of the 
Delhi Government, instead appointing “an independent nodal agency under the auspices of the 
Central Government to ensure that the relocation took place within the desired timeframe.”171 
The Central Minister for Urban Development was to head this nodal agency. It was not a co-
incidental choice of appointee, as the then incumbent was none other than Jagmohan, the man 
responsible for the massive Emergency era social engineering in Delhi. The Court showed its 
hand here, knowing full well that “Delhi governments lacked the political will to carry out 
relocation orders, as it would would adversely affect the livelihood and business of hundreds of 
thousands of voters”,172 and that if there was one person in government who could implement 
these orders, it was Jagmohan. And soon enough, the relocation orders “came to be associated 
with Jagmohan’s office and person” and in the discourse of the displaced, with the Emergency-





specifically, as Kaveri Gill notes, because, “the Supreme Court refused to hear the lawyer 
representing the collective body of small-scale traders and manufacturers affected by the 
relocation order. Various locality- and community-based trade associations had spent a 
considerable amount of time and effort raising substantial sums of money in order to hire a 
lawyer willing to defend them, only to have the Supreme Court have him sit down without an 
adequate hearing.”174 As with the auto-rickshaws, affected parties were not heard by the PIL 
court, before sealing their fate. Jagmohan was eventually removed from the Urban Development 
Ministry in 2001 at the behest of his own party leaders from Delhi, when he refused to ratify the 
change in land use norms to regularise de facto ‘industrial areas.’ He was now made the Tourism 
Minister, a position in which he wreaked further havoc as we shall see in Chapter 3.  
 
After having successfully deindustrialised the city through this single writ petition (civil) 
4677/1985, on 16th February, 2006, the Supreme Court went further down this path of making 
Delhi a ‘world-class city’ with an order in this same case proclaiming that all commercial units 
in residential areas would be closed down. This order took the zoning logic of the Delhi Master 
Plan further, with its clear separation of residential and commercial establishments. This PIL, 
which till 2005 was officially called “RE: Shifting of Industries from Residential Area of Delhi, 
New Delhi” in its recorded orders, took a new direction after 17th March, 2005, when  a bench 
headed by Justice YK Sabharwal, acting at the behest of Amicus Curiae Ranjit Kumar, decided 





This fateful move would make the case even more infamous than it already was — and both this 
judge and this Amicus lawyer would be identified with this new chapter. The court’s intervention 
would affect hundreds of thousands of commercial establishments in Delhi, as the desired zoning 
separation existed only on the map. The contradictions between the Master Plan’s desired city 
and the city that in fact existed was so widespread that many surmised that even the majority of 
shops in Delhi would turn out to be in areas demarcated as non-commercial, and would therefore 
be guilty of ‘misuse of property.’ In fact, the judgment of February 16 2006 records that the 
lawyer for MCD had argued that “since there is a large scale misuse of residential premises for 
commercial purposes, it is a physical impossibility to remove the misuser.”  The court reacted 
angrily: “Such a contention is not open to MCD. It is not merely a case of only lack of will to 
take action, it appears to be a case of predominance of extraneous considerations.” The state’s 
role in this process, in the eyes of the court, was seen as tolerating these illegalities and indeed 
being complicit in them, partly explained as ‘corruption’ and partly as ‘vote banks’, but often 
narrated as a jumble of the two. Or, as Justice YK Sabharwal wrote in a newspaper article about 
this case after his retirement, “Judges decide on law and not on populism.”175 
The municipal authorities were therefore ordered to seal these properties so that they could no 
longer be (mis)used. The extreme mismatch between the de jure and de facto situation here has 
often been explained away in terms of the modernist state’s attempt to impose western zoning 
ideas alien to Indian sensibilities and therefore an impractical hope. But it could, at least 
partially, also be attributed to the abject failure of the state authorities, which had made the 
Master Plan, in being able to implement it. There were projections with a timeframe in the 





by specific dates. The state, repeating its record with the industrial estates, did not end up 
developing even half the commercial space it was supposed to. The resulting mismatch of supply 
and demand of commercial land, not surprisingly, led to shops opening in areas demarcated as 
‘non-commercial.’ The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) was the sole developer, having 
acquired agricultural land all over the city in the 1950s and 60s and being given the 
responsibility to develop it. But the DDA completely failed to provide industrial or commercial 
or indeed residential properties in the measure estimated by its own plan document. Without 
holding the DDA and its failed monopoly accountable, the court repeatedly penalized the 
unplanned construction of industrial, commercial or residential establishments. It went about 
treating the symptom rather than the cause. Now, once again, the people who ran commercial 
establishments and worked in them were going to be penalized in the name of clamping down on 
illegality, without hearing them in this process. The state’s fundamental failure in creating the 
demand for these illegalities by not delivering the commercial space it targeted in the Master 
Plan, was impatiently glossed over. While the court ignored this omission, it relied on the same 
document as gospel to insist on strict enforcement of zoning. It thus acted wilfully blind to the 
impossibility of what it was demanding, by harping on about illegalities while ignoring the 
underlying reason behind it. Because the court had ordered sealing of commercial establishments 
in areas not designated as commercial, the case came to be known as ‘the sealing case.’ It was 
under that name that it dominated the newspaper headlines in Delhi from 2006. 
Once the Court had decided to start the crackdown on ‘misusers,’ it asked the MCD about the 
process it wanted to adopt to go about this mammoth operation. The MCD suggested a four-part 





issued to the misusers identified, then grant an opportunity to them of being heard and finally 
seal properties, focusing on  the blatant and obvious cases of large scale misuse. The Court had 
no patience for following such a process. Instead it wanted a public notice to be issued 
immediately (within ten days) in major newspapers stating that violators would have 30 days to 
stop misuse on their own, and file an affidavit saying they would themselves close shop and 
resume residential use. After 30 days if misuse did not stop, MCD would start the process of 
sealing, starting with major roads. This was the court’s plan of action. What followed however 
was much more complicated, as for once the Court had taken on a really powerful lobby— the 
traders and shopkeepers of Delhi.  
Initially things seemed to be following the Court’s script. The first public notice was issued on 
26th February, 2006, stating that the first phase of sealing would target those roads with more 
than 50 percent commercial misuse as well as other major roads above a specified width. On 24th 
March, more than a month after the court’s initial sealing order of 16th February, some traders’ 
associations approached the court for more time to stop misuse, and the court directed that the 
affidavits for voluntarily ceasing misuse would have to be filed within the next four days by 28th 
March, following which they would be given time till 30th June. But for those who did not file 
any affidavits, the sealing action would commence on 29th March, 2006. The 28th March deadline 
for affidavits was extended to 7th April, but sealing operations had started by then. 40,800 
affidavits were filed in this allotted time, swearing to stop the misuse by 30th June176 and “giving 
an undertaking to the effect that violation of this would…subject  him/her to offence of perjury 
and contempt of court for violation of the order of the Court.” But this large number who filed 





the sealing action had begun, a court-led campaign cheered on by the drumbeat of the daily 
newspapers.  
Not trusting the municipal bodies’ ability and willingness to carry out its orders without constant 
prodding, the Supreme Court on 24th March 2006 appointed a monitoring committee, “in order to 
oversee the implementation of the law, namely sealing of offending premises in terms of the 
letter and spirit of this Court’s directions.” The Committee was headed by Bhure Lal, the retired 
bureaucrat who also continued to head the EPCA which continued to give reports on vehicular 
pollution related issues. The other two members of this Committee were KJ Rao, another retired 
bureaucrat and Major General (Retired) Som Jhingan. They were allotted office space in Delhi’s 
swanky NGO-cum-cultural hub, the India Habitat Centre. By this time, the petitioner advocate 
MC Mehta in whose name the original case was still continuing, 21 years after he filed it, hardly 
ever appeared in court. Instead, the Amicus Curiae Ranjit Kumar had taken charge. The court 
had “directed that all the petitions relating to sealing in Delhi are to be routed through the learned 
Amicus-Curiae.” This meant that any petition relating to sealing of any commercial 
establishment in Delhi had to be dealt with as part of this case and not independently. And the 
Amicus decided when and how to hear it. This was crucially important, as soon there were 
thousands of interlocutory applications (IAs) and Writ Petitions filed by owners of commercial 
establishments aggrieved by the sealing actions taken pursuant to court orders. As the court 
orders were broad and the sealing was to be done by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), 
supervised by the Monitoring Committee, the question often arose of ascertaining whether in a 
specific case of an establishment being sealed, it was violating the Master Plan or not. Also, 





repeated cause of affected parties approaching the court. In such a situation, with the number of 
applications proliferating in the same case, it became cluttered and extremely difficult to 
manage. The Amicus, who had a monopoly on deciding which applications would be heard by 
the court and when, would become extremely powerful.  
 
This 1985 PIL writ petition number 4677/1985 had become, what I call an ‘omnibus PIL’. This 
meant that the case had become a juggernaut which dealt with all aspects relating to ‘misuse of 
properties’ at a city-wide level, with the Master Plan being the reference point in deciding the 
scale of the problem and its geography, and all other individual cases filed pertaining to this 
issue would be deemed to be a part of the omnibus case. Since there were obviously a very large 
number of properties affected, only a relatively small number of them could be sealed every day. 
The newspapers approvingly reported this sealing process on a daily basis, with comments by the 
members of the Monitoring Committee as they accompanied the MCD sealing squad. For 
instance, Committee member KJ Rao was quoted as saying in the Indian Express, “Seal this 
eatery right away, and lodge an FIR at the closest police station about the violations. Also, 
ensure that a guard is posted here till further notice to ensure that these people don’t sneak in to 
remove their things later.” The monitoring committee acquired a reputation for their zeal in 
removing the ‘illegalities’ from the city, and their activities were wholly backed by the media 
and the Resident Welfare Associations (organisations of middle class residents of  gated colonies 






The massive outcry from the traders and shopkeepers that followed the sealing actions under the 
orders of the court also got public attention, but it was seen by the newspapers and the courts as 
coloured by ‘political society’ and its illegalities. And ‘political society’ did indeed intervene, 
this time speedily unlike at the time of the relocation of industries. While the state had till now 
allowed the Court to shape the city as per its wishes, with the sealing matter the political stakes 
became too high. The shopkeepers and traders of Delhi had always been a powerful constituency 
for the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party,177 and both the leading parties were quite agitated 
about sealing (unlike the later slum demolitions issue, where the political pay-off, as we shall see 
in Chapter 3, was primarily seen as concerning the ruling Congress party).  
On 28th March, 2006, the day before the sealing was to start, a notification was issued by the 
Delhi Development Authority (DDA) modifying the Master Plan insofar as the chapter on mixed 
use was concerned. The aim was to take a liberal view regarding mixed land use, i.e. the 
provision of non-residential activity in residential premises.178 The attempt was to give relief to 
small shopkeepers affected by the Supreme Court directive, allowing some commercial activities 
to run in residential areas. The new policy to legalise commercial activities on the ground floor 
of residential premises would be applicable on 118 roads in the capital. This was however still 
too minuscule a relief and two days after the sealing started, the traders went on a 48 hour strike 
amid a flurry of political activity. On 10th April, Delhi traders met the President of India, APJ 
Abdul Kalam and sought his intervention, arguing that the business community was neither a 
petitioner nor respondent in the PIL under which action was being taken against them. Initially, 
the government tried to get a six month reprieve from the court to “complete the exercise of 





organised manner as per provisions of the Delhi Master Plan.” But this cut no ice with the court 
and it criticised the government for its “policy of appeasement.” The Bench of Chief Justice Y K 
Sabharwal and Justice CK Thakker observed on 28th April: “Appeasement causes confusion. We 
extended the time [for sealing] but meanwhile it [Centre] came out with a notification. By doing 
so what message you [Centre] want to convey to the law abiding citizen... It is a deliberate 
failure because of extraneous considerations at the cost of the citizen and the message is the law 
abiding citizen suffers.” The apex court also observed that it was because of the nexus between 
government officials, law enforcing agencies and businessmen that there was unauthorised 
commercial use of the residential areas.179 
Amidst the court’s intransigence and bipartisan political support, the government finally 
introduced a new law in Parliament called the Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006. This 
proposed a one-year moratorium from punitive action against unauthorised development in the 
capital and provided for status quo as on 1st January, 2006 of unauthorised development in 
respect of mixed land use, construction beyond sanctioned plans and encroachment by slum 
dwellers, JJ dwellers, hawkers and street vendors in the city. On 12th May, 2006, the Delhi Laws 
(Special Provision) Bill, 2006 was passed by the Lower House; the Upper House passed it three 
days later, and on receipt of assent of the President on 19th May, 2006, it was notified the same 
day— an unusually fast pace for a Central legislation. The very next day, the Government of 
India issued a Notification placing a moratorium for a period of one year in respect of all notices 
issued by local authorities in respect of categories of unauthorized development. By the Act and 
this notice, the government tried to relieve those who had given an undertaking to the Court, and 





the municipal authorities suspended their sealing drive. By the time the Notification was issued, 
around 15,000 commercial establishments functioning in residential areas had already been  
sealed, out of which 6,000 were de-sealed after the Court received affidavits from the owners. 
The RWAs immediately challenged the constitutionality of this new statute before the ‘sealing’ 
bench of the Supreme Court. Initially, the Court just expressed outrage in oral remarks calling 
this new law “wholly invalid and void”, and declared that “this is pure and simple legislature 
over-ruling this court.” The court speculated that the statute might be unconstitutional, but 
refused to stay its operation until the constitutionality question had been adjudicated. On 10th 
August, 2006, however, though the Court still made oral statements from the bench that “though 
prima facie the Act is an ‘invalid’ statute, we are not inclined to completely stay the legislation”, 
it insisted on suspending the notification that had been passed a day after the Act was passed, as 
it was seen as expressly trying to undo and overrule the actions that the Court had already taken.  
The premise was that even if sealing of new areas covered under the moratorium was now 
barred, the government could not undo actions with respect to the specific establishments against 
which the court had already taken action, either in terms of affidavits filed undertaking to stop 
misuse by 30th June or in cases of establishments already sealed. The court therefore ordered the 
Municipal authorities to reseal some 5,000 shops, which had been sealed by the court and then 
unsealed by the government. The court also ordered sealing of the 40,800 shops that had given 
affidavits to stop commercial activities on their premises after 15th September (extended from the 





The government was first wrongfooted and had to undo its earlier notification by a fresh notice. 
But amidst the resumption of the sealing, after three months and a fresh crisis, the Delhi 
Government finally amended the Master Plan in September, declaring large areas which already 
had massive commercial presence but was still designated ‘residential’ as ‘commercial.’ The 
amended Plan also declared that some residential colonies could have commercial establishments 
in their midst. Colonies, as residential neighbourhoods in Delhi are called, were categorized from 
A to G by size of residential plots and density of population (both being indicators of ‘posh’ness, 
an English word that has successfully been adopted into Delhi Hindi). Except for ‘A and ‘B’ 
areas, where zoning was to be strictly enforced, with minor exceptions allowed only if the local 
RWAs agreed, the other categories were granted a reprieve. The government also issued two 
notifications in September 2006, clearing 2,183 roads for mixed land use, commercial stretches 
and pedestrian shopping streets in the C, D, E, F, G and H categories of colonies across the 
capital. As the sealing continued, a ‘Bandh’ against the sealing campaign called by the 
Confederation of All India Traders on 20th September, 2006 led to violence and five people died 
in police firing in Seelampur, one of  the poorest parts of East Delhi180. These actions by the 
government as well as the protests were of course immediately condemned by the media, the 
RWAs and the court as unseemly vote bank politics. 
With the conflict heating up, the Court on 29th September, 2006 criticised the government for 
these notifications, calling them “ad hoc measures” and orally observed that “the last minute 
notifications are causing utter confusion and chaos to the citizens... An impression is given as if 
judiciary is on one side and government on the other side.” It continued to insist that at least the 





with it or have their shops sealed to protect “the dignity and authority of the Court.” The court 
allowed them time till 31st October, 2006 on account of the festival of Diwali. With regard to the 
others saved by the new September notifications, the court required fresh undertakings to be filed 
by all before the Monitoring Committee by 10th November, 2006 (later extended to 31st January, 
2007) that misuse would be stopped as per the Court directions if the law was invalidated and/or 
the notifications quashed. It also declared that sealing would continue vis-à-vis others not 
covered by the notifications. The court also restrained the government from issuing any other 
notification for conversion of residential use into commercial use except with the leave of the 
Court.  
With the 31st October deadline approaching and another bandh call given by the traders at the 
perceived discrimination against the 40,000 traders who had given undertakings, the MCD and 
the Government again approached the Court. This time they were armed with a survey which 
said that 25,000 out of these 40,000 odd would be covered by the September mixed land use 
notifications. The court finally recognized the anomaly in insisting on action against these people 
who had filed affidavits in time, while others who had not filed got away, and temporarily barred 
action against them. But after the experience of these shops who had filed affidavits, the others 
covered by the new notifications who were also now required to file fresh undertakings that they 
would be subject to the court’s final decision on the legality of the notifications by January 31 
2007, hesitated to file any affidavits because they did not want to be in a similar boat in the 
future. As sealing could now theoretically resume against all of them, the government deployed 
its final weapon on 7th February, 2007. It notified a New Master Plan for Delhi, which 





       *** 
The new plan – MPD 2021 – was declared an ‘Anti-Plan plan’ by the newspapers  and 
immediately challenged as invalid in the Supreme Court by the RWAs. The Court again reacted 
in a similar manner as it had to the other amendments and declared that it would examine the 
constitutionality of the Plan. It also made actions taken as per the new Plan norms subject to the 
Court’s final decision on its constitutionality. For instance, the Plan, for the first time, allowed a 
third floor in a residential building. Initially the court barred the MCD from giving any 
permission for construction of a third floor in residential areas under this provision, but a year 
later (by an order in March 2008), the court allowed it, subject to an undertaking given by the 
home owners that they would abide by its final decision on the validity of MPD-2021. An MCD 
official explained the standard practice after this order: “The court had said neither the owner nor 
the person to whom the property would be sold or transferred could claim equity, if the verdict 
goes against them. We just take an affidavit from the owner stating this.” The MCD had already 
sanctioned almost 25,000 building plans for the third floor by 2011.181 To this day, the writ 
petition challenging the 2007 Master Plan is pending in court, and hundreds of thousands of 
people own and/or live in third floor residential units throughout the city. But permission to 
construct it is given subject to the court decision and if the court decides against the New Master 
Plan norms, these would be declared illegal and subject to demolition— a kind of Damocles’ 
sword hanging over people in Delhi due to this case. Meanwhile, the drama of sealing and de-
sealing continued off and on even after the MPD-2021 came into force, though with relatively 





One of the reasons for the Court easing off on sealing was the retirement in January 2007 of 
Chief Justice YK Sabharwal, who had presided over the sealing matter from the beginning. In 
fact, he had initiated the matter by his order in 2005 and moved the focus decisively from 
relocation of ‘non-conforming industries’ to commercial ‘misuse’ of residential properties. On 
his retirement he confessed that the ‘sealing case’ in the Capital was the most difficult of his 
career. He said that he had to earn the wrath of his friends and relatives on the issue: “My friends 
and relatives even stopped talking to me. Yesterday one of my relatives [affected by the sealing 
order] told me sarcastically that I am a big man. I told him I cannot solve individual problems. 
The problem is because of corruption in the system and flaws in the Master Plan.”182 Perhaps the 
uniqueness of the sealing case in Delhi’s long history of PIL is not only the amazing alacrity and 
avidity with which the Government and MCD fought the long-drawn out chess battle with the 
court, with one move following another, but also that the potential losers in this case could 
include the “friends and relatives” of a Supreme Court judge, not something that could be said by 
the thousands made jobless by the relocation of industries in the same case or indeed, about the 
slum-dwellers who were to be made homeless by the appellate courts’ intervention in the 2000s.  
As Justice Sabharwal phrased his dilemma: “The issue of sealing was difficult, as on the one 
hand it was a question of law and on the other it was the sufferings of people.” For once, at least, 
the judge was in a position to encounter (and potentially understand) the “sufferings of people” 
caused by his PIL orders, unlike in the many other cases this dissertation examines. To put it in 
the language of Indian legal academia celebrating PIL in the early 1980s, made famous by 
Professor Upendra Baxi’s work, this is a rare instance of a contemporary PIL judge taking 





battle between corporate and non-corporate capital, the autorickshaw drivers were easy 
sacrificial lambs for the cause of environment — unlike, say, diesel car manufacturers. Large 
factory owners wanting to close sunset industries and convert them into profitable real estate 
were given a break by the court, while the labour working in the same factories paid a heavy 
price. Smaller factory owners had less space to maneouvre in court but a section of them 
managed to pull their political weight eventually. But the hundreds of thousands of traders and 
‘mom and pop shop’ owners of Delhi were an immeasurably more powerful constituency, for 
political society and eventually, even for the court. 
Perhaps this is why the sealing matter had a much stormier career in court — lasting for a whole 
year, and allowing the Court at best a pyrrhic victory. It is not a story we will encounter very 
often here, but the exception is worth studying precisely for that reason. When can people 
maneouvre around an all-powerful PIL court, and when can they not? 
       *** 
The most unsavoury aspect of the sealing case came to light four months after Justice 
Sabharwal’s retiremen— causing what Arundhati Roy then called a “scandal in the palace”.183 In 
May 2007 the tabloid Midday published a news item pointing out that just when Justice 
Sabharwal was kickstarting the ‘sealing case’ by turning the long-running PIL about relocation 
of industries into a case about misuse of commercial properties, his sons were entering into 
partnership with two major mall and commercial complex developers, resulting at the very least 
in a ‘conflict of interest’ as their father led a judicial campaign that indirectly benefited them. 





shopkeepers. Closing down shops would create a demand for mall space. The sealing campaign 
had further limited the availability of commercial space for shops, and as Roy put it, “The better-
off amongst those whose shops and offices had been sealed queued up for space in these malls. 
Prices shot up. The mall business boomed, it was the newest game in town.” And ironically, the 
judge who initiated and presided over the sealing campaign against commercial use of residential 
property, himself simultaneously allowed his sons to use his private as well as official residence 
for commercial purposes, that too as their firm’s registered office! Meanwhile, instead of starting 
any inquiry  against Justice Sabharwal, the whistleblower journalists of Mid-day were sentenced 
to four months’ imprisonment for contempt of court, in a hurriedly decided suo motu case184 
initiated by the Delhi High court.  
Even if the charges of corruption against Justice Sabharwal are unproven and it was perhaps “a 
borderline case”,185 the remarkable fact is that a jurisdiction such as PIL existed in which a judge 
could, by dint of nothing but his own will, initiate a roving inquiry into an issue like zoning that 
affected millions, decide on it and force its implementation at a citywide level with supervision 
by his own chosen officials, with his own handpicked lawyer deciding the direction of the case, 
without necessarily hearing the parties affected by his decisions. In such a system, petty 
corruption is at the very least an occupational hazard. Ideological predilection leading a judge in 
such a direction is scarcely less dangerous.  
Such an ideological slant in favour of corporate capital was clearly enunciated in a judgment 
made by the Supreme Court around the same time that it was leading the campaign against the 
toleration of illegalities in ‘the sealing case’. On 17th October, 2006, the Court delivered its 





controversy was the construction of a huge complex of three ‘world-class’ shopping malls, 
intended to be the most exclusive in India. The location of these malls was to be the South Delhi 
ridge, hitherto designated a forest area, and with a history of acute water scarcity in the 
residential neighbourhoods in the vicinity. A PIL had been filed against the malls by concerned 
citizens of the area. No environmental clearance had been obtained. An ‘expert committee’ 
appointed by the court found blatant illegalities and noted that “the location of large commercial 
complexes in this area was environmentally unsound”. But with substantial construction already 
completed, the committee recommended “a compromise with de facto situation”. The 
environmentalist petitioners protested against such post-facto regularisation, and cited various 
decisions of the Court where it had “taken serious view of unauthorized construction”. 
The Court brushed aside all objections, having decided already that it was “satisfied about the 
bona fides” of  the mall developers. What the bench did here was to clearly specify its double 
standards: “The stand that wherever constructions have been made unauthorisedly demolition is 
the only option cannot apply to the present cases, more particularly, when they unlike (sic), 
where some private individuals or private limited companies or firms being allotted to have made 
contraventions, are corporate bodies and institutions and the question of their having indulged in 





“This High Court used to rule this city”: Public Interest Litigation as a slum demolition 
machine 
 
“Yeh High Court is sheher par raaj karti thi.” (This High Court used to rule this city.) 
–Harish Nair, legal correspondent for the Hindustan Times, March 2009 
 
“Looking back now, it’s hard to map out everything that happened after the 14 December 2005 
Delhi High Court order that called for the demolition of all unauthorized constructions in Delhi. 
The todh-phodh, as the regulars at Bara Tooti called it, spread rapidly across the city as the 
Municipal Corporation’s demolition teams fanned out into markets and residential colonies…In 
January of 2006, the todh-phodh appeared in Sadar Bazaar as a creeping silence that made its 
way up the radial roads from Connaught Place.” 
–Aman Sethi, A Free Man, 2012186 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed the three most thorough-going transformations that the 
Supreme Court set in motion through PIL in Delhi in the decade between 1996 and 2006. Those 
interventions – in the running of public transport, industries and commercial establishments – 
had dramatically reshaped the Delhi in which I arrived to do fieldwork in August 2006. While 





Court was presiding over the most comprehensive and ruthless slum removal campaign that the 
city had seen in a generation.  
According to the official statistics, in 1998, Delhi’s slum population was approximately 3 
million, with about 6,00,000 households. When the next survey happened in March 2011, the 
official figure had fallen to 2.1 million and about 4,20,000 households. The only other  period 
when there was such a massive recorded fall in the slum population in Delhi was between 1973 
and 1977, when it fell from about half a million to about a hundred thousand, with a decline of 
about 80,000 slum households. This decline in 1973-77 is infamous because this was the period 
in which the Emergency was in force (between 1975 and 77) and one of the most notorious 
‘achievements’ of the Emergency was a massive programme of forced relocation of slums -- a 
well-known aspect of Delhi’s contemporary history187. But how did this other more recent 
decline in the slum population of Delhi take place? If the Emergency regime saw a breakdown of 
political negotiations as a technocratic elite ran amok, the period between 1998 and 2011 saw a 
very similar process unfold—only this time the vehicle was Delhi’s appellate judiciary.  
In the years after the Emergency, the slum population had returned to a steady rate of growth, as 
no regime in Delhi dared a repeat of that experience. By 1981, in fact, the slum population had 
already reached pre-Emergency levels. There were a few evictions in the ’80s and ’90s, but at 
least since 1990-91 a policy was in place that officially guaranteed relocation in case of any slum 
demolition, stating that any “past encroachment which had been in existence prior to 31.01.1990 





That political compact broke down from the late 1990s onwards, with the Courts presiding over a 
spectacular and largely gratuitous campaign against slums that led to almost a million people 
being evicted. The most infamous pronouncement that announced this new phase came from the 
Supreme Court in 2000, in a PIL which had no obvious connection with slums at all. Almitra 
Patel, an engineer with long-standing experience in solid waste management, filed a PIL in 1996 
in the Supreme Court against the municipal garbage disposal practices in 300 of India’s largest 
cities. The court went on to appoint a committee in this case in 1998, to formulate the Municipal 
Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules for the country, which were then officially 
notified. But once this apparatus had been set in motion, the petitioner “was unable to steer the 
course of the petition”189 and the presiding judge Justice BN Kirpal turned the case towards the 
unrelated issue of slums in Delhi190, through a bizarre logical jump: blaming the slums for the 
solid waste problem191. The petitioner Almitra Patel later observed in an interview that the Court 
was trying to play ‘Municipal Commissioner’ and took the case on a tangent for over two years, 
for reasons unclear to her.192 I quote here three passages from the infamous outburst by Justice 
Kirpal in this case: 
“11. In Delhi which is the capital of the country and which should be its show piece 
no effective initiative of any kind has been taken by the numerous governmental 
agencies operating here in cleaning up the city. 
13. Domestic garbage and sewage is a large contributor of solid waste. The drainage 
system in a city is intended to cope and deal with household effluent. This is so in a 





with no proper means of dealing with the domestic effluents, or in slums with no care 
for hygiene the problem becomes more complex. 
14. Establishment or creating of slums, it seems, appears to be good business and is 
well organised. The number of slums has multiplied in the last few years by 
geometrical proportion. Large areas of public land, in this way, are usurped for 
private use free of cost. It is difficult to believe that this can happen in the capital of 
the country without passive or active connivance of the land owning agencies and/or 
the municipal authorities. The promise of free land, at the taxpayers cost, in place of 
a jhuggi, is a proposal which attracts more land grabbers. Rewarding an encroacher 
on public land with free alternate site is like giving a reward to a pickpocket. The 
department of slum clearance does not seem to have cleared any slum despite it’s 
being in existence for decades. In fact more and more slums are coming into 
existence. Instead of ‘Slum Clearance’ there is ‘Slum Creation’ in Delhi. This in turn 
gives rise to domestic waste being strewn on open land in and around the slums. This 
can best be controlled at least, in the first instance, by preventing the growth of 
slums. The authorities must realise that there is a limit to which the population of a 
city can be increased, without enlarging its size. In other words the density of 
population per square kilometer cannot be allowed to increase beyond the sustainable 
limit. Creation of slums resulting in increase in density has to be prevented. What the 
slum clearance department has to show, however, does not seem to be visible. It is 
the garbage and solid waste generated by these slums which require to be dealt with 





These comments cited above, particularly the “reward to a pickpocket” analogy, revealed the 
Supreme Court of India’s contempt for any attempt at humane relocation, and soon became the 
basis of a ferocious slum removal campaign in the Delhi High Court. The Court’s main grouse in 
these cases was that of ‘public land’ being encroached upon.  
‘Public land’ was land that had been acquired by the government, especially the Delhi 
Development Authority (DDA) which was designated the sole developer of all the urbanisable 
land in Delhi in 1957. Land was acquired and socialised in the ’50s and ’60s, and was to be 
developed according to terms laid down in the Master Plan. As per the First Master Plan of Delhi 
passed in 1962, the DDA had, in 1959, notified 34,070 acres of urban and urbanisable land in 
Delhi for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. This was projected to “be sufficient for the 
growth of Delhi according to plan for the next 10 years or so.”  
Almost all  slums in Delhi are located on such public land, most of them on land owned by 
DDA. Legal scholar Usha Ramanathan has diagnosed this malaise, “The cause of the “illegal” 
occupation of public lands is… directly attributable to the non-performance of state agencies.” 
She quotes the Planning Commission of India, “Urban housing  shortage at the beginning of the 
10th Plan has been assessed to be 8.89 million units. As much of 90 per cent of the shortfall 
pertains to the urban poor, and is attributable (among other reasons) to... (non) provision of 
housing to slumdwellers.”194  
Emboldened by the ‘pickpocket’ remark of the Supreme Court, the Delhi High Court started to 
entertain a series of PILs filed by Resident Welfare Associations to remove ‘encroachments’ on 





the case would be as follows: a Resident Welfare Association (RWA) would file a writ petition 
in the High Court, praying for the removal of a neighbouring slum, alleging nuisance caused to 
them by its very existence. The court would grant the RWA’s prayer, and the matter would only 
end when the landowning agency of the encroached public land abided by the court’s direction 
of demolition and relocation of a slum.195 By end-2000, this had become such a standard pattern 
that when a slum was demolished by the DDA in spite of a status quo order in the case and the 
slum-dwellers then went to the High Court alleging contempt of court, the response of the High 
Court judge was, “considering the fact that each day I am noticing 3 to 4 writ petitions filed in 
my Court alleging that unauthorised constructions and trespassers be removed, as also the fact 
that at the ground level there is virtually, free for all, breach of this duty of care by the 
respondents is not being equated by me with contumacious conduct, i.e., contempt.”196 It is 
worth noting that this was just one bench of the Delhi High Court that saw three or four such 
petitions every day -- multiple such benches then existed to entertain such cases! 
The procedural departures that the Delhi High Court was making in its PIL jurisdiction in these 
RWA cases can be best gleaned from a comparison with another case from another time and 
another city, but in the same jurisdiction. A remarkably similar petition to these Delhi RWA 
petitions had been filed in Ahmedabad in 1984, complaining of “nuisance on account of 
emission of smoke, passing of urine on public street by the hutment dwellers who are residing in 
this area”. The case, however, was then dismissed by the Gujarat High Court -- not because of 
the affluence of the PIL petitioners and the poverty of the slum-dwellers, but for good old-





“(1) As to whether there is encroachment or not is a question of fact and it is difficult 
to ascertain in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution as to who has caused 
encroachment. This cannot be determined without recording evidence and without 
allowing the parties to lead evidence. Normally this Court would not adopt this 
course in a petition under Art. 226.  
(2). The persons who are alleged to have made encroachment and who are alleged to 
be residing in hutments are not parties in this petition. Without hearing them no order 
which may adversely affect them can be passed.”197 
These kind of arguments were given no play in the Delhi High Court of the 21st century. In 
hardly any of these RWA cases were the slum-dwellers to be evicted ever made parties to the 
case at the instance of the court and heard by it. In fact, ordinarily the name of the slum was not 
even mentioned by the Court in its orders in these RWA cases, they were simply designated 
‘encroachers’ and ordered to be removed. Similarly, the question of fact of the alleged ‘nuisance’ 
caused by ‘encroachers’ was never really examined and adjudicated by the High Court, which in 
any case it was not equipped to do under the writ jurisdiction of Article 226. 
By 2002, these RWA cases had reached such a scale that a High Court bench was constituted 
that heard 63 such combined petitions under the lead petition of Pitampura Sudhar Samiti vs 
Union of India. The judgment summed up the petitions as “filed by various resident associations 
of colonies alleging that after encroaching the public land, these JJ Clusters have been 
constructed in an illegal manner and they are causing nuisance of varied kind for the residents of 





by or on behalf of JJ Clusters who either want to continue in the same clusters and demand better 
facilities or are claiming their rehabilitation.” The main problem of “nuisance” caused by the 
adjoining slums as identified by the RWA in the lead petition was that of open defecation 
because of absence of toilet facilities. The DDA had failed to build public toilets for these slum-
dwellers, inspite of repeated assurances. Instead of asking the Court to force the DDA to do so, 
the petition wanted the removal of the slum itself. The Court dealt with the problem of slums as 
‘encroachments’ by bizarrely dividing the issue into two aspects – one being the removal of 
slums and the other that of their rehabilitation as per government policies. The second issue – the 
constitutionality of rehabilitation of these slum-dwellers – was relegated to  another bench, as we 
shall soon see. Meanwhile, the Court accepted the RWA contentions, adopting this reasoning: 
“humanitarianism must be distinguished from miscarriage of mercy… these residential colonies 
were developed first. The slums have been created afterwards which is the cause of nuisance and 
brooding ground of so many ills.”  
The governmental failure to provide minimum facilities like public toilets for slum dwellers and 
the resulting nuisance caused by public defecation was to be solved by removing the slum itself, 
not by making the government provide those facilities. So the conclusion reached by the court 
was to ask the government to demolish the slums that have come up. The court also rejected the 
slum-dwellers’ petitions saying, “Since they are encroachments of public land and are 
unauthorised occupants of public premises at public places, they have no legal right to maintain 
such a Petition.”  
The government’s existing policy requiring the provision of alternative land before demolishing 





of the Delhi High Court on 29th November 2002 in a PIL filed by the Okhla Factory Owners’ 
Association.198 The judgement continued in the vein of Justice Kirpal’s ‘pickpocket’ remark, 
quoting it for support “against the grant of indulgence to such encroachers” and went a long way 
further to delegimitise any need for relocation of ‘encroachers’ as a pre-requisite for demolishing 
their houses. The judgment set the tone with its very first sentence: “Benevolence in 
administration is a necessity but this benevolence has to be balanced against the rights of the 
residents of a town specially when dealing with one commodity which can never increase which 
is land.” After having cast the issue as the ‘rights’ of some versus ‘benevolence’ towards others, 
the Court examined the legality of the government policy of allotting land to squatters as “this 
problem of relocation of jhuggi dwellers was arising in a number of cases where public interest 
petitions were filed to clear public land.” The Court went on to not only do away with the 
requirement of relocation, it actually declared it illegal even where it was possible. Providing 
alternative sites, according to the Court, was self-defeating and “it has only created a mafia of 
property developers and builders who have utilised this policy to encourage squatting on public 
land, get alternative sites and purchase them to make further illegal constructions,” the Court 
speculated. The P-word made its by-then usual appearance: “A populist measure need not 
necessarily be a legal one.” The Court raised a statistical spectre by spelling out the amount 
required for providing minimum housing to the estimated 3 million jhuggi-dwellers of Delhi: 
about 59.25 billion rupees (the largeness of the figure was subtly underlined by enunciating it in 
all its numerical splendour, with the requisite zeroes). Finally, after evaluating the speed at which 
rehabilitation had taken place in the past, the Court stated that at this rate it would take them 272 





policy and made it seem impractical and impossible. The logic of the judgment  followed what 
Pratap Bhanu Mehta later called “the jurisprudence of exasperation”. As Mehta explains, “The 
function of law in this view is to express, both literally and figuratively, exasperation at the state 
of affairs…it expresses a certain impatience with reality… Much in our society would prompt us 
to tear our hair out in exasperation. Judges now see it as their job to give these sentiments 
expression in law.”199 
The Court finally managed to reach the conclusion that any rehabilitation by the government 
under its slum policy would itself be illegal. “The continuing existence of such a policy serves no 
social purpose. Such a policy without any social criteria, is illegal and arbitrary and we hereby 
proceed to quash the same which requires alternative sites to be provided to slum dwellers 
occupying public land before they can be removed from such public land.”  
What was to be done for these 3 million people living in slums was indicated as well: 
(7) No alternative sites are to be provided in future for removal of persons who are squatting on 
public land.  
(8) Encroachers and squatters on public land should be removed expeditiously without any pre-
requisite requirement of providing them alternative sites before such encroachment is removed or 
cleared. 
Where these millions of slum-dwelling people would go once evicted from their homes and why 
they were there in the first place was of no concern to the Division Bench of the Delhi Hight 





and state governments in Delhi went on appeal to the Supreme Court, which stayed this High 
Court order and allowed the government’s slum policy and allotment of land for relocation to 
continue, provided it clearly specified “that the allotment would be subject to the result of the 
petitions”.200 As of March 2013, this appeal in the Supreme Court was still pending, and to this 
day, all schemes for allotment of land to slum-dwellers in Delhi carry this proviso.201 
The two judgments of the Delhi High Court discussed above – Pitampura Sudhar Samiti and 
Okhla Factory Owners Association – turned out to be the last instances of reflection on moral 
and constitutional questions faced by the Court vis-à-vis slum demolitions, for the next seven 
years.202 What the Courts delivered after 2003 were orders, not judgments; that is, no reasoned 
justifications were forthcoming, just pure assertions of power. After having thus pronounced 
slum rehabilitation unnecessary and even illegal, the Court concentrated on creating an 
infrastructure for slum demolition and went on to, as we shall see, oversee the process itself. But 
already, in the Okhla judgment, the looseness of legal language moves law towards non-law. The 
judgment does not actually rely on legal principles as much as the idea that because a policy 
seems impractical based on past experience, it can be deemed unconstitutional. The non-
sequiturs about the potential costs and delays in rehabilitation were only possible in the post-PIL 
judicial discourse. The sheer arbitrariness with which decisions are taken makes the law declared 
in such PIL cases conspicuously non-legal. The reliance on legal norms is minimal, a decision is 
taken with very little relation to any norm, as a pure assertion of sovereignty. Despite all this, 
such an ideological judgment was, strictly speaking, possible to envisage as part of a regular 
litigation challenging the legality of Delhi Government’s slum rehabilitation policy. What 





After the judgment on the legality of slum rehabilitation as a general policy in the Okhla case, 
the High Court scheduled a hearing in the same case, ostensibly to give further directions in 
respect of individual grievances made in the two petitions relating to Wazirpur and Okhla, two 
specific industrial areas of Delhi. This hearing, which took place on 3rd March 2003, became the 
site of an awesome display of judicial power through the means of PIL, setting the pace for 
Court-led slum demolitions in Delhi over the next five years, on a scale for which the only 
precedent was the Emergency. It marked a new phase in the Courts’ relation with slums in Delhi.  
The important departure here was one of geography. Although the relevant petitions were 
specific to two areas – Wazirpur and Okhla – the Court decided not to be limited by such 
constraints, and took the petition’s concerns regarding ‘encroachments’ to a new location 
altogether – to the banks of the river Yamuna, the site of what was then the largest slum in Delhi, 
Yamuna Pushta. There was no justification for this bizarre segue other than the judges’ own 
whims (and this persistent ability to maneouvre seemingly unrelated PILs to cause massive slum 
demolitions was to earn quite a reputation for the presiding judge in this case.) To read Justice 
Vijender Jain’s order, it was as if the Supreme Court had never passed a stay order on the High 
Court judgment about the slum rehabilitation policy – the High Court carried on as if 
resettlement was no longer necessary before a slum was demolished. In this order of 3rd March 
2003, after gleefully recounting the statistics based on which the Okhla judgment had been 
given, Jain suddenly segued into unconnected terrain: 
“What is required to be done  in the present situation in this never ending drama of illegal 
encroachment in this capital city of our Republic?... Yamuna Bed and both the sides of the river 





Bed as well as its embankment has to be cleared from such encroachments… In view of the 
encroachment and construction of jhuggies/pucca structure in the Yamuna Bed and its 
embankment with no drainage facility, sewerage water and other filth are discharged in Yamuna 
water… We therefore direct all the authorities concerned… to forthwith remove all the 
unauthorized structures, jhuggies, places of worship and/or any other which are unauthorisedly 
put in Yamuna Bed and its embankment, within two months from today.” 
The Court here made its own accusations, came up with its own facts and ordered its own 
remedy, without feeling the need to hear anybody else. Additionally, it made an unsubstantiated 
correlation between slums near the river and pollution caused to it by them. In fact, research by a 
reputed non-profit organisation called Hazards Centre found that the slums near the Yamuna 
contributed less than 1% of the total sewage released into the river203. The PIL petition was just 
an excuse for the court to dwell on its own hobby horses. 
In another key move that Justice Jain would repeatedly come to make in such PIL cases, he 
appointed Mr Amarjit Singh Chandhiok, Senior Advocate, as the amicus curiae to assist the 
Court in this case. The petitioners may have had specific complaints for which they had come to 
court, but the Court had its own concerns which it intended to go ahead and set right through the 
same petition. To do so, it needed to appoint its own lawyer, the amicus curiae.  
Finally, although the target of the court’s intervention was Delhi’s largest slum cluster, ‘Yamuna 
Pushta’, it was never referred to by name in its order. This refusal, too, became part of the 
judicial style of these PILs as patented by Justice Jain. Perhaps the judge did not wish to dignify 





the proceedings, and over the one year or so that it took for this order to be implemented, no 
residents of the Yamuna settlements were ever made a party to the case. But the implication of 
such a widely worded order against all encroachments on the river Yamuna could be quite 
radical, as would be evident in a few years.  
Yamuna Pushta, meaning ‘embankment on the river Yamuna’ was actually “a string of slum 
colonies on the banks of the river behind Old Delhi,”204 which had different names, such as 
Gautampuri-I, Gautampuri-II, Kanchanpuri, Indira Colony and Sanjay Amar Colony, and housed 
about 1,50,000 people.   
When this case next came up for substantive hearing on 29th October, 2003, it was heard by  a 
different bench of the High Court. Though this new bench was keen to implement the Okhla 
order of removing the slums mentioned in the petition without any need for relocation, it also 
noted with some apparent surprise that “[w]hile hearing the matter on 3.3.2003, it appears that 
the Division Bench also took the cognizance of encroachers on Yamuna. The petition pertains to 
encroachment in Wazirpur area. Therefore, Registry is directed to give a separate number to the 
petition as the Court has taken cognizance on its own motion and to place the copy of the order 
passed by the Division Bench on 3.3.2003.” Such departures from basic legal procedures in PILs 
still surprised other judges of the High Court, though with Justice Jain having taken the lead, 
such judicial improvisation would not be exceptional for very long.  
The new petition of which the Court had taken cognizance was numbered Civil Writ Petition 
689/2004 and was called Court on its own Motion vs Union of India. With Chandhiok as the 





The order on 3.3.03 which sparked off this new writ was about removal of encroachments from 
Yamuna. Strangely enough, notice of this new case was accepted on behalf of the Central 
Government by the Tourism Ministry and not the Ministry of Urban Development, which is 
responsible for the lawful planned development of Delhi and ordinarily deals with such cases. 
This was because the Tourism Minister was Jagmohan, the aforementioned architect of the 
Emergency-era demolitions, who was now most keen to resume his reputation as ‘demolition 
man’205  
By the time the next hearing came round, in February 2004, Jagmohan had quickly manufactured 
a grand plan to develop the Yamuna riverfront after the anticipated removal of these slum 
clusters. The plan was to develop a 100-acre strip of land on the banks of the river Yamuna, “into 
a riverside promenade with parks and fountains which would be marketed as a major tourist 
attraction.”206 This was circulated as a brochure before the court and was called, ‘Yamuna River 
Front: Undoing a tragedy of governance and ushering in a new dawn’, with nine pages of glossy 
uncaptioned photographs of the Pushta showing industrial activities like ‘electro-plating units’ 
being carried on there, as well as photographs of homes with TV sets asking if these were homes 
of the ‘poor’207.The Court was persuaded by Jagmohan’s rhetoric. In particular it was agitated by 
the photographs showing the presence of industries in the Pushta and ordered the immediate 
clearing of all legal hurdles for the demolition of Yamuna Pushta.208 Between February and May 
2004 the Yamuna Pushta slums were finally destroyed under court orders209. About 6000 of the 
35,000 families displaced were resettled by the government 25 miles away in Bawana, at the 





Even after the demolitions in Yamuna Pushta, the suo motu case of encroachment on the river 
Yamuna continued. The Court kept ordering demolitions of other slums near the river. It also 
came up with a truly novel interpretation to speed up the process and pre-empt the need for a 
Slum Rehabilitation Policy in this case. “It is required to be noted,” said the Court, “that the 
policy of DDA for relocation would not apply to the river bed. It is not an encroachment on land. 
It is a water body and it is required to be maintained as a water body by the DDA and all other 
authorities.”211 A few months after this order, Justice Vijender Jain took charge of this case. Over 
the course of the year that he presided over it, he took it to another level with his innovations and 
determination to demolish as many slums as possible. As he modestly told me in an interview 
conducted in January 2010, a new dimension to judicial authority emerged in the period between 
2003 and 2006. Dissatisfied with the authorities’ less than complete implementation of his 
original suo motu order on Yamuna encroachments (he would quote his original order in 
subsequent orders repeatedly), and “in the absence of a comprehensive policy by the 
Government… to clear the Yamuna bed and its embankment”, on 16th November 2005 Jain 
ordered the constitution of a Monitoring Committee chaired by a retired High Court Judge, Usha 
Mehra, “to remove such encroachment forthwith and to monitor such operations.” The 
Committee consisted of highly placed ex-officio members212, the amicus Chandhiok and a retired 
Additional District Judge SM Aggarwal, who was appointed as Convenor. The Committee was 
to submit a monthly report “with regard to action taken in terms of order passed” on 03.03.03.  
This Committee, which came to be known as the ‘Yamuna – Removal of Encroachment 
Monitoring Committee’, was initially set up for a period of one year, but its tenure was later 





next to the Monitoring Committee appointed soon after by the Supreme Court in the so-called 
‘sealing case’). Having already zeroed in on encroachments as the cause of pollution in the river 
Yamuna and without any further discussion on other possible causes of such pollution, on the 
next date of hearing on 8th December 2005, Justice Jain ordered: 
“We direct the Committee to take up in right earnestness and on day-to-day basis the task of 
removing encroachments upto 300 meters from both sides of River Yamuna in the first instance. 
No encroachment either in the form of jhuggi jhopri clusters or in any other manner by any 
person or organization shall be permitted… We make it clear that the Committee will take up the 
task of removal of illegal encroachment on the basis of directions issued above and will not 
entertain any request for grant of any time for such removal on the pretext of relocation or any 
other alternative allotment… Illegal occupants of the river bed did not have the right to pollute 
the river and if there was a policy to relocate or rehabilitate them somewhere else, the eviction 
measure would not wait for such a policy to be implemented.”  
The Court did not provide any basis for arriving at the figure of 300 metres, but it became a 
benchmark of sorts, with government authorities soon turning it into some kind of a sacrosanct 
limit214. The Court had effectively set up the infrastructure for efficient implementation of its 
commands. This PIL came up regularly before the Court for the next one year, and its orders 
discussed the monthly reports submitted by the Monitoring Committee to the Court, which 
contained an account of the progress made by the various government agencies in removing 
encroachments from the river bed. The Committee made frequent inspection of the areas in 
question and reported to the Court. This improvisation by the Court ensured that all government 





Court would direct a senior officer of the government to be present in court to make sure it 
performed, or recall the order requiring him to be present in court if there was a good progress 
report from the Committee.215 Any further legal obstacles were removed by the Court on 29th 
March 2006, when  it ordered “all the courts subordinate to the Delhi High Court not to deal with 
any matter with regard to grant of stay against removal of illegal encroachers from the river 
embankment.” To further systematise the slum demolition campaign, the Court asked the DDA 
to submit “area-wise sketch plans showing clusters of jhuggis and other structures on various 
parts of Western embankment of the river Yamuna”. In the absence of any such plans, the 
Committee was asked to arrange for “satellite mapping instrument and technology”, so as “to 
have the mapping of all the jhuggi cluster and other structures on the western embankment on 
Yamuna river”. 
The Yamuna Monitoring Committee appointed by the Court, in the first year of its existence, 
was  successful in removing 11,280 jhuggies and pucca structures, including more than 130 
‘dhobi ghats’,216 from various places on both banks of the river Yamuna. This was hailed as 
“tremendous work” by Justice Jain and the Committee’s term was extended for another year. 
Most of the settlements were demolished within the first five months of the committee’s 
establishment, the biggest of its actions being the removal of 4,000 jhuggies situated in East 
Delhi, near Geeta Colony on the eastern embankment of the river Yamuna. Justice Jain later told 
me that he was particularly proud of having cleared this area, as a massive clover-leaf flyover 
and grade-separator came up there later, which he thought was one of his achievements and 





throughout this period, all kinds of ambitious road projects adjoining the river were given the 
green signal.  
After Justice Jain left the Delhi High Court in November 2006, this PIL took a completely 
different and unanticipated direction. The Commonwealth Games was to be held in Delhi in 
2010, for which purpose a massive Games Village was planned right on the floodplains of the 
river Yamuna. As this would violate the blanket directions that the Court had previously given in 
this case against any and all construction near the river, a different PIL filed against the Games 
Village was referred to the same Committee. The Convenor of the Committee, perhaps believing 
in the blanket mandate of the Committee to actually cover all illegal structures, and not just 
slums and such sub-standard constructions, actually interceded with the High Court against the 
Games Village. The High Court bench in 2008 found grave illegalities in the process of granting 
permissions for the Games Village and ordered a committee to examine this issue, without of 
course stopping its construction, which was going full steam ahead. But even this committee was 
declared unnecessary by the Supreme Court when it came up for appeal. The Supreme Court 
cleared the Games Village Project: the PIL against it, said the judges, had been filed too late in 
the day.  
The Yamuna case is a perfect example of what became a new judicial trend: that of turning a PIL 
filed about a specific problem in a specific part of the city into what I call an omnibus PIL: a PIL 
that deals with a particular issue wherever it comes up in the city. The city was the scale at which 
the court was thinking of the problem. The device of the omnibus PIL was deployed in 
particularly spectacular fashion by the High Court from 2003 onwards, with Justice Vijender Jain 





urban neighbourhood would be either removed or made irrelevant, and an amicus curiae 
appointed to guide the court on the issue on a city-wide basis. The whole city was thus made 
subject to judicial intervention and correction through this process. What was relatively new 
about this increasingly common and extremely powerful form of PIL was that the specific 
aggrieved party was removed, and a roving inquiry into the whole city conducted by the court 
through the amicus. The means by which the city was made legibile for this new optics of the 
court was usually the Delhi Master Plan that provided for strict zoning laws. Through this new 
manoeuvre, PIL became a means to target the ‘illegal’ residents of the city, who until then had 
been protected by their elected representatives. These ‘illegal’ citizens were not even made party 
to the proceedings. All problems were blamed on the conspicuous urban poor, who were seen as 
obstructing the neat solutions proposed to make the city come up to scratch as a ‘global city’ : 
they would simply have to go as collateral damage.  
That the poor were there in the first place was a function of what Partha Chatterjee has called 
‘political society.’ These people had been accommodated, however precariously, by the everyday 
populist politics that depended on them for electoral support. These were the networks most 
drastically unraveled by this new phase of PIL. The omnibus PIL and its procedural 
improvisations enabled the court to monitor and micro-manage nearly every aspect of the city’s 
governance and make the whole city the direct object of its reformative attention. We have seen 
in the course of this chapter the move made by  RWAs and other mediating actors as PIL 
petitioners asking the court to intervene and set the city right by cleaning up the excesses of 
political society. By 2003 it was as if the court no longer needed any external crutch to do this. It 






Another example of a Justice-Jain-style omnibus PIL that significantly changed the city is the 
case referred to as Hem Nalini Mehra vs Government of NCT of Delhi218. This was a PIL filed in 
2002 by the residents of two group housing societies in East Delhi, complaining of the 
callousness of government authorities in not carrying out the requisite sewer repair work and 
laying of an arterial  road. The Court managed to get the repairs done in a year’s time. But once 
this was done, at the hearing on 31st October 2003, the Court decided to expand the scope of the 
writ petition to road repair and road safety all over Delhi and made Pushkar Sood, the lawyer for 
the PIL petitioners, the amicus curiae in this omnibus PIL. Over the next three years, the Court in 
this PIL set up a centralised database of fatal accidents and a mechanism for cancelling driving 
licences of people involved in such cases. It demolished slum clusters, removed street vendors 
and kiosks as encroachment on public roads and footpaths219, closed down unregulated 
automobile repair shops, ordered the move of wholesale paper and chemical markets to 
peripheral areas, ordered new inter-state bus terminals to be set up in two peripheral areas of the 
city, ordered the construction of 14 multi-level parking lots for the decongestion of traffic in 
Delhi, ordered the installation of bollards (concrete separators) on roads and supervised the 
construction of flyovers (going into the details of alignment in the case of a clover-leaf flyover 
near Akshardham temple), underpasses and traffic lights near them. 
Another omnibus PIL championed by Justice Jain was the case of Hemraj vs Commissioner of 
Police220. The PIL was originally filed in 1999 to curtail goods traffic on the roads in and around 
the Chattarpur temple in South Delhi. But soon after this complaint was dealt with, the PIL was 





Delhi” and a committee with ex-officio members and two amicus curiae221 appointed by the 
Court, which came to be called “the Hemraj Amicus Curiae Committee”. By the time it was 
folded up by a new bench in 2008, this PIL and its committee were dealing with the issue of 
traffic congestion in the entire city. It did all that the Hem Nalini Mehra PIL did and more, and 
ordered its share of slum demolitions, as we have seen with the Nangla Machi slum in the 
introduction. In the meanwhile, it made some other really radical interventions. 
On May 17th 2006, Justice Jain ordered a massive crackdown on cycle-rickshaws in Delhi. The 
order began with a tirade against the “plying of cycle rickshaws on the main roads, narrow roads 
and congested roads” which the Court said, “has become a horrible experience”. It then directed 
the MCD not to grant any licenses in future for plying cycle rickshaws on Delhi roads and also 
ordered it to prohibit cycle rickshaws from plying on all arterial roads in the city. This would hit 
the livelihood of hundreds of thousands in a city with an estimated 0.6 million cycle-
rickshaws.222 The Court’s impatience with the continued proliferation of cycle rickshaws in 
Delhi clearly seemed to emerge from a feeling of lack or a sense of embarrassment about the 
inadequately modern nature of the cycle rickshaw. In the most bizarre intervention to make real 
its fantasy of a truly modern city, the Court in this same omnibus PIL ordered a ban on the plying 
of cycle rickshaws in the Chandni Chowk area at the behest of a traders’ association in the 
Walled City of Delhi.223 Chandni Chowk is the commercial heart of the Walled City. Having 
banned cycle rickshaws between Red Fort Chowk and Fatehpuri Mosque in order to reduce 
congestion there so that the entire area “is reglorified and people are able to do hassle free 
shopping in an atmosphere of quality environment”, it ordered the introduction of CNG buses as 





Delhi, which is so obviously suited to non-motorised vehicles like cycle-rickshaws224, its 
manifest absurdity attracted a lot of attention. The New York-based Institute for Transportation 
and Development Policy (ITDP) issued a statement that read: “We believe that for the court to 
make policy regarding road use is beyond its competence and judicial mandate… because roads 
are a public good, ultimately the use and allocation of scarce road space should be determined by 
a legitimate democratic political process informed by in-depth technical understanding”.  
The next giant move in this logical progression of the Delhi High Court presiding over the 
remaking of the city was to combine all the PIL cases relating to  “Unauthorised construction, 
Misuse of Properties and encroachments on Public Land” into one master case, eventually 
dealing with the entire city. The history of this case tells us something about the journey of PIL 
in Delhi. 
In 1989, in the middle class neighbourhood of West Patel Nagar, a post-Partition ‘rehabilitation 
colony,’ there was a dispute between two neighbours living in adjacent plots of 200 square yards 
each, leading one of them, Sarla Sabharwal, to file a writ petition in the Delhi High Court 
alleging that her neighbour was constructing extra floors on his property, which would exceed 
the municipal building by-laws and therefore asking the Court to order the MCD to take action 
against him. This writ was heard by a bench headed by Justice Kirpal, the same judge who ten 
years later in the Supreme Court gave the ‘encroacher as pickpocket’ judgment. The respondent 
neighbour promptly countered the charge by submitting a list of 32 buildings in that 
neighbourhood that were also violating municipal rules -- either by building more floors than 
permitted, or using the residential premises for commercial purposes, or extending the building 





sides of the building. In 1990, the judges declared that this was a “fit issue... in which public is 
interested” and decided to regard this case as a PIL. In 1991, the Court disposed of the case with 
orders to the MCD vis-à-vis 27 buildings in the area that were found to contain legal violations, 
to either ‘regularise’ illegalities which were compoundable and demolish those which were not 
compoundable. This order, and indeed the whole PIL, was restricted to middle class houses in 
Patel Nagar and Rajinder Nagar areas of Karol Bagh zone of the MCD in West Delhi. 
Twelve years later, the husband of the petitioner in the earlier writ filed a PIL in the Delhi High 
Court in the name of a “social welfare organization” called ‘Kalyan Sanstha’,225 which had never 
been heard of before or after, and of which he said he was the president. The petition alleged that 
the punitive actions for the West Delhi neighbourhoods ordered by the High Court in the earlier 
petition filed by his wife had not been implemented by the MCD, and the unauthorised 
constructions there had gone from bad to worse. The case plodded along for its first two years. 
On 30th November, 2005, it suddenly acquired a completely different valence, when it got listed 
before a bench headed by Justice Vijender Jain.  
Jain, as was his wont, decided to deploy this case to start a demolition drive in Delhi. He 
summoned official figures of unauthorized construction for all of Delhi: there were a total of 
18,299 recorded cases of unauthorised construction in the city over a period of five years. “To 
check the mushrooming of unauthorised construction” he wanted these demolished forthwith “in 
right earnest.” On 14th December, the Court issued a clarification: “We are making it clear that 
MCD has to launch a drive throughout Delhi in terms of our directions passed in this matter. 
There are other writ petitions… which relate to other areas. A copy of this order shall be placed 





clear that if there is any other area or locality in which there are buildings which do not conform 
to the parameters of building by-laws… the same shall be covered by order passed” in this case. 
The demolition drive was on. From this date onwards, all other cases pending in the Delhi High 
Court relating to “Unauthorised construction, Misuse of Properties and encroachments on Public 
Land” were to be heard under this omnibus PIL of Kalyan Sanstha Social Welfare Organisation 
Versus Union of India & Ors. (Civil Writ Petition 4582/2003). The MCD panicked at the 
enormity at the task before it and stated in a sworn affidavit that out of the approximately 4 
million properties in Delhi, 3 million are “in  violation of law,” ie, 70-80 percent of  buildings 
constructed in Delhi are unauthorized. The Court was livid, and called this “an attempt to create 
fear psychosis in the mind of honest citizens” and made the government “delete” the statement 
saying it was not based on any exact survey.  
On 18th January, 2006, noting that the “demolition drive has been undertaken in Delhi but it has 
been far from satisfactory,” the Court started thinking of alternatives. Before it was the example 
of the ‘sealing case’ in the Supreme Court that had taken a new dimension in February 2006. 
Observing that “[i]t seems that the MCD lacks the desire to check the rampant corruption and  
unauthorised construction” the High Court took the first step towards forging its own tools to 
oversee the implementation machinery of the demolition drive on 23rd March. It appointed four 
lawyers of the Delhi High Court as ‘Court Commissioners’ for four of the twelve municipal 
zones of the city. The Court Commissioners were  supposed to act as the “eyes and ears of the 
court” and were directed “to keep a vigil in these zones and take periodical inspections and 
wherever unauthorised construction is going on, they may note the number of the property and 





Commissioners “to inspect the premises at the localities in their respective zones and to see 
whether in a residential area any commercial activity is being carried out” and if so, to inform the 
Commissioner of Police “for immediate action.” The Commissioner of the MCD was to 
accordingly file an “action taken report” before the Court stating that the unauthorized 
construction/ misuse reported by the Court Commissioner has been removed. The names of these 
Court Commissioners along with their telephone numbers and addresses were published in the 
newspapers on the orders of the court “so that any citizen or resident welfare association if they 
want to contact the Court Commissioners can contact them and the Court Commissioners can 
take cognizance of such complaints”. An apparatus was thus set up whereby the RWAs need no 
longer approach the Court to lodge complaints but could just go to its agents, the Court 
Commissioners, who would inform the MCD and/or the police, who would then file an ‘Action 
Taken Report” before the Court.  
When the first ‘public notice’ regarding the “Appointment of Court Commissioners” appeared in 
the newspapers on 5th April 2006, there was interestingly no mention of “illegal encroachments 
on public land”. It was limited to “unauthorized constructions” and “commercialization of 
residential premises”. This was soon to change. Like Justice Jain’s other omnibus PILs, this too, 
the largest of them, would soon also target slums. This choice was particularly glaring in this 
case, as the whole history of the PIL was about rampant middle class illegality, but as always the 
slums were the easiest target. The cross-mediation that was observable in most instances of 
slum-demolition at this time – the Court ordering demolition, the media egging it on and the 





But before that stage was reached, the Court’s apparatus was refined further. On 18th May 2006, 
selected lawyers were appointed as Court Commissioners for all the twelve municipal zones of 
Delhi. Finding it “difficult to monitor day-to-day activities of this magnitude”, the Court 
appointed a Monitoring Committee consisting of two retired senior policemen and another ex-
officio senior policeman still in service, “to monitor all the directions which have been given in 
this writ petition by this Court and also to carry out, implement and execute the directions passed 
by this Court.” The whole apparatus was ready now. The court had acquired the means to find 
the illegalities in the city and set them right. The RWA as the PIL petitioner at the demand end 
and the MCD at the supply end were just nodes for the Court to do the right thing and clean the 
city up.  
The Monitoring Committee was officially advertised in the newspapers as “constituted by 
Hon’ble High Court, Delhi, regarding Unauthorised Construction, Misuse of Properties & 
Encroachment on Public land.”226 The Monitoring Committee started submitting monthly reports 
to the Court, on which basis the Court passed orders. ‘Illegal encroachments on public land’ soon 
became the focus, and “public land” was increasingly understood in terms of its real estate value. 
This perspective is evident from the Court’s order dated 25th August 2006, when the Monitoring 
Committee was still in its early days: “The report of the Monitoring Committee has been placed 
before us. It has been stated in the report that because of the relentless efforts of the Court 
Commissioners, encroachment on public land measuring more than 7,96,200 square yards having 
market value of more than Rs.500 crores227 on the basis of a very conservative estimate have 
been retrieved by the MCD/DDA from the encroachers and unauthorized occupants. The 





get the cases of criminal trespass registered under the IPC against those individual.” The court 
would periodically give itself and its agents these self-congratulatory pats on the back, and the 
media would join the celebratory chorus. On 22nd March, 2007, the Hindustan Times carried a 
full page story to celebrate the first anniversary of the appointments of the first four Court 
Commissioners and quoted a figure from a Monitoring Committee report: “In a joint effort under 
the guidance of the court-appointed Monitoring Committee, the commissioners have helped the 
government reclaim public land worth around Rs. 7,000 crore from the encroachers over the past 
one year.” The Monitoring Committee members are quoted as saying in a status report, “The 
commissioners have done a wonderful job... The MCD and the DDA are, therefore, richer by 
thousands of crores.” 
Much of the time of the hearings went in the sparring between the Court-appointed authorities 
and the governmental authorities. The Monitoring Committee would place its report, present its 
achievements and point out persistent obstacles to demolition in various areas. The Court would 
pull up the respective governmental authority. The state would appear as the wrong-doer, on the 
other side of the law. Both sides would be trying to speak for the public. The state would be seen 
as speaking for ‘political society’ and therefore characterised by the court and its agents as 
enmeshed in the toleration of illegality. Meanwhile the court and its officials would represent 
themselves as speaking for civil society. The lawyers for the parties affected would barely get 
time to have their concerns heard. In this free-for-all, the high-profile lawyers ordinarily 
representing cases of ‘unauthorised construction’ and other elite illegalities would be the only 
ones who had any chance of getting relief. Cases of subaltern illegalities cast as ‘encroachments 





did appear because at some pro bono lawyer’s initiative, the court would provide new and 
remarkable legal arguments to ensure they enjoyed no legal protection.  
By mid-2006 the Court was finding it difficult to control the size of the case. Its orders became 
increasingly opaque and difficult to decipher. The orders would often read as some variation of 
the following, “The xx Report of the Monitoring Committee is filed. xx acres of public land is 
encroached in xx area. Action taken report to be filed by the Municipal authorities on xx date.” 
Perhaps the court was being euphemistic, but since the relevant Report itself was not in the 
public domain, it was impossible to know from the order itself what action was actually to be 
taken. There was no possibility of availing data from the Monitoring Committee regarding its 
proceedings and recommendations, even if one was directly affected228. Police officers had been 
appointed to man the Committee and they ran it with as little transparency as any police 
department. 
The attention of this case had been successfully turned to Justice Jain’s old area of interest -- 
slum demolitions. On 12th October 2006, the Court noted some new insights regarding slums in 
Delhi: 
“The Monitoring Committee has also pointed out that J.J. clusters have undergone sea change 
inasmuch as three to four storey buildings have come up in place of Jhuggies and several  
industrial and commercial establishments are running therefrom. Time has come for the 
authorities in Delhi to formulate a policy so as not only to stop these  unauthorized trade 
activities being run from these Jhuggi Jhopri clusters but also in view of the fact that the 





unplanned and hazardous structures  thereby making Delhi a complete slum.” In a truly 
remarkable sleight-of-hand that could only have come from a deeply-held prejudice (in the most 
literal sense of that word), the Court had deemed a slum to no longer be a slum because it had 
grown vertically – but the proliferation of these very ‘non-slums’ was blamed for making the city 
look like a slum! 
The emergence of upward mobility in Delhi slums was used as a bogey to aid their demolition. 
By this time, the Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006 had come into force, with its 
moratorium on court-ordered sealing and demolitions. But the Kalyan Sanstha bench led by 
Justice Jain found ingenious ways to continue its exercise. On 16th November 2006, it did a 
bizarre reading of the new Act. Stating that “the intention of the Parliament is clearly 
discernible”, it held that the moratorium could not be extended to unauthorized pucca229 
structures built on government land. There were very few slums in the harsh environs of Delhi 
that did not have features that could be considered pucca. Like Jagmohan had used photographs 
of slum houses with television sets to delegitimize them as not being poor enough, Justice Jain’s 
court, too, found that the slums were not wretched enough and therefore did not deserve the 
sympathy of the law. The Monitoring Committee soon sent out a circular to the municipal 
authorities that “those of the Jhuggi Jhopri clusters which have undergone a change in character 
and have been replaced by 2/3 storey tenements come under this ruling and can no longer be 
entitled to the moratorium. They are, therefore, liable to be demolished as has already been done 
in a few places in Delhi.” 230 
This was Justice Jain’s last order in this case before he was transferred to Chandigarh High Court 





MK Sharma, continued the case in the same vein. The enormity of the scale of this case soon 
meant it got listed every week, eventually acquiring a fixed two-hour time slot on Wednesday 
afternoons between 2 and 4 pm. Having subsumed all other cases against encroachment on 
public land and unauthorized colonies in Delhi as per the orders of the Court, it had become a 
mammoth case, with literally hundreds of Civil Miscellaneous Petitions (CMs) being made part 
of it. Every person or organisation affected by the case would have to file a CM to be heard by 
the Court. The scope of the case was so large that people (or ‘parties’) affected in each hearing 
would be in the hundreds. But it was impossible for everybody to be heard, as two hours a week 
was not enough for the scale of the case. It became difficult to physically enter these courtrooms 
even for lawyers appearing in the case. The Kalyan Sanstha hearings were held in courtrooms of 
enormous size – rooms which had proper seating for more than a 100 people – and there still 
would not be even standing room. Luckily for all concerned, these were centrally air-conditioned 
courtrooms. The journalists who ordinarily sat in the fourth or fifth row of upholstered chairs 
behind the lawyers would in this case actually sit in front of the lawyers, often right below the 
judges, next to the court-clerk – as if to underline how major a role they played in acting as 
cheerleaders for this case. One journalist would later tell me how judges would often look at 
them when making particularly volatile remarks like “Catch the big fish”, “Close down the 
municipal corporation”, or “We don’t care about (municipal) councillors”. These provocative 
pronouncements were made to be picked up by the media. And sure enough, they would often be 





Under Vijender Jain, the possibilities of PIL were explored to the fullest, most gargantuan scale. 
As Pushkar Sood, one of the Court Commissioners in this case, said admiringly to me in an 




Four years after Justice Jain’s last Kalyan Sanstha order, a series of taped conversations between 
the corporate lobbyist Niira Radia and various well-known politicians, bureaucrats, industrialists 
and mediapersons were leaked to the press. The Radia tapes became one of the biggest political 
scandals in contemporary India. One of the lesser-known conversations leaked in these tapes is 
between Radia and a prominent bureaucrat named Sunil Arora, in which he informs Radia that a 
Delhi High Court judge, Justice Vijender Jain, was paid off Rs 9 crores231 at his residence in a 
sealing case related to real estate by a middleman232. The favourable judgement, (Arora goes on), 
was written one month before it was delivered in court; the middleman was even given an 
advance copy. Arora also referred to Jain as Justice YK Sabharwal’s man – “Sabharwal ka 
aadmi”. None of these allegations have yet been acted upon legally. Justice Jain is currently 
chairman of the Human Rights Commission of the North Indian state of Haryana. This was the 





Good judges, bad judges: critical discourses on Public Interest Litigation in India 
 
“The average intelligent Indian thinks of PIL as the modern equivalent of the bell which the 
better kind of king is reputed to have strung outside his palace for the desperate citizen to tug at 
and get an instant hearing and instant justice. The average intelligent Indian also thinks that all 
the limitations of judicial power that he or she is otherwise familiar with will vanish when the 
Courts sit to hear PILs, namely that they become benign despots who can set every wrong right 
by passing a condign order.” 
–K. Balagopal233 
 
The Court must ever remind itself that one of the indicia identifying it as a court is the nature and 
character of the procedure adopted by it in determining a controversy". 
–Justice Pathak, Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs Union of India234 
 
 
The Supreme Court, in a 2010 judgment, provided its own history of PIL, broadly dividing 






“Phase-I: It deals with cases of this Court where directions and orders were passed primarily to 
protect fundamental rights under Article 21 of the marginalized groups and sections of the 
society who because of extreme poverty, illiteracy and ignorance cannot approach this court or 
the High Courts. 
Phase-II: It deals with the cases relating to protection, preservation of ecology, environment, 
forests, marine life, wildlife, mountains, rivers, historical monuments etc.etc. 
Phase-III: It deals with the directions issued by the Courts in maintaining the probity, 
transparency and integrity in governance.”235 
 
From ‘poverty’ to ‘environment’ to ‘governance’: this is the trajectory of PIL that the court itself 
confesses to. Sudipta Kaviraj has written of how the decline of institutional spaces with Mrs 
Gandhi’s more personalized politics made possible a new irresponsibility of ideology  with 
baffling shifts of emphasis, the most spectacular of these being how “fertility and not poverty 
became the major obstacle to Indian development” during the Emergency. PIL, too, with its lack 
of institutional grounding and close identification with specific judges, has been prone to these 
sorts of wild fluctuations in ideology. The most celebrated of these has been the shift in emphasis 
from poverty in its first phase in the early 1980s to bourgeois environmentalism from the mid-
1990s. It is the inherent instability of populism in both cases that allowed such a fundamental 






This change in priorities in PIL cases has not gone unlamented. There has been a significant 
literature criticizing this shift, especially the dislodging of the poor from the position of PIL’s 
foremost constituency. From the early 2000s, partly as a result of the kind of Court actions in 
PILs that we saw in the previous two chapters, there has been strong criticism of the Court’s 
approach to PIL. Two principal strands can be discerned in this debate – one led by the left-
liberal activist constituency that is disappointed by what they perceive as the decline and fall of 
1980s-era PIL, and the other led by critical self-reflection from the Bench itself. This second 
strand is represented by a few incumbent  judges, the most vociferous being Justice Markandey 
Katju  in the Supreme Court.  
 
The argument of the first strand is pithily represented by Upendra Baxi as the “Structural 
Adjustment of Judicial Activism.”236 He calls the new version of PIL “judicial counter-
revolution proceeding via the structural adjustment of judicial role, function, and power.”237 
Prashant Bhushan, India’s most well-known PIL lawyer, argues that the shifts in political 
economy since the 1990s led to changes in the nature of PIL: “the court has in fact bought the 
ideology underlying the economic reforms – an ideology which venerates the virtues of the free 
market and undermines the role of the state in providing education, jobs, and the basic amenities 
of life to its citizens.”238 The change in judicial attitudes is understood as an offshoot of changes 
in political economy. A more subtle version of the same argument is made by legal scholar Usha 
Ramanathan when she points out that by the end of the 1990s, “the original constituency of PIL – 
the poor and the vulnerable to whom constitutional and legal rights had to be reached” did not 





PIL era of the late ’70s and ’80s, which was spearheaded by ‘progressive’ judges – Justices 
Krishna Iyer, PS Bhagwati, Chinnappa Reddy and DA Desai (Baxi likes to call them ‘the four 
musketeers’240). But now, in post-liberalisation times, the argument goes, ‘regressive’ judges like 
Justices Kirpal, Sabharwal and Jain have led PIL in the opposite direction. Aditya Nigam, too, 
has drawn a similarly sharp distinction between what he calls “PIL Mark 1” (’80s PIL) and “PIL 
Mark 2” (post-liberalisation PIL, which he labels “The Brass Band of Neo-Liberalism”)241 This 
strand of argument shows a stark refusal to recognize the connection between these two phases. 
It sees changing trends in PIL purely in terms of political economy, in a sense begging the 
question: why is the PIL court the agent of neo-liberalism in India? 
 
This ideological approach of thinking about PIL is best summed up by lawyer and legal scholar 
Rajeev Dhavan as ‘consequentalist’— “the consequences of judicial decisions speak for 
themselves… From such a consequentalist analysis flows the further charge that the judiciary is 
essentially class-based.”242 Such accounts typically give a history of the Indian judiciary in these 
‘progressive/regressive’ terms. Such a perspective had a field-day in the pre-Emergency era, 
when the Supreme Court was portrayed as having stood by the right to property and therefore 
deemed to be regressive and anti-land reform. It was this discourse which was so successfully 
mobilized by Indira Gandhi and Mohan Kumaramangalam in the early 1970s in their call for 
‘committed’ judges who were ideologically suitable. And this was the basis of the supersession 
of judges, as we saw in the first chapter. The enduring legacy of Kumaramangalam is that the 






Not surprisingly, the most articulate version of such a consequentalist approach to ‘judicial 
activism’ comes from Justice Bhagwati, the architect of PIL in India, in an article in 1985.243 It is 
important to rehearse Bhagwati’s argument in some detail, because his is probably the 
hegemonic position on judicial politics in India. His point of departure is that “judges do make 
law” and that “judicial activism is a necessary and inevitable part of the judicial process”.244 The 
question would be “what kind of judicial activism, how much of it” and “to what willed results.” 
Based on these criteria, Bhagwati argues that judicial activism can take three forms. The first of 
these he calls ‘technical activism’, which declares judicial freedom to deploy various techniques 
and choices. It “is merely concerned with keeping juristic techniques open-ended”.245 The second 
is what Bhagwati refers to as ‘juristic activism’. It “is concerned… with the creation of new 
concepts irrespective of the purposes which they serve.”246 It is not concerned with the social 
consequences of these concepts. Whether they “help to preserve the status quo” or to “impede 
equitable distribution” is irrelevant.  
 
Bhagwati found both of these forms of judicial activism limited. What he was concerned about 
was the “purpose for which such activism is practiced”. He was interested, he wrote, in “the 
instrumental use of judicial activism.”247 Craig and Deshpande called his style an example of 
teleological reasoning. 248 For Bhagwati, judicial activism could “be evaluated only in terms of 
its social objective.” He was therefore a votary of a third kind, which he called ‘social activism’ 





principle, he explained what it meant. Judges in India “have to justify their decision-making 
within the framework of constitutional values” aimed towards “substantivization of social 
justice.”249. In this they were “motivated” by the ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’ of the 
Indian Constitution which held out “social justice as the central feature of  the new constitutional 
order.”  These principles “inspired some of the justices to become social activists.” “Judge led” 
and “judge induced” PIL was the means they chose to achieve this. All the procedural limitations 
of common law adjudication, of standing, adversarial procedure, fact-finding and judicial 
remedies were departed from in the precedent-setting landmark PIL cases of the early 1980s. PIL 
has since been closely identified with the few ‘social activist’ judges. And academic analysis as 
well as political rhetoric, I would argue, have since been skewed by such a narrow 
consequentalist approach. 
 
The limitations of the ideological critique are compounded by its purely discursive strategy and a 
lack of critical focus on the materiality of PIL. One of the few critics to foreground the extent of 
departure that PIL makes is Usha Ramanathan, though for her, too, the problem lies not in the 
extraordinary powers of the PIL Court but in the change in discourse that takes place in post-
liberalisation PILs. She criticizes a leading commentator on Indian judicial activism SP Sathe for 
looking at PIL “as merely an aspect of judicial review.”250 The newness of PIL, she argues, is 
“because of the extraordinary techniques of judicial intervention that the Supreme Court 
invented, and adopted. It is also the casting aside by the court of restraints placed by the doctrine 
of ‘separation of powers’ that called for a degree of ingenuity, which marked this phase of 





accompanied by ‘juristic’ activism.”251 Indeed PIL had gone far beyond judicial review. And to 
use the old tools to examine its ‘achievements’ would be severely limiting.  
 
There is a chronic failure to recognize that PIL provides a new infrastructure to concentrate 
policy making power in the hands of judges and enables them to forge adequate machinery to 
operationalise these new policies. Judges can raise an issue of public importance by themselves, 
suggest solutions, appoint people to collect evidence and even appoint personnel to monitor the 
implementation of these policies. Purely as an analogy, let us say a pro-management judiciary 
may have changed the very nature of labour jurisprudence in the last fifteen years. But even if 
there is a stark trend in labour law that denudes labour of the legal protections it earlier enjoyed, 
such a trend would still not be comparable to what PIL has done in the same period. A pure 
conceptual development in the law can only go so far. It does not provide the apparatus to 
change the very nature of governance, to enforce their ideas via a takeover of the whole arena. 
PIL has made this possible in the arenas in which it has intervened. It provides the procedural 
infrastructure to create a field for its operation and transform it.  
 
The other critique of PIL has come from within the Supreme Court itself – and this has been a 
more institutional critique. The close identification of PIL with Justice Bhagwati in the early 
1980s meant that the famous ‘epistolary jurisdiction’, by which letters written to the court would 
be treated as petitions, often had letters being personally addressed to Justice Bhagwati. He 





imprinted the early PILs “with the insignia of an individual justice, whereas what is needed in 
days to come is a collective imprimatur of the Court for the new litigation.”252 An institutional 
response was attempted by the bench of two judges (S.M. Fazal Ali and Venkataramiah JJ.) in 
the Sudipt Mazumdar case in 1983, when it formulated ten questions regarding PIL and passing 
an order referring it to a Constitutional Bench (of a minimum of five judges)253. These questions 
included, among others: 
 
“1. Should this Court take notice of such letters addressed by individuals by post enclosing some 
paper cuttings and take action on them suo motu except where the complaint refers to deprivation 
of liberty of any individual?” 
“6. Can this Court take action on letters addressed to it where the facts disclosed are not 
sufficient to take action? Should these letters be treated differently from other regular petitions 
filed into this Court in this regard and should the District Magistrate or the District Judge be 
asked to enquire and make a report to this Court to ascertain whether there is any case for further 
action?” 
“10. Would such informality not lead to greater identification of the Court with the cause than it 
would be when a case involving the same type of cause is filed in the normal way?”  
 
After having kept this case pending for a long time, a Constitution Bench around 2000 decided 





questions have still not been taken up and decided by any bench of the Supreme Court. The ad 
hoc approach continues, and no attempt at tidying up PIL principles was ever successfully made. 
There have been a few judicial initiatives since then to lay down such principles, but all have met 
the fate of Sudipt Mazumdar. It is still worthwhile, in my opinion, to examine these attempts and 
the institutional inertia they were met with. 
 
In a concurring judgment to Justice Bhagwati’s in the Bandhua Mukti Morcha case of 1984, 
Justice Pathak tried to formulate an institutional response so that PIL could “command broad 
acceptance.” He clarified “that all communications and petitions invoking the jurisdiction of the 
Court must be addressed to the entire Court, that is to say, the Chief Justice and his companion 
Judges. No such communication of petition can properly be addressed to a particular Judge… 
Communications and petitions addressed to a particular Judge are improper and violate the 
institutional personality of the Court.” Feeling the need to place limits on the flexibility of 
procedure that can be adopted in a PIL, J. Pathak laid down certain basic norms: “whatever the 
procedure adopted by the court it must be procedure known to judicial tenets and characteristic 
of a judicial proceeding… The Court must ever remind itself that one of the indicia identifying it 
as a Court is the nature and character of the procedure adopted by it in determining a 
controversy. It is in that sense limited in the evolution of procedures pursued by it in the process 







In 1988, the Supreme Court did introduce a new streamlined procedure to deal with letter 
petitions: any letter petition received would first be screened by a new PIL cell and would then 
be placed before a judge nominated for this purpose by the Chief Justice. This was meant to 
make sure that letters, even if addressed to specific judges, would henceforth deal with in an 
institutional manner. But by the late 1980s, though their symbolic charge was undiminished, 
letter petitions had come to form a minuscule percentage of the PILs actually dealt with by the 
Supreme Court. 
 
In one of the few academic writings to have expressed the need for an institutional approach to 
PIL, SK Agrawala proposed in 1985 that “The Court is not equipped in terms of the 
infrastructure to apply the non-adversarial procedure. If adversarial procedure is not to be 
applicable in PIL matters, the parties must know as to what the components of the alternative 
procedure(s) are. The laying down of guidelines for the non-adversarial procedure is, therefore, 
equally important.”254  Particularly important are his suggestions regarding the PIL approach to 
questions of fact: “If the court has to manage the collection of facts, data and evidence on its 
own, it seems to be obviously desirable that a permanent, trained and experienced fact-finding 
machinery is set up under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.”255 
 
In a prescient suggestion that anticipated Justice Vijender Jain’s court commissioners in Kalyan 
Sanstha, Agrawala pointed out the problems that would emerge with Justice Bhagwati’s blithe 





those, whom or about whom he knows personally. It is human nature. Such commissioners are 
likely to be at least as biased as the judges who have been enthusiastic about PIL litigation. Bias 
even for a good cause, is bias all the same. Secondly, they may not be adequately trained for the 
job that may be entrusted to them... Fact finding, investigation and reporting are not something 
that everybody and anybody can be entrusted with.”256 
 
In August 2009, when I interviewed a court commissioner appointed in Kalyan Sanstha, he drew 
a direct connection between  his appointment in this case and the 1985 precedent laid down by 
Justice Bhagwati in Bandhua Mukti Morcha, that rules of civil procedure, which are normally 
made applicable in a modified form to all Supreme Court cases through the Supreme Court 
Rules257 need not apply to PIL cases. Therefore, cross-examination of evidence collected by 
commissioners would not be necessary. This would lead to fundamental departures from 
principles of adjudication, as Muralidhar and Desai argued in 2000, “The reports given by court-
appointed commissioners raise problems regarding their evidentiary value. No court can found 
its decision on facts unless they are proved according to law. This implies the right of an 
adversary to test them by cross-examination or at least counter affidavits.”258  
 
In one of the applications filed in Kalyan Sanstha, I watched as the lawyer for a slum ordered to 
be demolished by the Court, tried to make the factual point that these were kaccha houses259 
which would be saved by the moratorium under the Delhi Special Provisions Act. Chief Justice 





in writ jurisdiction.” In general, all the alleged facts (on the basis of which the commissioners 
were pushing the demolition apparatus into action) were deemed incontestable, thanks to the 
supposedly non-adversarial nature of PIL. The comment “This is not an adversarial proceeding” 
would be used repeatedly by the bench to deflect any questions of fact.  
 
After the 1980s, hardly any attempts were made to create clear procedural rules for PIL. In 1997, 
Chief Justice Verma, who had led the process of the apotheosis of the amicus curiae in Vineet 
Narain, announced the setting up of a committee under a Supreme Court judge to draft a separate 
chapter on Public Interest Litigation to be introduced in the Supreme Court Rules, “which would 
contain general rules for guidance to maintain uniformity.” But Chief Justice Verma soon retired, 
and nothing came of it. No general rules to govern PIL have been framed till date. 
 
In 2007, soon after the retirement of Chief Justice Sabharwal, just as the process I describe in 
Chapters 2 and 3 was reaching its peak, there was a severe attack on PIL from the Supreme 
Court Bench itself – by a maverick judge called Markandey Katju. Katju used to great effect a 
strategy commonly deployed by the Indian Supreme Court judges, which was to cite his own 
previous judgments as precedent. Katju passed at least four such judgments between 2007 and 
2009. The first, given in May 2007, and the last, given in 2009, are particularly interesting 
because they were both delivered as part of a two-judge bench, and the other respective 
incumbent judges gave their own answers to the questions Katju posed of PIL. But the most 





on the bench, AK Mathur, agreeing with him, because it immediately carried the force of law as 
binding precedent.260  
 
Katju’s 2007 judgment in Aravali Golf Club tapped into the discourse of Montesquieu’s 
separation of powers. He argued, “In the name of judicial activism Judges cannot cross their 
limits and try to take over functions which belong to another organ of the State... Judges must 
know their limits and must not try to run the Government. They must have modesty and 
humility, and not behave like Emperors.” Katju quoted a lecture by Justice Verma to ridicule the 
PILs in the Delhi High Court: “Judiciary has intervened to question a mysterious car racing 
down the Tughlaq Road in Delhi, allotment of a particular bungalow to a Judge, specific 
bungalows for the Judges’ pool, monkeys capering in colonies, stray cattle on the streets, 
clearing public conveniences, levying congestion charges at peak hours at airports with heavy 
traffic, etc. under the threat of use of contempt power to enforce compliance of its orders.” Katju 
added to this list: “the orders passed by the High Court of Delhi in recent times dealt with 
subjects ranging from age and other criteria for nursery admissions, unauthorized schools, 
criteria for free seats in schools, supply of drinking water in schools, number of free beds in 
hospitals on public land, use and misuse of ambulances, requirements for establishing a world 
class burns ward in the hospital, the kind of air Delhities breathe, begging in public, the use of 
sub-ways, the nature of buses we board, the legality of constructions in Delhi, identifying the 
buildings to be demolished, the size of speed-breakers on Delhi roads, auto-rickshaw over-
charging, growing frequency of road accidents and enhancing of road fines etc. In our opinion 





was incorrect, of course, but to point out that these matters were not fit subjects for judicial 
intervention was by now immensely counter-intuitive, and Katju’s intemperate style made it 
seem especially excessive.  
 
Katju’s opinions created enormous controversy in the media as well in legal and academic 
circles. The response was mostly acerbic. Rajeev Dhavan accused him of “judicial terrorism.”261 
Amazingly, this was the same term that Upendra Baxi had used in 1982 to attack Justice 
Tulzapurkar’s opposition  to the forum-shopping that Justice Bhagwati’s monopoly of PIL made 
possible262. Dhavan went on to oppose any attempt to re-open the questions posed in Sudipt 
Mazumdar, declaring that “[a]n assessment of PIL itself will open a Pandora’s box, which is 
neither necessary nor desirable.” T.R. Andhyarujina, one of the few senior advocates of the 
Supreme Court somewhat critical of PIL, suggested in a newspaper editorial that “a larger bench 
of the Supreme Court should lay down authoritative criteria of the permissible and impermissible 
judicial interventions... To distil judicial power by rigid rules of conduct is not advisable but it 
may at least guide the future course of the action of courts in the vast and amorphous jurisdiction 
assumed by them in the name of judicial activism.”263  
 
The Chief Justice of India, KG Balakrishnan, immediately went into damage control mode. He 
“quelled dissenting voices by declaring that public interest litigation cases (PILs) will continue 
despite the order.”264 He also immediately separated the two judges, so that Katju would no 





before the Chief Justice: should a Constitutional Bench be set up to decide the principles of PIL 
that Katju was questioning? Again, the answer was no. A three-judge bench was set up, but soon 
even that went into cold storage. It met the same fate as Sudipt Mazumdar.  The reason for this 
steadfast refusal to systematize the PIL jurisdiction is perhaps best explained by Pratap Bhanu 
Mehta, “The legitimacy and power that India’s judiciary does enjoy most likely flow not from a 
clear and consistent constitutional vision, but rather from its opposite.”265 
 
The two judges mentioned earlier, who disagreed with Katju while being on the same bench as 
him – Justice S.B. Sinha in State of UP vs Jeet S Bisht, and Justice A.K. Ganguly in University of 
Kerala vs Council, Principals, Colleges, Kerala & Others – are important to rehearse here, 
because the tropes they deploy are consistently used to repel any criticism of PIL. Both 
judgments reject the idea that there is any strict ‘separation of powers’ in the Indian Constitution. 
Another strategy common to both judgments is that one of the primary weapons they use to 
deflect Katju’s attack on PIL is the international recognition it has received. This is not 
uncommon: Indian Supreme Court judges like to pat themselves on the back, routinely citing 
articles by foreign academics hailing the ingenuity of PIL. Justice Sinha began his discussion 
with the statement: “Indian Supreme Court has achieved world-wide acclaim in fashioning new 
rights under Part III of the Constitution and also using Directive Principles as interpretive 
devices for giving a contemporaneous meaning to Part III.” He went on to quote an Oxford 
professor, Sandra Fredman’s article in a British public law journal, which saw “inspiration in the 






Justice Ganguly, too, relied on two British luminaries, one writing expressly on PIL. Ganguly 
justified the judicial legislations made by the Supreme Court in PIL cases by noting “that this 
attempted legislation by this Court has been applauded internationally”. He referred to a 
Cambridge Law Journal article which celebrated India’s departure from the idea of separation of 
powers: “It is possible for a court deliberately to depart from the triadic structure in order to 
combat the resource deficiencies of litigants. An interesting example of this can be found in India 
were the Supreme Court has attempted to meet the institutional challenges posed by a 
combination of a weak legislation and a poor citizenry. The Supreme Court has relaxed the 
formal restrictions on applications to the court. An application can be made by a letter, or even a 
postcard, addressed to the court… These measures must be commended as a significant attempt 
to adapt the court to the needs of the unempowered citizenship...”267.  
 
Another strategy both the judges used was to subtly point out how all the lawyers concerned in 
these two specific cases, indeed most members of the bar, were in favour of PIL. This is 
remarkable because it was certainly not true in the early 1980s. As Upendra Baxi noted then, the 
bar’s reaction swung “from indifference to indignation at what it regards as freak litigation”.268 
While the initial response to PIL from the bar, or at least its elite members, was one of hostility, 
two decades down, almost all the leading members of the Supreme Court Bar are leading 
exponents of PIL. This would be evident if one looks at the official online bios of the judges of 





elevated to the bench. Almost all prominently display their PIL cases as badges of honour. Pride 
of place is given to the cases they handled as amicus curiae.  
 
A trope repeatedly used to defend PIL from these attacks was the idea of ‘misuse’. Katju’s attack 
on PIL was seen as throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Even the ideological critics of 
post-liberalisation PIL were critical of this. After all, the argument went, it was not PIL per se 
that was the problem, it was the ‘misuse of PIL’. This trope is a persistent one in Indian legal 
debates generally. It is not the law which is the problem, it is its misuse. Indian security statutes 
might give the police blanket powers to arrest and detain suspects indefinitely without bail, and 
confessions made to police officers be made admissible as evidence. But if such powers lead to 
endemic practices of torture, it is called ‘misuse’. The PIL jurisdiction gave blanket powers to 
judges to act as per their ideological beliefs in order to help the poor and promote distributive 
justice. But this was not seen as a problem. Institutional checks were not needed, went the 
argument, what were needed were good judges. The right kind of PIL was still possible if we had 
the right kind of judges. So different PIL commentrators and dramatis personae were hopeful of 
their respective personifications of good judges. Upendra Baxi would be nostalgic about his ‘four 
musketeers’ from the 80s. A successful PIL litigant from 1990s Shiv Sagar Tiwari would long 
for the days of Justice Kuldip Singh whom he described as a “dabangg judge”— an uber 
masculine, fearless judge— while the rest were feckless “eunuchs” according to him. And a 
Kalyan Sanstha commissioner would wistfully talk of the days of Justice Vijender Jain as the 
golden period of PIL. None of these PIL-wallahs had any problems with the kind of enormous 





of the PIL game that they all wanted to play. As Colin Gonsalves, a leading PIL lawyer, told me 
in an interview in May 2009: “[The PIL] court has capacity to do good and do bad. I would 
rather the court has this capacity than not.” PIL was a Faustian bargain that its votaries were 
willing to make. 
POSTSCRIPT - I 
In 2008, the Delhi High Court got a new Chief Justice, AP Shah. Shah was renowned as a left-
liberal judge, and with the powers that accrued to his position, he started cleaning the Augean 
stables. As the Chief Justice, he could completely reset the tone of the Delhi High Court on PIL. 
As legal scholar Nick Robinson observes, “The power to set benches is also given to High Court 
Chief Justices. Like their counterpart in the Supreme Court, they have a strong say in controlling 
their court’s agenda. For example, in most High Courts, it’s the Chief Justice’s bench that first 
hears public interest litigation (PIL). Consequently, High Courts gain a reputation either as 
sympathetic or unsympathetic to PILs based largely on the Chief Justice alone.”269 Most of 
Justice Vijender Jain’s omnibus PILs (discussed in Chapter 3), which had remained active under 
Chief Justice MK Sharma, were finally terminated during Chief Justice Shah’s benevolent reign. 
Hemraj, Hem Nalini Mehra, the Yamuna encroachments case – all were disposed of by the High 
Court during this period. Kalyan Sanstha was not fully disposed of under Shah, but was 
defanged with the disbanding of the Monitoring Committee and the Court Commissioners in 






In the omnibus PIL system, these cases were not really meant to ever be closed. They were to be 
kept perpetually pending so that the court could govern that aspect of the city – whether it be 
unauthorized constructions, traffic congestion or road conditions. Justice Shah’s PIL bench made 
a major departure from the earlier trend by passing orders closing these cases, like in Hemraj, 
where the Court stated: “It appears to this Court that the continued monitoring of the 
implementation of the earlier directions issued by this Court in these petitions is no longer 
necessary… Several directions have already been issued in these matters and it is needless to 
reiterate them. It is incumbent on the authorities concerned to implement those directions. If 
there is any specific instance of violation of these directions, it would be open to any of the 
Members of the Amicus Curiae Committee to bring it to the notice of the authorities concerned 
for their prompt remedial action”.  
 
Some of Justice Jain’s most egregious decisions, like the ban on cycle-rickshaws, were reviewed 
and set aside. Meanwhile, the most celebrated decision in Delhi High Court’s history, declaring 
as unconstitutional a provision of the penal code criminalizing sodomy, was given by Justice 
Shah’s bench. Suddenly all was well with the judiciary. The original constituency of PIL was 
happy – the right kind of PILs were being heard, and the wrong kind culled. (On the other hand, 
the constituency which had a field day during Justice Jain’s and Justice Sharma’s day was 
despondent. As a journalist who covered the High Court ‘beat’ for an English newspaper told 
me, “After this bench, [I have had] nothing newsworthy in last three weeks. Shah makes no off 
the cuff remarks. When PILs like Hemraj of 10-15 years vintage were disposed by him, even the 





eunuchs.271 Such a language reeking of machismo in which PIL-watchers speak of PIL judges 
tells its own story.) 
 
There were other important developments. Some of the excesses committed during Justice Jain’s 
time finally came to light, and could be legally recognised. The sinister possibilities of Kalyan 
Sanstha’s Monitoring Committee were exposed in  a writ filed by the street vendors in a market 
in south Delhi who had been evicted by the former’s orders. In this case, it was proved that an 
oral order was passed by the Monitoring Committee in 2006 and communicated telephonically to 
the concerned MCD official for removing ‘unauthorised encroachers’ in Ram Lal Market, 
without any order in writing being given. This would pre-empt any legal action against the 
evictions as no paper trail would exist at all. Such kind of arbitrary functioning of the Monitoring 
Committee had been speculated upon earlier, but it was now confirmed by the High Court itself 
that the Court-appointed Committee had been issuing oral orders for evicting and demolishing 
‘unauthorised encroachers.’ The reason it was found out was because the coordinator of the 
Monitoring Committee had written to the MCD official reminding him about the earlier 
telephonic communication and asking him for an Action Taken Report regarding the 
encroachments.  
 
In an apparent attempt to redress such previous wrongs and prevent similar future ones, the High 
Court bench in 2008 clarified “that oral orders are an antithesis of natural justice, fairplay and 





have the consequence of vitally affecting the livelihood of any party or any other civil 
consequences cannot be passed orally and even if in rare matters of extreme urgency such as a 
fire or a riot, oral orders are passed, such orders must be reduced to writing ex-post facto and put 
on record as soon as possible. Furthermore, the oral orders being non-reasoned naturally afford 
no remedy whatsoever to the affected party.”272 Over two decades before this, in 1985, Justice 
Pathak in Bandhua Mukti Morcha had tried to introduce this minimum idea of natural justice, so 
that when evidence was collected by court-appointed commissioners in a PIL, at least a chance to 
hear the other side and contradict it be given to the affected party. But Justice Bhagwati did not 
want to encumber PIL with any such procedural safeguards. His radical ideas had now come 
home to roost.  
 
Justice Shah retired in February 2010. Soon the old PILs his bench had ordered to be closed were 
attempted to be revived. For instance, there was a PIL that had been filed by the Jangpura RWA 
in 2006 for “the  removal of unauthorised constructions and  encroachments”, which had led to 
demolition of slums in the Jangpura area in South-central Delhi in 2006-07. In July 2008, the 
RWA had filed a new application before the High Court, asking for the demolition of all 
remaining structures, including a mosque, used by the slum-dwellers who were said to be 
Bangladeshis. This application was listed before Justice Shah’s bench,  who instead of ordering 
any further demolition, disposed of the PIL itself with this order: “most of the unauthorised 
structures have been removed and there is a boundary wall constructed to ensure that no further 
encroachments take place. It is stated by the counsel for the Respondents [MCD] that any further 





promptly looked into and appropriate action will be taken thereon. In view of this statement, this 
Court does not consider it necessary to continue to monitor the progress of the implementation of 
its directions.” In October 2010, with Justice Shah gone, this old PIL was revived through the 
backdoor with a contempt case filed by the Jangpura RWA, alleging that the above order by 
Shah in 2008 had ordered the MCD to take action against encroachments in the area and they 
had not done so. The High Court, without issuing any notice to the affected parties, immediately 
ordered the MCD to take action against the encroachments and file a ‘compliance affidavit’. 
Accordingly, on 12 January 2011, the MCD demolished the mosque called Noor Masjid in 
Jangpura.273 
 
In October 2012, there was an attempt to revive the most powerful of Justice Vijender Jain’s 
PILs: the Kalyan Sanstha case. A PIL was filed against illegal constructions by Anil Dutt 
Sharma, a city businessman274, in the Delhi High Court. Sharma sought an order of the Court 
directing the municipal authorities: “(i) to remove entire illegal encroachments, illegal 
constructions on the pavements, roadsides, roadside-drains, parking places, common areas, green 
lands in entire areas of Delhi and to clear each and every roads, lanes, parks, parking areas and 
common places in Delhi for free traffic and common use as per existing Master Plan 2021; 
and/or (ii) Direct the respondents concerned to forthwith repair, clean and improve all the roads, 






The bench, headed by the new Chief Justice D Murugesan demanded a status report from the 
municipal agencies in response. In February 2013, when the bench next heard this PIL, the 
Judges are reported to have observed that “it is clear from the status report the court's 
intervention is needed to make the officials take action”, and revived its scrutiny of the nodal 
steering committees of the municipal bodies of Delhi.276 The court ordered, “all the instances of 
encroachment on public/municipal land and/or unauthorized construction on such land, which 
are the subject matter of this petition, shall be brought by the petitioner to the notice of the 
concerned Nodal Steering Committees within six weeks from today and the Nodal Steering 
Committees shall take action on them in accordance with law and file an Action Taken Report 
within 3 months, commencing after 6 weeks from today.”  
 
The bench also instructed that all petitions filed by those affected by the MCD’s court directed 
demolition drive would have to come before this same bench for any relief. The court had kindly 
restricted the scope of its order to only all “encroachments on public land/municipal land and/or 
unauthorized constructions, if any, raised on public land/municipal land” in Delhi. The Times of 
India celebrated this as the return of Kalyan Sanstha, “Delhi high court monitored drive against 
illegal construction in the city is set to return, after a hiatus of five years.”277 The Hindustan 
Times legal correspondent was more gleeful, “After a gap of more than four years, bulldozers 
will be back in a big way on Delhi’s streets.”278 
 





When his relatively serious attacks on PIL seemed to cut no ice, Justice Katju resorted to what 
can only be called devastating parody. This most vivid portrayal of the amazingly protean 
possibilities of PIL was in a two judge bench he was heading in 2009. His actions were part 
immanent critique and part Brechtian theatre that I had the privilege to witness.  
A PIL had been filed in 2001 by a Chennai lawyer about the poor condition of wetlands in 
India.279 The various governments were asked to file replies but nothing much happened till 
2009, when the case came before Katju. He decided that reviving all the wetlands in India were 
too small a matter to be dealt with in one case. He wanted to make the PIL into ‘the water 
matter’, where all the endemic water problems facing the country would come before him. The 
analogy drawn was to ‘the forest matter’, that has taken over the forest governance of the 
country, heard every week on Friday afternoons for two hours by a three-judge bench of the 
Supreme Court. (Since 2010, heard by two such benches).  
Katju ordered: 
“The present Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constititution of India relates to conservation 
of wet lands which in our opinion would include ponds, tanks, canals, creeks, water channels, 
reservoirs, rivers, streams and lakes. Although, the writ petition as framed related to protection of 
wetlands in the country for preservation of the environment and maintaining the ecology, we 
have suo motu expanded its scope as mentioned below.”  The court had its own diagnosis of the 
water problems facing the country, “There is acute shortage of water in our country and one of 
the main reasons for that is that most of the water conservation bodies in our country such as 





such persons have constructed buildings, shops etc. on the same. Our ancestors were wise people 
who realised that because of droughts or some other reasons there may be shortage of water in 
future and hence they made the provision of a pond near every village, tanks in or near temples, 
etc.” And its own solutions, which Katju had already expressed himself on in another judgment 
that he had passed earlier that year, gratuitously holding forth on water scarcity in India in an 
inter-state water dispute280.  
 
But this time his words had the force of law. Katju wanted the “Central Government to 
immediately constitute a body of eminent scientists in the field who should be requested to do 
scientific research in this area on a war footing to find out scientific ways and means of solving 
the water shortage problem in the country”281. It was also recommended that “the said body shall 
be given all the financial, technical and administrative help by the Central and State 
Governments for this purpose. The said body of scientists was requested to, inter alia, perform 
the following tasks: 
 (i) to find out an inexpensive method or methods of converting saline water into fresh water. 
 (ii) to find out an inexpensive and practical method of utilizing the water, which is in the form of 
ice, in the Himalayas. 





 (iv) to utilize the flood water by harnessing the rivers so that the excess water in the floods, may 
instead of causing damage, be utilized for the people who are short of water, or be stored in 
reservoirs for use when there is drought.”282 
 
The Times of India reported this order with bemusement: “A Bench headed by Justice 
Markandey Katju, who is known for his strict approach towards PILs and his conviction that 
administration cannot be run by the courts through such litigation, issued notice to the ministry 
of science and technology to tell the court about the follow-up action it has taken since his 
recommendations on February 6 in an inter-state water dispute case. The reaction of the Bench, 
also comprising Justice V Sudershan Reddy, may have surprised counsel Gopal 
Shankaranarayan, who appearing for petitioner M K Balakrishnan had been toiling for the past 
couple of years to convince the apex court for some urgent action to protect the disappearing 
wetlands vitally affecting the water table, flora and fauna. But, he would not complain for the 
Bench while expanding the scope of the PIL said that the prayers would include all methods 
needed to solve water shortage problems, including converting sea water into 
fresh water and water in snow cap peaks.”283 
 
Katju wanted this PIL to be heard by him every month. The case was heard seven times in 2009 
while he was on the Bench. The Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology, Union of India 
filed in August 2009 the first progress report of the “Technology Mission: Winning, 





in this case. The petitioner, a debarred lawyer, was enjoying his moment of reflected glory and 
had made copies of the report for all the members of the press.  
After Katju retired, this case has never been listed by the Supreme Court at all. Perhaps nothing 
much came out of it, but Katju had provided a textbook demonstration of the amazing powers 






Conclusion: The Procedural is Political 
In Max Weber’s classic theory of modern law in ‘Economy and Society’, he describes the need 
for a logically formal rational legal system to exist in tandem with the rise of capitalism. This 
model of modern law is that of a society dominated by an autonomous rule system, or 
“legalism”, as legal sociologist David Trubek calls it. A legalistic society in this sense is of 
course an ideal type, and so is its Weberian opposite: kadijustiz. As Weber’s translator Max 
Rheinstein explains it, the term kadijustiz was used by Weber as “a term of art to describe the 
administration of justice which is oriented not at fixed rules of a formally rational law but at the 
ethical, religious, political, or otherwise expediential postulates of a substantively rational 
law.”284  
The legal history of post-Emergency India shows a remarkable opposition to legalism and a 
concomitant embrace of ‘kadijustiz’ at all levels of the judiciary – or, as Rajeev Dhavan has 
called its Indian analogue, ‘panchayati justice’. Being legalistic has decisively emerged as a 
negative attribute for judicial performance in post-Emergency India. In this dissertation, I have 
focused on the impact of the rise of this culture of legal informalism at the highest levels of the 
Indian judiciary, through the examination of PIL. But the institutional impact of such legal 
informalism is not limited to the PIL jurisdiction alone. It has infected every part of the legal 
system.  
One of the most spectacular instances of ‘panchayati justice’ in recent years, which finally led to 
some critical debate on this phenomenon, was the verdict given by the Lucknow Bench of the 





contemporary India: the civil suit to decide the Ram Janmabhoomi - Babri Mosque dispute. The 
legal dispute was to settle title to the disputed property between three principal parties: the Hindu 
idol ‘Shri Ram Lalla Virajman’, another Hindu religious organization ‘Nirmohi Akhara’, and the 
Sunni Central Wakf Board. As a private property dispute filed in a civil court, such a case is 
governed by strict rules of procedure, and the court can only give forms of relief that are legally 
prayed for. However, the verdict given, after the suit had been pending for decades, was to divide 
the property equally among all three parties. What was particularly strange was that the court 
dismissed the Wakf Board’s suit as time-barred for having been filed after the limitation period 
had expired, but still went on to award it relief. Particularly insidious was the looseness with 
which the judgment referred to the parties by their religion. But, for our purposes, what is of 
interest is the debate this verdict led to.  
For once, ‘panchayati justice’ emerged as a term of criticism in India public discourse. Eminent 
senior advocate P.P. Rao said about the judgment: “It is difficult to appreciate how the property 
can be divided by the court while dismissing the suits. This is nothing but a panchayati type of 
justice. If the court accepts that the Waqf Board is entitled to one-third of the land, it can’t 
dismiss the suit. If the court dismisses the suits, it can’t give only a portion of the land. The court 
has gone beyond the prayers in the suits. When no one had asked for division of the land, how 
can the court divide the land into three portions?”285 Rajeev Dhavan weighed in: “Never in legal 
history has a title suit been converted into a partition suit in this way… This is panchayati justice 
which takes away the legal rights of Muslims and converts the moral sentimental entitlements of 
Hindus into legal rights.”286 Retired Chief Justice of India A.H. Ahmadi said, “I am not sure on 





third be a masjid now, and if the title is theirs, how can two-thirds be divided? There certainly 
can be a compromise but that should have happened after the verdict. The verdict should not 
appear like a decision of a panchayat foisted forcibly on all parties.”287 
The contrary view, celebrating the judgment, showed its impatience with technicalities. I quote 
here three powerful senior advocates of the Supreme Court. Harish Salve said: “It has used the 
judicial discretion available to a court. There is no legal principle preventing judges to exercise 
statesmanship as long as it is within the framework of the law.”288 KK Venugopal declared: “It is 
a statesmanship-like judgment and it is good for the country.”289 And Mukul Rohatgi offered the 
following comment: ‘“I think it is a political kind of solution. It has given something to 
everybody. This seems to be the just possible solution in respecting the sentiments of all parties. 
We should be progressive on these issues and accept the judgment.”290  
Opinions on either side could be neatly contrasted. The former view could be seen as narrowly 
legalistic, critical of the Court for overreaching itself, while the latter strand of opinion 
appreciates the court’s political statesmanship, even if extra-legal, against the background of the 
need for communal peace. The latter argument might be summed in aphoristic terms as: It might 
be bad law, but it’s good politics. Such teleological reasoning carries the day in post-Emergency 
Indian legal culture. The underlying assumption behind such an approach seems to be that the 
political is purely external to law, not immanent within it. The votaries of panchayati justice 
seem to believe that there is no political content to the legal form itself, that it can be evaluated 
purely by the decision it leads to. The normative basis of this legal form and the sedimented 
history it contains within itself is rarely paid any attention in such an analysis. But is it a valid 





dealt with less flippantly? Is there no way to understand law except on the basis of criteria 
external to it? Is the only way to evaluate legal developments in terms of their consequences? 
Does the utter collapse of court procedure— the exclusion of necessary and proper parties to a 
dispute, for instance— not affect the political evaluation of the decision arrived by such a 
‘court’? The consequentalism vs deontology binary might not be the most useful way in which to 
think about these questions. But I would argue that there is, at the very least, a need to think in 
terms of institutional consequences rather than narrow immediate results. An attempt is made in 
this dissertation to assess the enduring political repurcussions of what I have argued has been a 
reckless overhauling of Indian legal institutions in the last few decades. 
The apotheosis of legal informalism or panchayati justice in post-Emergency India has been 
achieved in spite of the fact that the biggest legal scandal of this period, the Bhopal settlement, 
was an astonishing example of judicial bad faith passing for panchayati justice. Then too, let us 
not forget, the Supreme Court said, “Legal and procedural technicalities should yield to the 
paramount considerations of justice and humanity.” What came in the way of imposing legal 
liability in Bhopal, the court argued, was the suffering of the people. Upendra Baxi wrote in 
mourning after the settlement that it was if the poisonous Methyl Iso Cyanate gas “had entered 
the soul of Indian jurisprudence.”291 Unfortunately this ‘Indian jurisprudence’ survived the 
poison and lived on. The lessons of Bhopal were not learnt. Let us not forget the main perfidy of 
the settlement. The victims were not even consulted before the Court pronounced on their fate. 
They were considered “irresponsible and uninformed”292 and therefore given a fait accompli. 
Their grievance had been expropriated first by the Indian government and then by the Indian 





victims. That such a court would soon get rid of the petitioner in PILs and arrogate powers as 
victim and ajdudicator to itself can hardly be surprising. Veena Das ends her essay on Bhopal 
with a quote from Lyotard: “It is in the nature of a victim not to be able to prove that one has 
been done a wrong. A plaintiff is someone who has incurred damages and who disposes of the 
means to prove it. One becomes a victim if one loses these means.”293 PIL has become a giant 
machine to turn plaintiffs into victims. 
The turn away from legality to panchayati justice is manifest in other spheres too. When the ‘lok 
adalat’ (people’s court), a kind of informal court of small causes, was first introduced nationally 
in 1987, it was to be “guided by the principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legal 
principles”.294 But even this vague phrase was seen as too rigid and an amendment in 2002 
introduced the ‘permanent lok adalat,’ which was to be “guided by the principles of natural 
justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of justice, and shall not be bound by the 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872”.295 As Galanter and Krishnan 
argue, “the shift of decisional standards from “legal principles” to “principles of justice” suggests 
a major enlargement of the presiding judge’s discretion and a robust faith that the poor have 
more to gain from benign paternalism than from juristic or popular legality”.296  
Galanter and Krishnan record that when they presented their critical hypothesis on lok adalats 
(they called it ‘debased informalism’) to an audience of High Court and Supreme Court judges, 
they were accused of seeing things through a Western, even colonial lens. The judges’ rather 
impatient response was to say that irrespective of how perfunctory such justice might be, lok 





how justice functions in India”. Such an argument, that ‘Indian conditions’ require informalism, 
has been the basis of the valorisation and justification of PIL right from its inception.  
This normativization of substantive justice for Indian conditions has been advocated by Partha 
Chatterjee as well in his recent work on political society. Chatterjee asks, “Is justice better served 
by the non-arbitrary procedures of the equal application of the law, or by the contextual and 
possibly arbitrary judgment that addresses the peculiarities of a particular case?”297 This 
dissertation is partly a response to that question, and an attempt to address, however partially, the 
related academic lack that Chatterjee underlines when he points out that “the continuing social 
legitimacy of arbitrary power is an important and under-researched aspect of the practices of 
Indian democracy.”  
So who decides what serves justice better? Chatterjee’s own answer to this question is subtle but 
clear enough, “Political society in India... affords the possibility of inviting the arbitrary power of 
government to mitigate the potentially tyrannical power of the law.”298  He goes on to 
approvingly cite two historical accounts from colonial Bengal that criticised the British regime of 
non-arbitrary rule of law and argued that “direct access to an impartial judge who was 
knowledgeable about and sensitive to the specific circumstances of a case was far more likely to 
serve the cause of justice.”299 Chatterjee argues that this “critique has continued to inform 
popular beliefs and practices about the judicial system of modern India.”300 
According to Chatterjee, there are at least two discourses this “widely shared popular critique of 
the modern normative idea of the non-arbitrary and equal application of the law” can draw its 





genealogy of an endemic tendency in modern political theory to diagnose an empirical deviation 
from the norm, and then carve out an exception to the norm. This tendency itself keeps evolving 
as we move from colonial to postcolonial regimes of power. While the first ‘symmetrical’ 
response of political theory since Bentham, was of “many conservative colonial officials of 
British India, that the impersonal procedures of rational law and bureaucracy were unsuited to 
backward societies used to customary rather than contractual obligations and that the exercise of 
personal but impartial authority was more appropriate.”  This would lead to the declaration of a 
colonial exception. On the other hand, with the more contemporary ‘sequential’ approach of 
‘multiple modernities’, “we might be moved to suggest not the irrelevance of the norm of the 
impersonal and non-arbitrary application of the law but its critical re-evaluation in the light of 
emergent practices in many postcolonial countries that seek to punctuate or supplement it by 
appealing to the personal and contextual circumstances.” From this, Chatterjee goes on to 
speculate “that the enormous powers of judicial review of legislation and active surveillance of 
executive acts assumed by the Indian law courts — powers unknown in any other liberal 
constitutional system in the world — is a response to this popular critique of procedural non-
arbitrariness.” Chatterjee’s project includes an attempt “to redefine the normative standards of 
modern politics in the light of the considerable accumulation of new practices that may at present 
be described only in the language of exceptions but in fact contain the core of a richer, more 
diverse and inclusive, set of norms.”301 
In other words, ‘emergent practices’ or ‘improvisations’ are to lead to redefined norms— 
underlying this, I worry, is an attempt to derive an ought from an is. Chatterjee’s confidence that 





seems to me difficult to sustain. The difference between these two colonial and postcolonial 
logics of carving out an exception to the global norm is not as stark as Chatterjee argues: the two 
do bleed into each other, in their common culturalist justification, for example.  
Chatterjee’s examples of such practices are in the realm of political society, where governmental 
authorities like municipal officials or the police carve out exceptions for marginal populations to 
inhabit spaces illegally or to get access to government largesse, in such a way that these 
temporary arrangements do not disturb the rule of law. The problem is that his argument moves 
from this world of administration to the world of law. To reiterate, Chatterjee argues that 
“political society, operating under conditions of electoral democracy in India, affords the 
possibility of inviting the arbitrary power of government to mitigate the potentially tyrannical 
power of the law.” The reverse, too, can happen once his argument is carried through to law: the 
possibility now arises of inviting the arbitrary power of law to mitigate the potentially tyrannical 
power of the government. And this is exactly what PIL does, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 3. It 
invokes the arbitrary new populist powers of the law courts to mitigate the populist powers of 
political society. PIL might have arisen as a populist partner to Mrs Gandhi’s politics, but the 
huge powers such populism lent it have enabled it to emerge as a bulwark against political 
society. It is important perhaps to keep in mind the specificity of this new mutant beast of 
judicial populism, and the differences between it and the classic populism of political society.  
The larger question however is: can there be any normative critique possible of the Indian 
political present, without succumbing to a negative comparison with a global norm? Should we 
valorise the present and in fact make it normative, just because the new forms of politics depart 





different and happening in India? Postcolonial political theory has to have a critical relationship 
with postcolonial political practice. What the language of such critique should be, is a difficult 
question. It certainly cannot be the lack of its approximation to a global norm. For instance, one 
cannot criticise the Indian Supreme Court based on an adverse comparison with the US Supreme 
Court. But I would be wary of any attempt to impart any normativity to the practice and 
popularity of PIL, for example, just because it departs from Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. As 
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